DiTommaso Lubin’s Chicago business trial lawyers have more than two and half decades of experience helping business clients on unraveling complex business fraud and breach of fiduciary duty cases. Our Chicago business law attorneys work with skilled forensic accountants and certified fraud examiners to help recover monies missappropriated from our clients. Our Chicago business, commercial, and class-action litigation lawyers represent individuals, family businesses and enterprises of all sizes in a variety of legal disputes, including disputes among partners and shareholders as well as lawsuits between businesses and and consumer rights, auto fraud, and wage claim individual and class action cases. In every case, our goal is to resolve disputes as quickly and sucessfully as possible, helping business clients protect their investements and get back to business as usual. From offices in Oak Brook, near Wheaton and Naperville, our Chicago business lawyers serve clients throughout Illinois and the Midwest.

If you’re facing a business or class-action lawsuit, or the possibility of one, and you’d like to discuss how the experienced Illinois business dispute attorneys at DiTommaso Lubin can help, we would like to hear from you. To set up a consultation with one of our Chicago and Woodstock business trial attorneys and class action and consumer trial lawyers, please call us toll-free at 630-333-0333 or contact us through the Internet.

The Wall Street Journal reports that Hilton settled a corporate espionage suit brought against it by Starwood.

Hilton hired two former Starwood executives who allegedly stole over 100,000 documents belonging to Starwook outlining many of Starwood’s key marketing plans and ideas for liefstyle chains such as W. Hilton settled the case for an unspecified cash payment along with an agreement banning it from starting a luxury lifestyle chain for two years.

The article concludes that by settling now, Hilton avoids having to deal with the ban on developing a lifestyle luxury hotel chain once the economy heats up again:

In a case that presented questions very interesting to our Chicago arbitration and mediation attorneys, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has ruled that standing to arbitrate is not an issue that should itself be submitted to arbitration. In Equistar Chemicals, LP v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company of Connecticut, No. 4-07-0478 (Ill. 4th 2008), Hartford, an insurance company, sought to hold Equistar responsible for damage to a turbine generator owned by Hartford’s insured, Trigen-Cinergy Solutions of Tuscola. Trigen had signed a contract with Equistar that included an arbitration clause, and Hartford filed a demand for arbitration of its claim as a subrogee of Trigen. In court, Equistar moved to stay arbitration until Hartford’s standing to invoke arbitration could be determined. That court denied the stay, saying standing should be determined by arbitrators.

Equistar has an ethanol plant in Tuscola, Ill. It hired Trigen to provide energy, water and wastewater treatment at the plant, and their contract included an arbitration agreement. Later, an Equistar employee allegedly acted negligently with a circuit breaker, causing an electrical arc that damaged a turbine generator belonging to Trigen. Hartford, as the insurer to Trigen, paid $853,442 to repair the damage, then filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. It requested the $853,442 in damages from Equistar, by virtue of its subrogee relationship with Trigen. Equistar responded by objecting in Illinois trial court to Hartford’s standing, the jurisdiction of arbitrators and the arbitrability of the claim. It later filed a motion to stay arbitration until, among other things, standing could be determined. The trial court denied that motion, concluding that Hartford had standing as a subrogee, but that standing can be determined in arbitration.

Equistar filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing that the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act requires the court, not private arbitrators, to decide questions of standing. It quoted at length from the Act: “…if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised[.] … On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. That issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if found for the moving party.” Under this language, the Fourth said it’s clear that the Act requires courts to make the initial determination of whether parties have agreed to arbitrate. In this case, it added, there was no reason to delay things by sending the question to arbitration, since arbitrators would have no special skill in determining whether Hartford had standing to invoke arbitration.

In determining otherwise, the trial court had relied on language in the parties’ arbitration agreement saying “the decision of the arbitrators (including the decision that the dispute is arbitrable) shall be final and binding upon the parties[.]” The trial court had written that this language leads logically to the conclusion that arbitrators make determinations of arbitrability and the courts shall have no role. The Fourth disagreed, writing instead that this language only clarifies how much authority arbitrators should have; it does not expand their authority. Parties are free to give arbitrators that authority, the court wrote, but they can and should explicitly say so.

The Fourth next looked at the issue of Hartford’s standing as a subrogee — an issue of first impression in Illinois. Equistar argued that Hartford, as Trigen’s subrogee, cannot compel arbitration because it was not a party to the arbitration agreement. Their agreement did not explicitly include subrogees, assignees or other third parties, and in fact explicitly said the parties did not have the right to incur obligations to third parties on behalf of the other, or commit the other party to a contract. Hartford countered that its right to arbitration comes through subrogation law, not the contract, making this language irrelevant. Illinois caselaw in Ervin v. Nokia, Inc., 349 Ill. App. 3d 508, 512, 812 N.E.2d 534, 539 (2004) defines contract-based theories that can bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement, but subrogation is not among them. Two cases from other states have come to different conclusions on the issue, the court noted. And Illinois subrogation law puts the subrogee (in this case, Hartford) directly into the shoes of the subroger (Trigen).

Ultimately, the Fourth decided that Hartford should have the same rights and obligations as Trigen. That means Hartford does not merely have a right to arbitrate, the court wrote — it is required to do so under Trigen’s contract. Thus, it upheld the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to stay arbitration. This meant affirming the decision as a whole, even though it noted that it disagreed with the trial court that arbitrators should determine standing.

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The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected a contractual ban on class actions by Insignt in a case regarding a mass shut down of consumer internet services

The Court held a class action “is often the only economically viable legal procedure” to address a large volume of very small claims, the court said in an opinion issued Thursday. For that reason, it said, a ban on class actions like the one in Insight’s contract “may effectively shield a company from liability for unlawful activity.” In the Insight case, consumers were seeking refunds on $40 bills and absent a class action that would not able to retain a lawyer to act as a private Attorney General to vindicate their rights and those of the other victims.

The Court provided this example:

Our Illinois alternative dispute resolution lawyers noted an opinion from the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversing a trial court that declined to compel arbitration. In Hollingshead v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 1-09-0067 (Ill. 5th Jan. 22, 2009), the court ruled there simply was not enough evidence to support the trial court’s decision to deny to compel arbitration. The case pits Carol Hollingshead, independent administrator of the estate of Selma Elliott, against Elliott’s investment company and Leonard Suess, an investment advisor there and Elliott’s son-in-law. Hollingshead sued the defendants for various causes of action related to financial mismanagement, but defendants moved to compel arbitration under several contracts related to the investment accounts. The trial court denied this motion without an explanation or an evidentiary hearing.

Elliott passed away in 2003 at the age of 101. During her lifetime, she had an account at A.G. Edwards, managed by Suess. Her power of attorney was granted to her daughter, Judy Suess, at the time of her death, so that Judy Suess could manage Elliott’s affairs. Those affairs included 11,000 shares of stock in the pharmaceutical company Merck, which had a value of $985,000 in 2001. Around 1994, defendants used that value to open up a margin account and buy other stock. Unfortunately, the value of her portfolio dropped significantly and the defendants began selling off the Merck stock to cover margin calls. Plaintiff claims this triggered tax liabilities that could easily have been avoided if the sale had happened after Elliott’s death. She sued them for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and negligence.

However, Elliott had signed three contracts with Edwards before her death and Judy Suess as power of attorney had signed another, and all of them had an arbitration agreement. Defendants moved to dismiss the case and compel arbitration on this basis. The trial court heard arguments that did not get into the record on appeal, then denied the motion without comment. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. They argued that the contracts are the only evidence in the record and clearly apply to the lawsuit. The plaintiff argued in response that the arbitration agreements are substantively and procedurally unconscionable and the product of undue influence, all of which make them unenforceable. Defendants responded that this is a question for an arbitrator to decide.

The Fifth started with this last issue. It did not agree. Under caselaw, arbitrability is an issue for the courts unless the parties have specifically agreed otherwise, it wrote. The plaintiff is not challenging the validity of the contracts as a whole — indeed, she is relying on them in the breach of contract count.

Next, the court examined the plaintiffs’ arguments to invalidate the arbitration agreements. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration agreements are enforceable except “on such grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” This includes the plaintiff’s claims of unconscionability and undue influence. However, the court found that generally, there was no support in the record for the plaintiff’s arguments. To support the claims of unconscionability, the plaintiff made allegations in her complaint about Elliott’s age and the relationship between her and the Suesses, but did not provide any evidence, the court said. Nor do the allegations in the complaint, even if taken as true, support those defenses, it added. Under caselaw, advanced age is not enough in itself to show that a person is incapable of signing contracts, the court noted, and there is nothing per se procedurally unconscionable about having a relative for a broker.

Similarly, the Fifth found no evidence in the record to support the undue influence claim, aside from unsubstantiated claims about the familial relationship between Elliott and the Suesses. The plaintiff also made claims for substantive unconscionability, saying the $1,575 cost of arbitration is too high and the forum is biased. Again, the Fifth found, these claims are not supported by sufficient evidence in the record. It also dismissed a claim that waiving judicial review is inherently unconscionable, noting that this is directly contradicted by the FAA. For those reasons, the Fifth found that the trial court should not have declined to compel arbitration without an evidentiary hearing. It reversed that decision and remanded it to the trial court for further proceedings — including an evidentiary hearing, the Fifth said, if the plaintiff requests one.

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A fine balance exists between consumer laws which the government believes protect consumers from scams and interfering with the free market and access to justice. Credit repair organizations which take money in advance can perform a valuable service to help consumers get refinancing but many unscrupulous credit repair outfits simply charge a large fee in advance and then deliver little or no service. Federal law and many state laws forbid credit repair outfits to take money in advance but exempt lawyers. Our firm has prosecuted and defended class actions and Attorney General actions involving credit repair outfits who take money in advance.

Due to so many credit repair scams in that state for mortgage foreclosure modification services California passed a law forbidding lawyers for taking money in advance for foreclosure services, the New York Times reports.

The article states:

Supreme Court Case Tests Bans On Class-Action Suits November 09, 2010 … class action could bring potentially millions of dollars for all those consumers improperly charged. But the cell phone contract barred class actions

By Nina Totenberg

Our Oak Park, Illinois consumer rights private law firm handles individual and class action predatory lending, unfair debt collection, lemon law and other consumer fraud cases that government agencies and public interest law firms such as the Illinois Attorney General may not pursue. Class action lawsuits our law firm has been involved in or spear-headed have led to substantial awards totalling over a million dollars to organizations including the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumer Law Center, and local law school consumer programs. The Chicago consumer rights attorneys at DiTommaso Lubin are proud of our achievements in assisting national and local consumer rights organizations obtain the funds needed to ensure that consumers are protected and informed of their rights. By standing up to consumer fraud and consumer rip-offs, and in the right case filing consumer protection lawsuits and class-actions you too can help ensure that other consumers’ rights are protected from consumer rip-offs and unscrupulous or dishonest practices.

 

USA Today reports that companies in order to save money in this economic downturn are treating employees as “independent contractors” in name even though the employer is controlling all aspects of their employment in order to skirt federal and state wage and overtime laws and to avoid paying withholdings. If an employer controls all aspects of a worker’s terms of employment it cannot legally call them indepedent contractors and avoid the requirments of wage laws.

The article reports that this practice is growing and that lawsuits and government actions to prevent it are also on the rise. The article states:

Companies are increasingly using contractors to meet peaks in demand and complete short-term projects. The trend intensified in the recession as firms cut staff. The portion of contingent workers in the labor force is up to about 10% from 8% five years ago, Asin says.

Using these contingent workers cuts labor costs about 30%, Labor says, as employers avoid paying unemployment taxes, workers’ compensation, health care and other benefits.

About 62% of employers said at least some of their workers are misclassified, according to a September survey by SIA. Labor estimates misclassification cut federal revenue by $3.4 billion in 2010. The practice is common in construction, trucking and home health care.

The question of whether workers should be labeled employees or contractors largely hinges on whether employers control their activities. A report last week by the National Employment Law Project concluded port trucking firms misclassify most of their workers.

To read this article in full click here.

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Elizabeth Warren the head of the new Federal Consumer Protection Agency sat down with Michelle Singletary the Washington Post to explain the first goal of the new agency. Warren told Singletary the the Ageny’s first initiative would be to ensure that banks and finance companies compete on an even playing field on the interest rates and other terms they offer consumers rather than hiding those terms in a thicket of legalese. If pricing for financial products is clearly disclosed then more consumers will know what they are purchasing and will not get caught unawares by a teaser loan rate that suddently spikes making it impossible for them to pay their mortage or credit card bills. This will also encourage that banks and finance companies begin to compete more on pricing.

The article states:

But right now, Warren says her focus is on helping consumers understand how much they are paying for debt on everything from credit cards to mortgages. At a recent conference held by the Consumer Federation of America, Warren said the bureau’s initial goal isn’t to impose a series of “thou-shalt-not rules.” Instead, she said that first on the agenda is providing consumers with better and shorter credit disclosures. Although this goal may sound so simple, it has the potential to greatly reduce the financial burden for people, because they don’t fully comprehend how much their debt is really going to cost them. “There are a lot of financial institutions that make their money by keeping products confusing so the price isn’t clear until it’s way too late,” Warren told me. “They make money by concealing risk, which means that people can’t compare the products head to head.”

 

Our Oak Brook, Ill. shareholder dispute attorneys and Chicago business law lawyers took note of a recent appeals court decision in a heavily disputed case involving a family business. In Santella v. Kolton and Food Groupie Inc., Nos. 1-08-1329, 08-1357 & 08-1847 consolidated (Ill. 1st July 31, 2009), Rick Santella accused his sister, Mary Kolton, and her husband William of undermining the family’s business to enrich themselves once they became majority shareholders. The business is Food Groupie, Inc., which markets and sells use of anthropomorphic food characters and educational products that promote healthy eating. According to Santella, the intellectual property is the collective work of the family.

When Food Groupie was originally formed in 1987, Santella held a 35% interest; Mary and William Kolton held 25% each; and a non-party, their brother Ron Santella, held 15%. All four were named directors. In 1988, the plaintiff bought Ron Santella’s interest, giving him a 50% interest in the corporation to match the Koltons’ combined 50%. Shortly afterward, plaintiff transferred 1% of his interest to Mary Kolton, with the understanding that William Kolton would transfer his 25% to Mary, giving her a majority 51% interest with the idea that Food Groupie would be more successful if it was known as a woman-owned company. In exchange for this transfer, Santella claims, the parties executed an agreement that company decisions would be made only by a unanimous vote.

The business ran without incident until 2002. During that time, Santella claims Food Groupie made a profit each year between 1992 and 2001 and the three shareholders always unanimously approved compensation. But in 2002, Santella alleges that the Koltons called a shareholders’ meeting without him or Ron Santella, and gave themselves salary increases, bonuses and 401(k) contributions. This cost Food Groupie a total of 45% of gross company sales, despite a profit that year of only $15,000. The alleged ruse was repeated in 2003 and 2004. As a result, Santella claims, he was paid only one dividend of $1,470 during that time, rather than the $28,808 he believes he was entitled to as a 49% shareholder.

When he confronted his sister about this in 2003, he says she froze him out of the business decisions, changed the locks on the office and was interested only in buying him out. He further claims she usurped Food Groupie’s intellectual property by trademarking characters in her own name, and inappropriately licensed the company’s intellectual property without his consent. Finally, he claims the Koltons held a secret shareholder meeting in 2004 at which they voted to replace him with William’s brother, Anthony Kolton. He sued the Koltons, individually and as a shareholder derivative claim, for breach of the shareholder agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, usurpation of corporate opportunities and violations of the Illinois Business Corporations Act.

In 2005, that lawsuit resulted in the court’s appointment of John Ashendon as custodian of Food Groupie. In 2008, Santella filed an emergency motion to stop what he claimed was his sister’s plan to liquidate the company and move its misappropriated intellectual property to a similar business called Healthypalooza. He also alleged that the couple had continued to pay themselves inappropriately high salaries and commissions, and use the company’s profits for their personal legal defense. He sought to remove the Koltons as officers and enjoin them from using the company’s assets or competing with it, among other things. The court eventually found for Santella on some issues, removing the Koltons and ordering them to return the $144,019 in commissions they had been paid in 2005, 2005 and 2007. It said the court would appoint new officers and directors. It did not say any of these remedies were interlocutory or time limited.

The Koltons filed an interlocutory appeal in 2008, but failed to move to stay the repayment order or actually repay the $144,019. The trial court found them in contempt and ordered them to pay a fine for every day they were late. They eventually paid back the $144,019, but not the roughly $20,000 or so in fines.

On appeal, the Koltons argued that the relief granted to Santella was not supported by sufficient evidence or proof. Specifically, they argued that the Business Corporations Act requires a plaintiff like Santella to prove his claims of improper conduct before the court may order return of the allegedly improper bonuses or their removal as corporate officers. For that reason, they said, the court orders must be reversed. Santella made several arguments against the appeal, most notably that the appeals court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the non-financial claims. The defendants filed their appeal pursuant to Rule 307(a)(1), which applies to appeals concerning injunctions, and Santella argued that the trial court’s orders removing and replacing directors and officers were not injunctions.

The First agreed with this, saying it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those orders because they were not direct orders to the Koltons “to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing.” In fact, it took the analysis a step further and examined whether it had jurisdiction over the repayment order. That order was an injunction, the First wrote, but it also must be interlocutory to fall under Rule 307(a)(1). If it was a permanent order, it was outside the scope of the rule. The appeals court found that it was a permanent order, because it did not preserve the status quo. In fact, the court noted, the trial judge had specifically said so when she made her contempt ruling. The trial court had also made conclusions about the rights of the parties and had not time-limited the order. For those reasons, the First found that it also lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the repayment order, and dismissed the appeal entirely. The opinion noted that appellants may still seek a finding from the trial court under Rule 304(a).

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