Motions to Dismiss

The Illinois Appellate Court for the 1st District ruled May 7 that a legal malpractice class action against the law firm DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary could not go on because it was filed well after a tolling agreement ended. In Joyce v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary LLP, 1-07-1966 (Ill.App. May 7, 2008), the court upheld the dismissal of a purported class action by stockholders of 21st Century Telecom Group, a Chicago telephone company, pursuant to a tolling agreement between 21st Century and DLA Piper.

The underlying dispute started in 1999, when 21st Century agreed to merge with competitor RCN. DLA Piper attorneys drafted a merger agreement with a mistake that lowered the price of the stock 21st Century shareholders were to receive by $19 million. In response, Edward Joyce, the stockholders’ representative, made a tolling agreement with DLA Piper, in which the statute of limitations was tolled unless a stockholder lawsuit was filed against the firm on or before December 31, 2002. The firm agreed not to avail itself of any statute of limitations defense until after that day. This agreement was amended four times, each time altering only the date. The last agreement set that date at August 21, 2005.

Joyce filed a legal malpractice class action in Cook County against DLA Piper on August 30, 2006. After some procedural disputes, including a finding by the trial court that the filing was timely, the firm won a motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s lack of standing as a non-client. The plaintiffs appealed and the defendant cross-appealed on the trial court’s decision that the suit was timely.

Judge Dow of the Federal Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed without prejudice a bona fide error defense in a putative Fair Debt Collection Act class-action for failure to plead facts akin to the “first paragraph in any newspaper story.” The Court ruled that a bona fide error defense raises a claim of mistake, and therefore must be pled with factual particularity under Rule 9.

The Court held:

Notwithstanding the “disfavored” status of motions to strike and the “liberal pleading standard” in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, the Court concludes that the motion is well taken. Because the defense at issue deals with an alleged “mistake” — a “bona fide error” in the statutory parlance — Defendant is obligated to comply with both Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 9(b). The standard under Rule 9(b) requires parties to state the circumstances of a mistake with “particularity.” As the Seventh Circuit has explained, Rule 9(b) mandates that parties allege at the pleading stage “the who, what, when, where, and how of the mistake.” GE Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1078 (7th Cir. 1997). Defendant correctly points out that Rule 9(b) permits pleaders to allege matters such as intent and knowledge in a more general manner. However, the remaining factual details of an alleged mistake — for example, who made the mistake and when and how it occurred — must be set out with “particularity” in the pleading. Although Defendant has added some detail to its original effort to plead its affirmative defense, there still is work to do before the Court reasonably can conclude that Defendant has complied with its obligation to provide “the first paragraph of any newspaper story” (GE Capital Corp., 128 F.3d at 1078) setting forth with particularity Defendant’s version of the circumstances supporting the defense, as Rule 9(b) and the Seventh Circuit case law require.

Articles Posted in Motions to Dismiss

Tolling Agreement Supersedes Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice Case

Northern District of Illinois Federal District Judge Rules That Bona Fide Error Defense in a Putative FDCPA Class-Action Must be Pled With Particularity Under Rule 9