A St Louis news station reports:

A class-action lawsuit was filed this week in St. Louis Circuit Court on behalf of former and current nurses and medical personnel employed by BJC Healthcare System …

The lawsuit, Speraneo v. BJC Health System Inc., d/b/a BJC Healthcare, accuses BJC of failing to properly pay employees through its recording policies and failing to pay overtime for employees working more than 40 hours per week. BJC’s timekeeping rounds down to the nearest quarter hour even though exact times employees clocked into work are electronically documented.

BJC is also accused of automatically deducting time for meal breaks even though some employees, such as nurses, work through their break time and are not compensated.

You can view the lawsuit here.

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In recent years, courts have largely been ruling against employers in cases of disputed non-compete agreements. A non-compete agreement is a provision in an employment agreement which states that the employee, after leaving the employer, will not compete with the employer for business within a certain time frame and a certain geographical radius of the employer. Such provisions are intended to protect the employer but many of them have lately begun to stretch the bounds of what is reasonable, making it increasingly difficult for the employee to find another job.

In one such dispute over a non-compete agreement, John Malyevac signed an employment agreement with Assurance Data, which included a non-compete provision. The provision stated that, after termination with the company, Malyevac would not compete with Assurance Data within a fifty-mile radius of its headquarters for a duration of “twelve (12) [sic] after the date of termination.” After Malyevac left his employment with Assurance Data and went to work for another company, Assurance Data sued Malyevac for alleged breach of employment contract.

Malyevac filed a demurrer to the complaint, saying that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A demurrer, also known in most courts as a motion to dismiss, is when the defendant asks the court to dismiss the case based solely on the allegations given in the complaint, rather than the actual facts. Malyevac also claimed that the non-compete agreement was too broad and therefore unenforceable. For example, he pointed out, the provision of prohibiting the employee from soliciting for customers for “twelve (12) [sic] after the date of termination” does not say whether that applies to days, weeks, months, or years. Six to twelve months is a common duration for these types of agreements, but without specifically saying so in the agreement, it would be difficult for a court to uphold.

Assurance Data argued that the court could not decide how enforceable the non-compete agreement is on demurrer, because doing so would deny the company the opportunity to present evidence that the restraints of the agreement are reasonable and necessary to protect its legitimate business interests. The Fairfax County Circuit Court ruled in favor of Malyevac and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Assurance Data appealed the ruling.

The Virginia Supreme Court, however, disagreed, saying that the enforceability of non-compete agreements must be determined on a case-by-case basis “balancing the provisions of the contract with the circumstances of the businesses and employees involved.” The court agreed with Assurance Data that, in cases of disputed non-compete agreements, it is the responsibility of the employer to provide evidence that the scope of the agreement is no more than that which is necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of the employer. Such a determination can only be made after considering three elements of the non-compete agreement: 1) how the agreement would restrict the employee’s job functions; 2) the geographic scope of the restriction; and 3) the duration of the restriction.

The ruling is significant for both employers and employees. Although the current court ruling is in favor of the employer, such favor is conditional upon the employer’s ability to provide sufficient evidence that the scope of its non-compete provision was indeed necessary to protect its business interests. Employers may want to take extra care in the future to ensure that their non-compete provisions cover only what is necessary to protect them and no more. The ruling is also significant for employees who may want to take a closer look at their employment agreements before signing.

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The issue of ground contamination is an extremely important one for homeowners. With the collapse of the housing market, many people have already found that their homes are worth far less than what they paid or still owe on them. If there has been any kind of chemical leak in the area, homeowners may find themselves with property that can’t sell at all, no matter how low they drop the price.

Such might be the case due to Shell Oil Company allegedly contaminating private property near its refinery in Roxana, IL. The lead plaintiff, Jeana Parko, filed the lawsuit on behalf of herself and her neighbors, alleging that they suffered lower values on their property as a direct result of benzene leaking into the ground and other carcinogenic chemical releases caused by the refinery. The leaks were allegedly caused by broken pipelines in the refinery itself, resulting in more than 200,000 pounds of pure benzene being released directly into the ground. The lawsuit was originally filed in Madison County Court in April 2012, but has since been moved to federal court.

U.S. District Judge G. Patrick Murphy has agreed to certify the class, although Shell argued that the owners of the estimated 387 plots of land at issue should be forced to litigate individually. Defendants often argue for individual litigation over class action lawsuits because the awards of individual litigation are likely to be much lower and the plaintiffs are less likely to sue on their own. The pressure of a certified class is also more likely to induce the defendant to settle the case outside of court.

Judge Murphy did not agree with Shell’s arguments for denying the class certification. In his decision, he wrote, “The question of whether hazardous petroleum byproduct pervades village property and of whether defendants are complicit in any resultant damage are best suited to class-wide resolution”. He also points out that to have each of the almost 400 plaintiffs file their own individual lawsuits would create a “redundant and unnecessary strain on the dockets of multiple justices” without doing anything to increase the “accuracy of the resolution”.
Derek Brandt is a shareholder of Simmons, Browder, Gianaris, Angelides & Barnerd, the law firm representing the plaintiffs in the case. Brandt argues that the class certification will be beneficial to both the plaintiffs and the defendants. “It gives authority to the defendant, so that no one later can come back and ask ‘what about me?’ All of the plaintiffs would be included in whoever is in the class,” says Brandt. “It also gives the plaintiffs an advantage because they can proceed in mass.”

Earlier in the case, Shell attempted to have the class action lawsuit stayed or dismissed due to two other similar cases they are facing which are still pending in Madison County. These attempts were unsuccessful and the case is now preparing to go to trial.
In addition to Shell Oil Company, the defendants in the lawsuit include Equilon Enterprises dba Shell Oil Products, US, ConocoPhillips Company, WRB Refining LP, ConocoPhillips WRB Partner and Cenovus GPCO.

Simmons is also representing the Village of Roxana in a similar lawsuit against Shell Oil Co.

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While many people grumble about paying the exorbitant ATM fees that are being charged these days, few people know that there may be legal recourse. Until recently, the Electric Funds Transfer Act required ATMs charging a fee to provide two notices to customers: one notice in a sticker on the ATM, and another notice on the screen during the transaction. The Act has since been amended so that only the onscreen notification is required. However, during the time that both notices were required, Kore of Indiana Enterprise allegedly failed to provide one of these notices on two ATMs that they owned.

Kore owned ATMs in two bars in Indianapolis, which are allegedly popular with college students. Kore allegedly failed to post a notice that it charges a fee for each use of the ATMs. David Hughes sued Kore on behalf of himself and everyone who had used the ATMs during the time that the Electric Funds Transfer Act required two notices of an ATM fee. The lower court denied his motion for certification for class status, and Hughes appealed.

A plaintiff in an individual suit of this kind is entitled to actual damages or to statutory damages of anywhere from $100 to $1000. In the case of a class action lawsuit, the amount of damages is left to the discretion of the judge but cannot exceed $500,000 or 1 percent of the defendant’s worth, whichever is smaller. If the plaintiffs are successful, it is also the judge’s responsibility to award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” which the defendant would also pay.

In this class action lawsuit, the limit to the damages would be $10,000, since that is 1 percent of Kore’s worth. In the time period that this case covers, there were more than 2800 transactions at the two ATMs. The damages for a class action would this be at most $3.57 per transaction. If each class member only engaged in one transaction, that would leave 2800 class members who are each entitled to no more than $3.57.

The district judge decertified the class for two reasons, the first reason being that the class members would do better to bring individual suits, since they are entitled to at least $100 in an individual lawsuit. The $100 to $1000 range for statutory damages appears to be per suit rather than per transaction. However, individual lawsuits of this kind are unlikely to make it to court since $100 is such a small reward to sue for.

The judge’s second reason for decertifying the class was that the requirement of providing notice to class members could not be satisfied since the ATMs do not store user names. They track each transmission with a 10-digit identification number. The first six digits identify the user’s bank while the last four identify the user. To attach names to these numbers would require subpoenaing each bank that is identified. Since these ATMs were used largely by college students, this could involve subpoenaing hundreds of banks from students’ home towns.

Since distributing $3.57 to each class member would provide no real relief to the plaintiffs, the best solution, according to the appellate court, may be a “cy pres” decree. This is when the money the plaintiffs are awarded in a case goes to a charity whose work coincides with the interest of the class. In this case, the money could be given to a foundation that deals with consumer protection. Such a foundation could do much more with $10,000 than each class member could do with $3.57. Another purpose of a cy pres is to prevent the defendant who violated a statute or otherwise engaged in wrongdoing from getting away without punishment when distribution of the award to the class members is unlikely.

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision refusing to certify the class and remanded the case for further proceedings.

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Arbitration provisions are appearing in more and more contracts lately, in everything from employment contracts to consumer contracts. With increasing frequency, companies are looking to block employees and consumers access to the courts, in the event that they have a complaint against the company.

In a recent class action lawsuit, Ganley Chevrolet and Ganley Automotive Stores, tried to force a consumer class action lawsuit against them into arbitration. The courts, on the other hand, have agreed that the dealership group’s sales agreement was “incomplete and misleading” and therefore unenforceable.

The dispute began in March 2001 when Jeffrey and Stacy Felix purchased a 2000 Chevy Blazer. Ganley allegedly told the Felixes that they were approved for 0.0% financing but that the offer would expire that evening. They agreed and traded in their van as part of the deal. Ganley allegedly insisted that they take the new car home with them. A few days later though. Ganley told the couple that the bank would approve only 1.9% financing, which they accepted. After having the car for more than a month, the Felixes were told that the bank had decided not to approve the 1.9% financing but that Ganley had found another bank which would give them a loan with a 9.44% financing rate. The Felixes refused to sign a new agreement at such a high rate. They kept the vehicle though, and have been putting money in escrow to purchase it.

Meanwhile, they filed a lawsuit against Ganley Chevrolet and Ganley Automotive Stores alleging “bait and switch tactics.” This is a practice in which a dealer will offer goods at one low price to get the customer interested, then suddenly raise the price at the last minute. It is also a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales and Practices Act. The lawsuit further alleges misrepresentation and emotional distress. It includes individual claims as well as class action claims and challenges the validity of the arbitration provision in the sales agreement.

The lower court judge found the arbitration provision to be “ambiguous and misleading” and therefore rejected Ganley’s request for arbitration and approved class action status on behalf of all consumers whose sales agreement with any Ganley store had the same provision from June 1999 until the company changed the provision in 2007. The judge also awarded $200 in damages to each of the “thousands of members” of the certified class.

Ganley appealed the decision and the case went to the Ohio Court of Appeals which upheld the class certification in a 2-1 decision. The court found that class action status in this case was appropriate under the consumer protection law. The one dissenting judge agreed that, Ganley’s use of the arbitration provision might be an “unfair or deceptive practice” that would justify individual lawsuits in court. However, he argued that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for class action status and such was his reason for dissent.

In order to qualify for class action status, the plaintiffs must meet certain criteria. These criteria include: 1) an identifiable class must exist, and its definition must be clear; 2) the named plaintiff representatives must be members of the class; 3) the class must be large enough to make joining all of the members practicable; 4) the class must have in common questions of law or fact; 5) the claims or defenses of the representatives must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 6) the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Ganley argues that the trial court should not have certified the class because the class definition and time period are too broad and ambiguous. Ganley also argued that the commonality, predominance, and typicality prerequisites to class certification had not been met. The Court of Appeals disagreed and upheld the lower court’s ruling.

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The Seventh Circuit has affirmed most of a district court ruling involving an Illinois partnership dispute involving claims for fraud, excessive partnership distributions and fraud in a trademark application for a corporate logo. The cases highlights that partnership disputes can result in very time consumer and expensive litigation when there is no clear-cut written partnership agreement. In this case, the victorious defendants were awarded substantial attorneys fees.

The case arose out of the following facts. Three individuals Swift, Schaltenbrand, and Siddle joined together as partners to operate a mail-order pharmacy, divide the profits from that business, and eventually sell the book of customers to another pharmacy. After some initial success, the partners began taking profit distributions that far exceeded the partnership’s profits and according to the Seventh Circuit did not square with any formula. All of the partners according to the Seventh Circuit’s description of the facts seemed pleased to strip the enterprise of monies and to even take out loans to do that:

Soon after the partnership started gaining steam, however, the partners began exploiting their informal arrangement for personal gain. Swift, Siddle, and Schaltenbrand repeatedly requested andreceived) profit distributions that far exceeded the amounts to which they were entitled under the agreement.
Despite the fact that the partnership was a money‐losing  enterprise,  the  partners  continually found the funds for distributions. For example,
evidence presented to the court indicated that, from 2005 to 2009,
the partnership operated at a net loss of over$400,000. During this same period,
however, Swift, Schaltenbrand, and Siddle received  nearly  $4  million  in  combined distributions.

Swift even persuaded Schaltenbrand to take out loans to facilitate
these unjustified  payments  to  the  partners.  For  his part, Swift concealed his excessive demands (which he knew had
no  basis  in  the  actual  profitability  of  the  partnership) commingling them with DeliverMed’s requests for  cost reimbursements.
Swift and Schaltenbrand each became aware of  the  other’s  excessive
distributions, but neither of them cared. So long as each
partner was able to obtain his own unjustified share of
partnership funds, no one made a fuss.
However, when a dispute erupted between the partners
Swift sued Schaltenbrand and Siddle claiming that
they had taken more money than the allegedly
agreed upon percentages and that he was therefore
entitled to larger distributions and owed money.

The district court listened to 14 days of testimony before ruling in favor Schaltenbrand and Siddle holding that Swift never properly included fraud claims, wasn’t a credible witness and couldn’t support his damages claims for greater distributions with evidence of a contract setting the agreed upon percentages. The court also invalidated a copyright registration that Swift’s marketing company obtained for a logo used by the partnership, finding that Swift knowingly misrepresented a material fact in the application to register a copyright in the logo.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that Swift did not prove Schaltenbrand and Siddle breached any obligation to provide him with a certain percentage of the distributions or even that such an obligation or contract to provide set percentages existed. The Seventh Circuit also found Swift waived fraud claims by failing to include them in the final pretrial order. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred by invalidating the copyright registration without first consulting the Register of Copyrights as to the significance of the inaccurate information. The Copyright Act requires courts to perform this “curious procedure” before invalidating a registration based on a fraud on the Copyright Office. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case so that Register could be notified and the issue decided based on the requirements of the statute.

You can view the entire opinion here.

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NPR reports:

An Australian record label may have picked a fight with the wrong guy. The label sent a standard takedown notice threatening to sue after YouTube computers spotted its music in a video. It turns out that video was posted by one of the most famous copyright attorneys in the world, and Lawrence Lessig is suing back. … Lessig is suing Liberation Music because he wants labels to stop relying on automated systems to send out takedown notices, he says.

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Whenever consumers use credit cards, merchants pay swipe fees, which are typically passed along to all consumers in the form of higher prices. American consumers pay the highest swipe fees in the world—eight times those paid by Europeans. These fees, which amount to about $50 billion annually, are highly regressive: low-income and minority cash customers end up subsidizing high-income credit customers. Unfortunately, most consumers don’t know about the fees. And even those who do typically can’t do anything about them.

Merchants are, however, permitted to charge different prices to consumers who pay with credit versus cash, which would give consumers the option to choose a lower-cost payment method in exchange for lower prices. The credit-card lobby has long fought to stop merchants from being able to implement such dual pricing. Under state laws adopted at the industry’s behest, the price difference must be described as a “discount” for cash, not a “surcharge” for credit—even though they’re mathematically identical. In New York, a merchant who uses the wrong word could face criminal prosecution.

A number of New York businesses filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the New York state law forbidding merchants from imposing a “surcharge” on any customer who pays with a credit card. Along with the Friedman Law Group, we represent five New York merchants: a hair salon, an ice-cream parlor, a liquor store, a martial-arts academy, and an outdoor furniture store. The suit, filed in federal court in Manhattan, was assigned to U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff.

The main claim is that New York’s law violates businesses’ constitutional right to free speech and that New York state is thus seeking to enforce the credit-card industry’s preferred speech code. Merchants, we contend, should be able to use whatever words are most effective to inform their customers about the high cost of using credit cards, and consumers have a right to receive that communication.

United States District Judge Jed Rakoff issued a lengthy and well reasoned opinion agreeing with the challenge in all respects. The Court held that the law violates the First Amendment and is void for vagueness. The opinion provides a detailed analysis of not only the constitutional arguments, but also the behavioral economics of no-surcharge rules and their regressive economic effect that harms consumers and results in significantly higher prices.

The beginning of the opinion states:

Alice in Wonderland has nothing on section 518 of the New York General Business Law. Under the most plausible interpretation of that section, if a vendor is willing to sell a product for $100 cash but charges $102 when the purchaser pays with a credit card, the vendor risks prosecution if it tells the purchaser that the vendor is adding a 2% surcharge because the credit card companies charge the vendor a 2% “swipe fee.” But if, instead, the vendor tells the purchaser that its regular price for the product is $102, but that it is willing to give the purchaser a $2 discount if the purchaser pays cash, compliance with section 518 is achieved. As discussed below, this virtually incomprehensible distinction between what a vendor can and cannot tell its customers offends the First Amendment and renders section 518 unconstitutional.

You can view the opinion here.

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