Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

Chicago Consumer Attorneys Who Assist in Stopping Debt Collector Abuse

May 29, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

The National Association of Consumer Advocates provides the following advice about Debt Collector Abuse:

Debt Collection Abuse (FDCPA)

In spite of federal and state legislation, debt collectors continue to abuse consumers in order to unfairly pressure them into paying debts. These abuse tactics are often intended to scare or intimidate consumers, sometime with threats of violence or arrest. Other debt collectors will try to pile on illegal interest or fees to make the debt seem larger that it actually is. In some instances, these debts are time-barred, discharged in bankruptcy, or not owed for other reasons.

Mutual Fund Owners May Not Sue Over Excessive Fees, Seventh Circuit Rules

May 28, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

In a mutual fund’s shareholder dispute, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on May 19 that an investment advisor’s fiduciary duty to shareholders does not require that the advisor’s fees be “reasonable” by any legal definition. In Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 07-1624 (7th Cir. 2008), the circuit affirmed a summary-judgment ruling in favor of the mutual fund manager by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

Three shareholders in the Oakmark complex of mutual funds sued the fund’s advisor, Harris Associates, contending that the fees they paid toward Harris’s compensation were too high. The bulk of the opinion (which the majority called “the main event”) concerned section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, an amendment to the 1940 act added in 1970. That law gives investment advisors at registered investment companies a fiduciary duty to shareholders with regard to any compensation they or their affiliates receive. However, said the Seventh Circuit, “a fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation…. Section 36(b) does not say that fees must be ‘reasonable’ in relation to a judicially created standard. It says instead that the adviser has a fiduciary duty.” The court goes on to note that fiduciary duty is well-defined in trust law and does not foreclose an advisor’s ability to negotiate for compensation.

In doing so, the court disapproved caselaw from Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). That case requires that “[t]o be guilty of a violation of §36(b) . . . the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”

Seventh Circuit Finds No Duty to Defend For Liability Insurer When Liability Based on Intentional Wrongs

May 27, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

In an insurance contract dispute, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled April 23 that a liability insurer has no duty to defend a village from litigation alleging intentional misconduct, but not negligence. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Village of Franklin Park, No. 06-2924 (7th Cir. 4/23/2008) is a contract dispute between an insurer and an Illinois township accused in separate litigation of severely underfunding its mandatory firefighters’ pension fund.

Under Illinois state law, municipalities must establish and administer pension funds for their firefighters. Firefighters in Franklin Park sued under that law, alleging that the village had intentionally underfunded their pension fund for more than 30 years. After the suit was filed in state court in January of 2002, the village asked its liability insurer, St. Paul, to defend it under a policy that covered disputes over employee benefits plans. The insurer declined, and the village disputed this, but did not sue. In late 2004, St. Paul filed in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend the village. In March of 2006, the district court granted that judgment, ruling that St. Paul’s contract created a duty to defend against negligence, not the intentional wrongdoing alleged by the firefighters. The village appealed both the judgment and the denial of a motion to reconsider. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In its opinion, the three-judge panel agreed with St. Paul that the firefighters’ allegations were not a “loss” under the meaning of the policy, pointing to caselaw that distinguishes between loss and money that was illegally or unethically withheld from its rightful owner.

Illinois Blocked-Crossing Law Is Preempted, State Supreme Court Rules

May 26, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Until recently, under the Illinois Vehicle code (625 ILCS 5/18c–7402(1)(b)), trains that blocked any road crossing for more than 10 minutes were subject to traffic tickets. That law was overturned in January when the state Supreme Court ruled that the blocked-crossing law violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act (FRSA). The opinion in Eagle Marine Industries, Inc. v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 102462 (January 2008), a business dispute, reversed a preliminary injunction against Union Pacific issued by a circuit court in Sauget, near St. Louis, and upheld by an appeals court. It relies on the same court’s decision earlier that month in The Village of Mundelein v. Wisconsin Central Railroad, 103543 (January 2008), which upheld an appellate court’s decision to vacate a large fine against the railroad.

In Mundelein, the village issued a $14,000 fine to Wisconsin Central under a local ordinance that prohibited a train blocking a highway-grade crossing for more than 10 minutes unless it had broken down or was continuously moving. The Wisconsin Central train blocked such a crossing for 157 minutes. At the ensuing trial, the court rejected the argument that the FRSA preempted the local law. However, that decision was reversed on appeal.

The Illinois Supreme Court agreed, saying that Mundelein’s ordinance, which is based on Illinois’ state law, interfered too much with the FRSA. Because Eagle Marine relied on the state law, the court said, it had to decide that case in the same way as Mundelein. Thus, the Illinois blocked-crossing provision and any local laws based on it were preempted by FRSA and therefore void.

Midwest Insurers Have Duty to Defend in Junk Fax Class-Action Suits

May 25, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

The Illinois Supreme Court handed a victory to plaintiffs throughout Illinois with its 2006 ruling in an insurance dispute over whether insurers must cover the costs of a junk fax class action lawsuit for an insured covered for an “advertising injury.” In Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Swiderski Electronics, Inc., 2006 Ill. LEXIS 1655, the state Supreme Court ruled that business insurers have a duty to defend “junk fax” class action lawsuits.

The underlying dispute in the Illinois Supreme Court case started when private investigator Ernie Rizzo filed a proposed class action lawsuit against Swiderski Electronics for sending him “junk faxes.” Unsolicited advertisements sent via fax violate both the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Swiderski had an insurance policy from Valley Forge Insurance Company, which insured Swiderski against a personal or advertising injury that arises out of “Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person’s right of privacy[.]” The insurer claimed that because the faxes had not revealed Rizzo’s own personal information, they did not invade his privacy and thus were not covered. They also claimed that sending information via fax does not constitute publication.

The insurer asked a trial court for a declaratory judgment stating it was not obligated to cover Swiderski; all parties filed cross-motions seeking summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of Swiderski, as did the appellate court and, eventually, the Illinois Supreme Court. That court rejected Valley Forge’s arguments, rejecting the claim that faxing is not “publication,” using the plain meaning of the word. It also ruled that privacy under the federal TCPA and caselaw includes the right to be left alone:

Bond Filing Absolutely Must Precede Attachment Order Under Illinois Attachment Act, Appeals Court Rules

May 24, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

In a business fraud lawsuit pitting a bank against its security vendor, the Illinois Appellate Court for the 1st District ruled May 1 that an attachment order must be voided under the Illinois Attachment Act if plaintiffs fail to file an attachment bond beforehand. In ABN Amro Services Company, Inc. v. Navarrete Industries, Inc., No. 1-07-0089 (Ill. App. 2008), the appeals court voided such an order and remanded it to the trial court.

The case arose from alleged fraud by INS, which provided security for multiple Chicago-area La Salle Bank branches. A fraud investigator discovered that Armando Navarrete of INS was fraudulently overbilling the banks by an alleged $15.9 million, then paying kickbacks to the banks’ vice president for security, George Konjuch. The bank filed a lawsuit in September of 2006 against INS, Konjuch, Navarrete and another INS employee, alleging fraud, civil conspiracy and constructive trust, plus breach of fiduciary duty against Konjuch. (Konjuch and Navarrete have since been indicted by a federal grand jury for the scheme.)

At the same time, plaintiffs asked for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction and an order of statutory prejudgment attachment, all of which were attempts to keep the alleged conspirators from absconding with the money. Upon receiving notice of these filings, defendants immediately filed motions to void the restraining order and the prejudgment attachment. After hearings, the trial court dissolved the restraining order and denied the preliminary injunction, but declined to vacate the attachment order. Both sides appealed.

Federal Judicial Center’s “Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges” is an Excellent Research Tool for Class Action Lawyers and Judges

May 24, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

The Federal Judicial Center’s “Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges” is an excellent research tool for class action lawyers and judges. The Manual covers in a very informative and useful manner many of the basic issues that come up in class-actions. By covering the judge’s perspective it helps class action attorneys prepare the issues in a manner that will persuade the Court. To review the Manual click on this link Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges.

Seventh Rules Credit Must Be Firm, But Not Valuable Under FCRA

May 24, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

The Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion limiting class-action lawsuits regarding “firm offers of credit” under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. In Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Services, 2008 WL 1701839 (7th Cir. April 16, 2008), the Seventh Circuit also limited the scope of its 2004 decision in Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2004). In that decision, the court said that when companies offer “a token line of credit” along with consumer goods, that credit offer must have value to the customer.

Among the issues addressed by the court are:

* Under Cole, an offer of credit entangled with an offer of merchandise must be valuable. However, Cole does not apply to “pure offers of credit” not entangled with another offer. The FCRA requires only that an offer of credit be firm, not that it be valuable to most or all of its recipients.

Tolling Agreement Supersedes Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice Case

May 23, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

The Illinois Appellate Court for the 1st District ruled May 7 that a legal malpractice class action against the law firm DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary could not go on because it was filed well after a tolling agreement ended. In Joyce v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary LLP, 1-07-1966 (Ill.App. May 7, 2008), the court upheld the dismissal of a purported class action by stockholders of 21st Century Telecom Group, a Chicago telephone company, pursuant to a tolling agreement between 21st Century and DLA Piper.

The underlying dispute started in 1999, when 21st Century agreed to merge with competitor RCN. DLA Piper attorneys drafted a merger agreement with a mistake that lowered the price of the stock 21st Century shareholders were to receive by $19 million. In response, Edward Joyce, the stockholders’ representative, made a tolling agreement with DLA Piper, in which the statute of limitations was tolled unless a stockholder lawsuit was filed against the firm on or before December 31, 2002. The firm agreed not to avail itself of any statute of limitations defense until after that day. This agreement was amended four times, each time altering only the date. The last agreement set that date at August 21, 2005.

Joyce filed a legal malpractice class action in Cook County against DLA Piper on August 30, 2006. After some procedural disputes, including a finding by the trial court that the filing was timely, the firm won a motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s lack of standing as a non-client. The plaintiffs appealed and the defendant cross-appealed on the trial court’s decision that the suit was timely.

The Chicago Consumer Attorneys at Lubin Austermuehle Win Precedent In Hotel Billing Fraud Case

May 23, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Our firm obtained a favorable verdict in a consumer fraud case with Terrill v. Oakbrook Hilton Suites & Garden Inn 788 NE2d 789 (2nd Dist 2003). In that case, our client, Cathy Terrill, was overcharged for a hotel room; her bill contained a charge for “taxes” that included an undisclosed non-tax charge for security services. This case was part of a set of class actions in Du Page County from 2000 to 2007 (Oakbrook Terrance Hotel Overcharge Class Actions), all of which alleged that hotels misled and overcharged their customers by including non-tax charges as “taxes” on their bills.

In Terrill, the Oakbrook Terrace Hilton moved for summary judgment at the trial court, claiming the Hotel Operators Occupation Tax Act (35 ILCS 145/3(f)) and Illinois Supreme Court precedent barred Terrill’s suit. The trial judge denied that motion and the hotel appealed. It claimed that because the security fees paid for extra security from Oakbrook Terrace law enforcement — a local government entity with the power to collect taxes — it had already paid the extra money to the state Department of Revenue and could not be sued.

The Illinois Second District Court of Appeal rejected that argument, calling it “untenable at best”: