Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

Although renters usually expect to pay through the owner of the property for utilities, they usually only expect to do so if it is specifically included in the lease. According to a recent class action lawsuit against Regus PLC and its subsidiaries, the company allegedly charged fees to its renters for kitchen amenities, use of the telephones, telecom handsets, and internet activation and access.

According to the complaint, each plaintiff was provided with an “Office Agreement” which listed the location of the office, the duration of the client’s entitlement to the office, the amount of the “Initial Payment”, the amount of the security deposit, and the monthly payment from that point forward. The agreement allegedly did not “disclose any goods, services, penalties, and/or taxes for which Regus assesses charges and the amounts or methods of calculation of Regus’ charges associated with such goods, services, penalties, and/or taxes.”

However, once the plaintiffs received their bills, they found charges for things which were never mentioned in the lease. These charges included “amounts for one or more of the following …: i) ‘Kitchen Amenities Fee;’ ii) ‘Telephone Lines;’ iii) ‘Telecom Handset;’ iv) ‘Local Telephone;’ v) Internet activation and access charges; vi) taxes; and vii) penalties”. The lawsuit refers to these charges collectively as the “Unauthorized Charges”. Because of these Unauthorized Charges, the monthly payments made by clients was regularly in excess of what the Office Agreement had provided. However, if clients failed to pay these extra charges, they were allegedly subjected to penalties by Regus.

The lawsuit further alleges that Regus had clients make payment via an automated system in which the charges were automatically applied to the clients’ debit card or credit card. This meant that customers frequently got charged by Regus before even seeing a bill or having a chance to dispute the charges.

According to the complaint that was filed, Regus is also guilty of false advertising. Contrary to the experiences of the plaintiffs, the advertisements that Regus put on its website included the following:

“With Regus, you only pay for what you need when you need it”; “No up front capital expenditure required”; and “Flexible terms and one-page agreements.”
The complaint alleges that the additional fees the plaintiffs were charged directly contradict, not only the leases which were signed by the plaintiffs, but also the advertisements provided by Regus. For example, regarding the kitchen amenities, the lawsuit alleges that “Regus assessed a $30 per person monthly charge to Plaintiff … in excess of the monthly office payment amount indicated in the Office Agreement. Neither Regus’s practice of assessing this charge nor the amount of the charge is disclosed in the Office Agreement or the Fine Print. The charge was assessed regardless of whether any kitchen amenities were used.”

As far as the use of the telecom handset for which some plaintiffs were charged, the complaint alleges that

“the retail value of the two handsets provided by Regus does not exceed $99.00, yet Regus charged … a total of $222.75 (including purported taxes) per month for the use of the handsets during the term of the Office Agreement.”

The lawsuit seeks to bring a class action which would include everyone who had an Office Agreement or similar agreement for one of Regus’s locations in California and who paid one or more of the Unauthorized Charges between May 8, 2008 and the time that the complaint was filed. The lawsuit is also petitioning for a second New York class which would consist of similarly situated renters in the state of New York. The plaintiffs are currently unaware of just how many people qualify to participate in the classes, but they believe that each class could consist of more than 100 members.

You can view the complaint in the lawsuit here
.

Continue reading ›

When the Supreme Court agrees to hear a case, the decision that the Court reaches in that case can have long-standing consequences for future rulings in similar cases made by courts all over the country. In recent years, class action lawsuits have been particularly contentious in the courts. In order to attain class certification, a class of plaintiffs is generally required to fulfill four requirements:

1. The class must be large enough to justify combining all of the claims into one lawsuit, generally, this means at least 100 class members;
2. The class must have questions of law or fact in common;
3. The claims of the representative parties must be sufficiently similar to the claims of the rest of the class; and
4. The representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Despite these clear requirements, various courts have ruled to certify classes of plaintiffs while other courts have denied certification based on a lack of ability to fulfill the above requirements.
Securities class actions in particular have faced an increasing number of challenges in recent years, leaving shareholders who have been the victims of fraud with little or not outlet for redress.

Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund

In this case, investors filed a lawsuit against the publicly traded energy company by claiming that it misled them about key information, including its liability in a recent asbestos investigation. The investors allege that such misinformation affected the company’s stock prices and ultimately harmed the company’s shareholders.

Halliburton is challenging the Supreme Court’s decision in 1988 in Basic v. Levinson, in which the Court determined the fraud-on-the-market theory, which has been the basis for most securities class actions ever since. The theory states that, when a public company makes a misrepresentation in an efficient market, that misinformation is carried through the market and affects the company’s stock price. An investor purchasing a security is thus presumed to have relied on that misinformation. However, the concept of an efficient market, while largely uncontested in the 1980s, has since come under scrutiny and has recently been questioned by some of the current justices of the Supreme Court. If the Court overturns its decision in Basic v. Levinson, each class member will have to prove that they relied on the misinformation when purchasing or selling company stock.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys fear that such a requirement will render class certification for such cases nearly impossible. Some of them have claimed that it could have consequences beyond just securities class actions. Consumer class actions, for example, might also be affected.

The “Washing Machine” Cases

Two separate consumer class actions alleging defective washing machines have made their way through the court system and are currently being petitioned to be heard by the Supreme Court. The defendants in the lawsuit, Whirlpool Corp, and Sears Roebuck & Co., are asking the Supreme Court to overrule the decisions made by lower courts to certify classes of consumers. The plaintiffs against Whirlpool allege that 21 different models of the company’s high-efficiency, front-loading Duet clothes washers sold since 2001 have a design defect that results in mold.
Both Whirlpool and Sears argue that the classes fail to meet the predominancy requirements of class certification and that most of the class members were not harmed.

If the Supreme Court agrees to hear the case and rules in favor of the defendants, the decision could have serious consequences on all issue-based class actions. It has the potential to severely limit consumers’ ability to bring their grievances against a company.

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA)

While rulings made by the Supreme Court can sometimes mean drastic changes in the law, it also frequently means simply clarifying older laws. For example, the SLUSA was enacted in 1998 as a way to prevent shareholders from evading the pleading standards of federal litigation by filing suit in state court, whose pleading standards are usually less rigorous. Specifically, SLUSA prohibits state-based suites alleging fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale” of covered securities.

The current lawsuit arose when investors bought securities which were not covered under SLUSA directly, but were certificates of deposits which were backed by SLUSA-covered securities.

When Robert Allen Standford’s $7 billion Ponzi scheme was revealed to the public, the shareholders filed a class action lawsuit alleging fraud. The law firms Proskaur Rose LLP and Chadbourne & Parke LLP were included as defendants in the lawsuit for allegedly aiding the Ponzi scheme.

A Texas federal judge ruled that the investors’ claims were precluded by SLUSA. The decision was appealed and went to the Fifth Circuit Court, which found that the claims were only “tangentially related” to SLUSA-covered securities trades. The attorneys representing the law firms are appealing the decision, arguing that the Fifth Circuit Court’s decision allows plaintiffs to avoid SLUSA.

If the Supreme Court decides to rule in favor of the defendants, the result could have far-reaching implications on shareholders’ ability to file claims.

Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.

Consumers who have suffered as a result of fraud are not the only ones capable of bringing a lawsuit against a company for violating consumer rights. State attorneys general also have the option of bringing a lawsuit to recover damages on behalf of consumers. These are known as parens patriae cases. At issue in this lawsuit is whether a parens patriae case in which the attorney general is seeking to represent 100 or more consumers should be treated as a class action.

Mississippi’s attorney general, Jim Hood, filed a lawsuit against a group of electronics companies for allegedly fixing the price of liquid crystal display panels.
If the Supreme Court rules that parens patriae lawsuits count as class actions, it could give defendants the option of moving such cases to federal court. If the Court rules that these lawsuits cannot be treated as class actions, then the state attorneys’ general can keep them in their home courts, which are often more disposed to be favorable to the attorney general.

Carrera v. Bayer Corp. et al.

This lawsuit was filed against Bayer by a consumer who alleges that the pharmaceutical company engaged in deceptive practices by claiming that its One-A-Day WeightSmart could enhance metabolism. Since Bayer does not sell its products directly to consumers, the company has no records of who purchased the vitamin. The defendants therefore claim that the class cannot be certified because the plaintiffs have no way of finding every single class member, despite such a limitation never having been a requirement for class action certification.
The district court certified the class, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision, saying that the difficulty in determining consumers who belong to the class rendered it ineligible for certification.

If the Supreme Court agrees to hear the case and makes a ruling in line with that of the Third Circuit Court, the decision could affect consumers’ ability to file claims. The plaintiffs in the case also argue that such a decision could encourage companies like Bayer not to keep a record of customer purchases.

Continue reading ›

When class actions are filed, courts need to consider all aspects of the class before determining whether or not it can be certified. This includes whether class members from other states have claims similar enough to the class members of one state, particularly in cases where the lawsuit is filed under a state law. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently handled a case in which the status of the class was disputed for this reason.

Gwendolyn Phillips was sued by Asset Acceptance, LLC for some outstanding debt that she still had with the company. However, Phillips argued that the lawsuit was invalid because the statute of limitations on the debt had already passed.

Few debtors are aware that a statute of limitations on their debt exists. Even those who do know frequently find that it is cheaper and easier to simply settle the debt rather than try to fight it in court. To try and mitigate these effects, Phillips moved to certify a class action of plaintiffs consisting of debtors who have been sued by Asset Acceptance for debts resulting from the sale of natural gas who have been sued after the statute of limitations has expired. According to the records currently available, the class that Phillips is proposing can consist of as many as 793 members if they all choose to participate. 343 of which are eligible to file claims in the state of Illinois.

Which Illinois statute of limitations applies to this was case disputed between the parties. One statute gives four years as the limitation while the other statute gives five. Phillips claims that the applicable statute is the one that lasts for four years while Asset insists that the five-year statute is the proper one. Regardless, Asset sued Phillips more than five years after her debt had accrued.

The district court ruled that, because Phillips had been sued by Asset after five years, she was an inadequate representative for members of the class who had been sued after only four years. The court therefore shrunk the eligible class members down to less than thirty members, which the judge ruled was too small to justify the numerosity requirement of a class action. The judge therefore dismissed Phillips’s motion for class certification.

Phillips appealed the decision and the case went to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate court rejected the lower court’s reasoning that the difference of one year was sufficient to disqualify Phillips as an adequate representative. Rather, the appellate court found that Phillips had no ulterior motive for insisting that the relevant statute lasted for only four years, as she had been sued after five. Therefore, the court found no reason that she should not be an adequate representative for the class.

Further, even if the court had found a significant difference between class members who had been sued after four years as opposed to members who had been sued after five, the court found that certifying a subclass with a second representative made more sense than decertifying the entire class.

In examining the case, the appellate court found that the relevant statute was for only four years, and as a result, Phillips is eligible to represent the entire class of 343 Illinois plaintiffs. Whether or not plaintiffs in other states can be included in the class or subclasses will need further evidence to determine. In the mean time, the appellate court remanded the case back to the district court.

You can view the entire decision here.

Continue reading ›