Most Americans are aware that what we eat has a large impact on our health, both short term and long term. Not least among these is the fact that diet plays a major role in heart disease. In order to ensure that they are making the best possible decisions at the grocery store, many Americans rely on information from the American Heart Association (AHA) in order to provide them with the necessary guidelines. To facilitate this, the AHA marks certain processed foods with a Heart Check mark in order to notify consumers that this particular food follows the guidelines as set out by the AHA.

However, according to the allegations in a recent lawsuit against the AHA and Campbell Soup Co., the Heart Check mark can be misleading. The lawsuit alleges that the AHA collects fees from “manufacturers of unhealthy, processed foods” in return for the manufacturer being granted the right to put the Heart Check mark on their products. However, according to the lawsuit, Campbell’s “Healthy Request” soups allegedly do not meet the AHA’s “non-commercial nutritional guidelines” most notably for sodium. Instead, the lawsuit alleges, the foods bearing the Heart Check mark meet the lower standards of the federal Food and Drug Administration. This could potentially cause problems for many consumers since high sodium consumption has long been association with high blood pressure and heart disease.

The lawsuit alleges that this practice is “unfair, deceptive and misleading” because it “causes consumers to overpay for Campbell’s AHA-certified soups, but also presents substantial health risks to all consumers, including the more than five million American consumers suffering from congestive heart failure”.

According to the lawsuit, Campbell Soup gets to charge customers more for its Healthy Request Products than it does for its other products, while the AHA collects between $5,200 and $17,500 per product each year. So the arrangement is of financial benefit to both Campbell Soup and the AHA while allegedly being detrimental to both the budget and the health of consumers.

The lawsuit alleges that a single serving of Campbell’s AHA-certified soups have “nearly three times the amount of sodium permitted by the AHA’s noncommercial nutritional guidelines, while a full can contains between six and seven times that amount.” Food manufacturers often play with their serving sizes in order to make their food fit nutritional guidelines. The AHA Heart Check mark has allegedly appeared on 97 different Campbell products ranging from soups to juices, breads, and sauces.

Carla Burigatto, Campbell’s director of external communications, has released a statement saying that “Campbell has complete confidence in the accuracy of our labels and our marketing communications and that they meet regulatory and other legal requirements”.

The American Heart Association has likewise denied the allegations of the lawsuit, saying that its “food certification program regularly conducts laboratory testing to verify that products earning the Heart Check mark meet our nutritional criteria”. They are careful to point out that these criteria “are more stringent that those of the Food and Drug Administration.” The AHA also insisted that the revenue from the Heart Check fees “is only sufficient for the program’s product testing, public information and program operating expenses.”

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When a person feels that they have been wronged and seeks redress, there is sometimes debate as to which person or entity is really responsible. In a recent case against Getty Images (US) Inc., the judge agreed that the defendant had been wronged, not by the company being sued.

Marshall Thompson is the only surviving original member of the Chi-Lites, a rhythm-and-blues group from Chicago. Thompson filed a lawsuit against Getty Images for allegedly profiting from his likeness without having first obtained his permission.

The U.S. District judge, Matthew F. Kennelly, dismissed the lawsuit but he did give Thompson a few days to file an amended complaint.

In the original complaint, Thompson alleges that Getty Images violated the Illinois Right of Publicity Act (IRPA), which prohibits the use of an individual’s identity without that person’s written permission. According to the complaint, Getty Images violated the IRPA when it posted several images of Thompson online and offered to license them to customers.

In his written opinion on the case, Judge Kennelly pointed out that Getty Images’ website stated that the pictures of Thompson were to be licensed “for editorial use only”. Such a restriction would require customers who obtained licenses for the pictures to also obtain the appropriate rights and clearances before using the images for commercial purposes.

Such language absolves Getty Images from responsibility if one of its customers used the pictures for commercial purposes without first obtaining Thompson’s written permission to do so. In his opinion, Judge Kennelly maintains that, according to “Thompson’s theory, liability would attach to a photographer who licensed his photograph to a publication that then printed the photograph for a commercial purpose”. The judge concluded that this “is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute, as it would extend liability much too far and chill speech protected by the First Amendment.” This is an example of the fact that, when considering whether or not a law has been breached, judges must also take into account how their decision might impact other laws and statutes already in existence.

Judge Kennelly further rejected the argument that Getty Images had violated IRPA by using the photos to promote the sale of a product (that product being the photos themselves) without Thompson’s permission. Judge Kennelly concluded that IRPA only extended so far as to prohibit the use of a person’s image to promote another product. However he ruled promoting the sale of the photograph itself is not covered under IRPA.

In his written opinion, Kennelly noted a similar case in which a stock photography library had used the image of the late musician, James Brown, to sell a product. Brown’s estate had then stated a claim under IRPA and the Illinois Appellate Court had sided with the estate. Judge Kennelly admits that the decision reached by the court in that case was “arguably contrary” to his own ruling. However, he also noted that he found the Illinois Appellate Court’s ruling “unpersuasive” and believed that, should the case get so far, the Illinois Supreme Court would agree with his view of the law.

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This blog has already discussed new litigation and recent cases regarding non-compete agreements. It may already be obvious that more and more of these cases are being decided in favor of the defendants. Another such case has recently had its time in court and, once again, the defendant came out on top.

In the lawsuit, Dr. William Yates went to work for Bosley Medical Group, a hair replacement clinic in Illinois’s Cook County. When he began working for them as an independent contractor in 2005, Dr. Yates had no apparent experience with hair restoration. According to his employment agreement, Bosley was to invest in teaching Dr. Yates the “highly specialized practice of hair restoration”. According to the complaint, Bosley invested more than $200,000 in Yates’s training. In 2012, Dr. Yates went to work for Ziering Medical, a rival hair replacement clinic located in DuPage County.

The crux of the case rested on the matter of geography. Apparently, as it is written, the non-compete agreement could have been interpreted two ways: 1) that the non-compete was limited to Cook County, or 2) that Dr. Yates could not work for a rival of Bosley’s anywhere in the United States, Canada, or Mexico. Paragraph 32 of the non-compete agreement states that, after termination of his employment with Bosley, “[F]or a period of two years thereafter, [Dr. Yates and WDY] shall not directly or indirectly compete with BMG or any of its affiliates … in hair restoration, including but not limited to hair transplantation and scalp reduction and related procedures, within the geographic marketing areas of [Bosley and its affiliates], namely any county (or counties, as defined below), in which [Bosley or its affiliates] then maintains an office.”

In their arguments, the attorneys for Bosley chose the interpretation which focused on counties. Although Dr. Yates was not technically worked in Cook County after he left Bosley, the plaintiffs argued that he was competing for clients in the Chicago area and that Ziering Medical advertises in Cook County. According to Bosley’s argument, advertising in Cook County was sufficient to violate the non-compete agreement. The Court rejected this argument, stating that

“Paragraph 32 of the Agreement does not prohibit Dr. Yates from providing hair restoration services in DuPage County. Bosley is located in Chicago. The Agreement is clear that this bars Dr. Yates from competing with Bosely in Cook County only. … Bosley’s allegation of breach of Paragraph 32 of the Agreement is based solely on advertising by Ziering in the Chicago Tribune and on its website. Such advertisements are not a breach of Paragraph 32.”

When Bosley pointed out that he should have the right to protect his investment in Yates’s training, the Court agreed with him, but only up to a point. In the end, it all came back to geography and the Court determined that the non-compete had not been violated. The Court stated in its Decision that “Bosley does not allege that Dr. Yates has directly or indirectly provided hair restoration services in Cook County. Bosley could have also barred competition in the counties surrounding Cook County as it did for other metropolitan areas where it maintains surgical offices, but did not do so. Bosley also could have barred marketing to prospective customers in Cook County by Dr. Yates, but did not do so by the language of Paragraph 32. Bosley is asking this court to construe Paragraph 32 liberally in favor of restraint but this court is required to construe Paragraph 32 narrowly in favor of natural rights.”

The Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss with prejudice.

You can view the full opinion of the court’s decision here
.

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Non-compete agreements have become fairly common, especially for those working in the technology field. Many companies are afraid that their employees will leave and take trade secrets and/or customers to their competitors. To prevent this from occurring, most employers require their employees to sign non-compete agreements as a condition of employment. Other times employers will sometimes have an employee sign such an agreement after she has already started working for the company, but in certain states, that requires some sort of additional compensation for the employee, such as a bonus, in order to make it binding. A non-compete agreement usually states that an employee will not work for any of the company’s competitors within a certain time frame after their employment with the company has ended. The time frame is generally for a year or two and there is normally a geographical component as well, most often prohibiting the employee from working for a competitor in the same state or county as the company.

Employees often sign these agreements thinking that they have no choice if they want the job. Or maybe they can’t think of a reason they would leave their current employer to work for a competitor. The latter plan might work out just fine for some people but for others, particularly in this economy, all it takes is a downsizing and suddenly these happy employees find themselves without a job and working for a competitor may be their only option.

While more and more courts lately have been siding with the defendants in lawsuits regarding non-compete agreements, many employees are still hesitant to leave their current employer. The idea of a lawsuit can be intimidating, especially knowing that lawsuits can be expensive and the company has much greater resources at their disposal than the employee to devote to fighting a legal battle. It’s also a sensitive area because, when a non-compete agreement is violated, the new employer is often also listed as a defendant. An employee trying to find work will not want to get their new employer in trouble. At the very least, the prospect of getting sued will make them a less desirable candidate to the new employer.

There are ways around these non-compete agreements and discussing options with a non-compete attorney is a great place to start. Many non-compete attorneys will tell you that the first step is always to talk to the current or former employer to see if they can adjust the non-compete agreement to create narrower definitions. Ideally, the result would still protect the employer while giving the employee the freedom she needs to make a living. Many companies aren’t even aware of how their own non-compete agreements are drafted. All they know is that they don’t want their employees to up and leave and take a bunch of the company’s hard-won customers or confidential information with them.

The non-compete agreement is supposed to prevent that but sometimes the agreement has been broadened to a point where it makes it almost impossible for the employee to find work. When working with a company that is at all reasonable, finding a middle ground is may be possible, sometimes with the help of an attorney to assist you. In any case, when trying to get around a non-compete agreement, it is better to be proactive by discussing it with your current or former employer before making a commitment to the new employer. You can also retain an attorney to review the agreement to determine if it is enforceable as sometimes it may be drafted too broadly or there may be a lack of adequate compensation rendering the agreement unenforceable.

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While scientists have gathered convincing evidence to support the theory of global warming, many remain skeptical. Where the skeptics might find themselves in trouble is when they allegedly wrongly accuse scientists of manipulating data to reach false conclusions. Such is the case with scientist Michael Mann and National Review, which ran an article last summer accusing Mann of implementing fraud in his research.

Mann was one of a group of researchers that developed the climate change model known as the “hockey stick graph”. This graph shows a dramatic rise in global temperature at the end of the last millennium. Many of those who refuse to believe that climate change is real have criticized Mann and his work. Several investigations have been conducted over the years into Mann’s research methods. They have all cleared him of any wrongdoing.

These investigations, though, were not enough for the author of the National Review Article, which drew comparisons between Mann and former assistant football coach, Jerry Sandusky, who was convicted of child molestation. The article questioned the validity of a particular investigation by Penn State which cleared Mann of any wrongdoing. According to the article, the University’s investigation of Sandusky’s conduct and the investigation of Mann’s research methods both took place under former Penn State President Graham Spanier. The article quoted a July 13 post from the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s blog, which said that Mann “could be said to be the Jerry Sandusky of climate science, except that instead of molesting children, he has molested and tortured data in the service of politicized science.”

The defendants argued that the statements were opinion and rhetorical hyperbole and therefore protected under the Constitution’s First Amendment. They filed a motion to dismiss under strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). SLAPP is a District of Columbia law which bars plaintiffs from filing lawsuits against plaintiffs with the aim of intimidating them into silence by burdening them with the cost of legal defense until they abandon their criticism. Most SLAPP plaintiffs do not expect to win their cases, hoping instead to achieve their goals through intimidation, mounting legal costs, or simple exhaustion before the case advances very far.

District of Columbia Superior Court Judge Natalia Combs Greene denied the motions to dismiss, having found that the article’s statements crossed the line from opinion to factual assertions. At this stage of the proceedings, Judge Combs Greene allowed that the criticism of Mann’s work may be fair but that is not currently the issue. The issue is whether or not Mann has a valid complaint against the defendants and, since they presented their statements as facts, rather than opinions, Mann has the right to defend his reputation in a court of law. According to the judge’s written statement, “there is a strong probability that the [National Review] Defendants disregarded the falsity of their statements and did so with reckless disregard.

In another recent case reviewed by our Chicago libel lawyers, in the District of Columbia’s Court of Appeals, the appellate court issued an order which found that the anti-SLAPP statute didn’t provide for interlocutory review. This means that National Review cannot appeal the judge’s decision to deny their motion to dismiss. The next stage of the case is discovery.

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Many people file libel lawsuits simply in retaliation against those who acted or spoke out against them. For this reason, once a libel lawsuit has been filed, the first thing the court does under Illinois new SLAPP statute, if the speech at issue involves petitioning the government, is give the defendant a chance to prove that the lawsuit is simply retaliatory and without merit.

Such was recently the case in a lawsuit between two lawyers, one the former employer of the other. The defendant, Clinton Krislov, is the sole shareholder of Krislov & Associates and former employer of Robert J. Stein. Stein worked for Krislov’s firm from 1994 to 2001 before going to work for a new firm. The new firm happened to be one of three firms representing the plaintiffs in a motion for class certification in an unrelated class action lawsuit.

One of the requirements for attaining class certification is proof that the attorneys representing the plaintiffs are competent in class action lawsuits. In order to prove this, attorneys frequently list their history and qualifications as part of the motion for class certification. Krislov happened upon this motion for class certification while conducting unrelated research and took interest in the section describing Stein’s legal experience. In June 2005, Krislov sent a letter to the judge in the case, claiming that Stein’s statements referring to his experience were

“simply misstatements, known to the filers to be untrue.”

The judge then contacted Stein and his fellow attorneys in the case and provided them with a copy of Krislov’s letter. Stein responded by disputing Krislov’s claims and providing documentation to support his experience. Krislov then sent a letter to the judge in reply to Stein’s letter and Stein filed an amended complaint against Krislov, alleging libel and libel per se. Stein also alleged that Krislov owed him vacation and bonus pay from when he had worked as an employee of Krislov & Associates. Krislov argued that the letter to the judge had been privileged information and, initially, the trial court agreed and dismissed the libel lawsuit.

Stein moved to reconsider though, and the trial court reversed its decision. Krislov filed another motion to reconsider, but the court held firm this time. In its decision, the court found that only communication which called into question professional acts could be considered privileged. As it is, the court argued that, “[a]bsolute privileges must be narrowly construed, and where an attorney has injected himself into litigation with which he has absolutely no connection, we do not find that any kind of absolute privilege exists’ and that Krislov had absolutely no duty under the Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct to report misconduct elsewhere.”

Krislov then filed another motion to reconsider, arguing that he was immune to the libel lawsuit under the Citizen Participation Act (CPA). The CPA was designed to prevent Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP). SLAPP lawsuits are lawsuits without merit which are filed by the plaintiff without any intention of winning the case. Rather, the aim is to distract or discourage defendants from participating in behavior which the plaintiff might view as threatening. SLAPP lawsuits are known for sucking time and resources from the defendants and from the courts so it is in everyone’s best interest to stop them at an early stage.

The court agreed with Krislov’s motion to reconsider on these grounds and awarded almost $100,000 to Krislov for attorney fees and costs. Stein filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that Krislov’s actions were not protected under the CPA and that the court should have considered the libel claims separately from the wage claims. The court disagreed and Stein appealed the decision.

The appellate court looked first at the question of whether the letter sent from Krislov to the judge was privileged. Communications between lawyers about other lawyers may be privileged in certain instances, particularly since lawyers have a duty to report unethical behavior of other lawyers when they are aware of it. Actions which lawyers undertake to report these actions are protected from legal retaliation but the appellate court found that the unsigned letter that Krislov sent to the judge did not qualify for this protection. The court cited Restatement of Second Torts in its decision, pointing out that

“An attorney of law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or the institution of, or during the course and as part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel.”

Since Krislov was not in any way involved the case at issue, he is ineligible for this protection.

The court then considered the CPA claims. A defendant filing under the CPA is responsible for proving that the lawsuit has no merit and is merely a retaliatory move. According to the appellate court, Krislov failed to do this. Instead, the court acknowledged both the legitimacy of the libel lawsuit as well as wage allegations. The court remanded the case.

You can view the Appellate Court’s opinion here.

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Healix and HHI compete in the business of infusion therapy services: administration of substances such as pharmaceuticals intravenously or by any method other than ingestion. Some medical care providers offer these services to patients in their offices. Healix and HHI provide support.

In 2007 Healix recruited the Clinic as a new customer. The Clinic had two members: Keller, a physician, and Porter, a nurse practitioner. Under their five-year contract, Healix would provide services after the Clinic built an in-office pharmacy and hired staff to work there. The Clinic was responsible for the cost of construction. Healix required Keller and Porter to execute personal guarantees and took a security interest in accounts receivable. Four months after signing the contract, the Clinic notified Healix that it would not fulfill its responsibilities.

The Clinic was in breach, but Healix did not sue. One month later, the Clinic entered into a contract with HHI. Healix learned of the new contract and sued HHI for copyright and trademark infringement and for tortious interference with a contract.

The intellectual property claims were dismissed. After a trial, the district judge rejected the tortious-interference claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding lack of causation because the evidence indicated that the Clinic would have “walked away” regardless of HHI’s actions.

The Seventh Circuit in addressing the failure to prove fact of damage from the tortious interference held:

In any event, the case can be disposed of on another ground. Keller held a majority membership interest in the Clinic. The district judge assumed that this entitled him to decisionmaking power, and Healix does not dispute this finding. Keller testified that the Clinic would have breached
the Healix contract regardless of HHI’s involvement, be-­‐‑ cause securing financing for the in-­‐‑office pharmacy would have been impossible. The district judge found Keller’s statements to be credible. Healix does not challenge this finding, and it is enough to dispose of Healix’s claim.

You can view the opinion here.

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The old cliché of a journalist who will do anything for a story might not be too far from the truth if the claims in this case which caused this CBS reporter are in fact true. Such appeared to be the case for Amy Jacobsen when cameras caught her in a bikini at the house of a person of interest in a major case.

In April 2007, Lisa Stebic disappeared. She and her husband, Craig Stebic, were in the process of getting divorced when Lisa failed to show up to pick up her children, then 10 and 12 years old, from school. After she disappeared, friends and neighbors claimed that Lisa had been inquiring about a domestic violence shelter. She reportedly told one friend, “If anything ever happened to me, look towards Craig.”

After Lisa disappeared, neighbors of Craig Stebic’s house were told by a media consultant to have video cameras aimed at the house at all times in case they should catch anything suspicious. It was one of these neighbors who turned the video of Jacobsen and her children in bathing suits at Craig’s house.

According to Jacobsen, she was driving to the local swim club with her two sons on July 6, 2007, when she got a call from Jill Webb, Craig’s sister. Webb reportedly said she was upset about some of the network coverage of the case and asked Jacobsen if she would talk about the case with her at Craig’s home. Jacobsen said she agreed after Webb told her she could bring her children with her.

A few days later, CBS aired footage of Jacobsen and her children enjoying what looked like a pool party at Craig Stebic’s house. On July 12, Stebic was named a person of interest in his wife’s disappearance.

If Jacobsen is the type of reporter who will do anything for a scoop — a claim she denies in her libel suit –, it appears to have worked. She is one of only two reporters that Craig talked to during the investigation.

After the footage aired, Jacobsen was fired from her position as a reporter at NBC. One year later, Jacobsen filed a libel lawsuit seeking more than $1 million from CBS and the neighbor who shot the video of her at Stebic’s house.

In February 2009, a Cook County judge allowed four counts of defamation to be considered by the courts. Judge Elizabeth Budzinski determined that “the CBS newscaster presented the footage with statement made in the form of insinuations and questions regarding Jacobsen’s activities while at the Stebic home”. Such insinuations and questions, Budzinski wrote in her ruling, “suggest that Jacobsen used improper methods in cultivating sources and obtaining stories.”

A different judge however, Judge Jeffrey Lawrence, has recently dismissed the lawsuit, saying that the parts of the CBS report that Jacobsen complained about are “constitutionally protected expressions of opinion.” Additionally, Lawrence argued that Jacobsen and her attorneys did not provide sufficient evidence that the content in the CBS report was fabricated.

It is not time for CBS to relax yet, though. Jacobsen is intent on an appeal. Her attorney, Kathleen Zellner, said that they “had always figured there would be an appeal before this went to trial because there are too many issues.” Zellner went on to say that the appeal will rest on her argument that Jacobsen was not a public figure at the time that CBS aired the story and that Judge Lawrence’s explanation contradicts a ruling that a prior judge made earlier in the case.

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An appellate court in Illinois reversed a lower court ruling dismissing a defamation lawsuit brought by an associate professor at Northwestern University. Mauvais-Jarvis v. Wong, et al, Nos. 1-12-0070, 1-12-0237 cons., slip op. (Ill. App. 1st Dist., Mar. 28, 2013). The plaintiff claimed that the defendants committed libel against him in emails and other correspondence exchanged in the course of an internal investigation into data presented by the plaintiff for publication. The trial court dismissed all defamation claims, holding that the statements in question were subject to an absolute privilege because the defendants were investigating “suspected research misconduct.” Id. at 2. The appellate court accepted the plaintiff’s argument that the statements are only protected by a qualified privilege, and that the defendants had not established in their motion to dismiss that the privilege should apply.

The plaintiff, Franck Mauvais-Jarvis, is an associate professor of medicine at Northwestern University and the research director of the school’s Comprehensive Center on Obesity. Part of his research is funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The court gives a comprehensive overview of HHS’ policies on “research misconduct,” which includes fabrication, falsification, or manipulation of data and research materials, as well as plagiarism. Id. at 4. Northwestern maintains an Office of Research Integrity (ORI) based on HHS regulations, which conducts reviews of alleged research misconduct.

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