Illinois Appellate Courts

Second District Court of Appeal Upholds Nominal Judgment for Plaintiffs’ Failure to State Reasonable Basis for Damages

June 1, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

In a hard-fought Illinois consumer fraud lawsuit over deception by a condominium developer, the Second District Court of Appeal has upheld an award involving both nominal damages and punitive damages. In Kirkpatrick v. Strosberg, Nos. 2-06-0724 and 2-06-0731 (Ill. 2nd Aug. 8, 2008), four plaintiffs, led by John Kirkpatrick, sued a real estate developer over misrepresentations about the square footage and ceiling height of the luxury condominiums they purchased in Glen Ellyn, Ill.

Defendant Morningside Development Group is general partner of defendant Glen Astor Condominium Investors LP, a residential real estate developer. Defendant David Strosberg is Morningside’s president. Glen Astor entered into contracts with the plaintiffs for their purchase of luxury condos on the top floor of a development. Before purchasing the condos, the plaintiffs allege, they read sales materials promising nine-foot ceilings and specific amounts of square footage in the units. In three cases, floor plans specifying square footage were incorporated into their contracts. A rider to the contracts specified that dimensions are approximate and subject to adjustments due to the location of building components. During construction, the builder had to lower the ceilings by six inches because of the size of roof components. After buying the condos, the plaintiffs realized that both the square footage and the ceiling heights were smaller than promised.

At trial for the subsequent lawsuit, the court determined that the difference in square footage resulted from differences between how LeNoble and the plaintiffs’ own appraiser measured the square footage, but that LeNoble’s smaller measurements were appropriate and proper. Thus, the court struck down the square footage claims. Finally, it found for the plaintiffs on the breach of contract claims regarding the lowered ceiling. It found that there were actual damages, but that the plaintiffs’ expert appraiser had not given adequate information about damages. The breach of contract took place in 1997, the court said, but Philips gave a diminished value as of 2004 that was “nothing more than a guess without proper basis.” Thus, the court awarded nominal damages of $100 each on the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act claims regarding the ceilings. It also awarded $300,000 in punitive damages and $83,000 in attorney fees.

Material Breach of Contract Invalidates Covenant Not to Compete, Illinois First District Rules

May 27, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Our firm’s Illinois non-compete agreement litigation lawyers were pleased to note a ruling by the First District Court of Appeal that a doctor may not bring a lawsuit against his former business partner for breaching a non-compete agreement. Bisla v. Parvaiz, No. 1-07-1647 (Ill. 1st., Feb. 21, 2008), arose out of a soured employment arrangement between Dr. Virenda Bisla and Dr. Akhtar Parvaiz, both doctors in Chicago. Bisla hired Parvaiz as an employee in 1998, under an agreement specifying that Parvaiz would have the opportunity to become a 50% partner in Bisla’s medical company after three years, if he met certain criteria. It also specified that Bisla would provide medical insurance for Parvaiz and his family, and malpractice insurance in Indiana for Parvaiz.

Neither type of insurance was provided to Parvaiz, according to the First District. And when the three years in the agreement had passed, Bisla did not offer Parvaiz a 50% share of the company, as agreed. Instead, he offered Parvaiz a 45% share, spread over five years, and presented him with a new employment contract and stock purchase agreement. Bisla told Parvaiz that it was in his best interests to sign these papers, but Parvaiz refused because they did not comply with the original employment agreement. He continued working for Bisla’s company for the next five years, but believed that they were using an oral contract since the first employment contract had expired.

The next year, Bisla’s company was temporarily dissolved by the State of Illinois for nonpayment of a filing fee. Bisla did not tell Parvaiz about the dissolution, which automatically terminated their employment agreement. However, in 2005, Parvaiz began working for a competing medical company. When Bisla found out, he demanded a share of the proceeds, then fired Parvaiz and eventually brought a lawsuit seeking to stop him from competing. Parvaiz countered that he believed the agreement was over. The trial court agreed, finding that their agreement was invalid because the employment agreement was breached by both the temporary dissolution and Bisla’s refusal to make Parvaiz a partner. It denied the injunction Bisla sought against Parvaiz, and Bisla appealed.

Fourth District Court of Appeal Finds Company May Be Liable For Causing Another Company’s False Claim to Be Presented

May 22, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

In an Illinois state qui tam lawsuit, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has ruled that an accounting company may be held liable for knowingly allowing another company to submit a fraudulent claim to the state. In Illinois Health Facilities Authority ex rel. Scachitti v. Morgan Stanley, 887 N.E.2d 601 (April 2, 2008), three individual plaintiffs brought suit against financial services company Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and accounting firm Ernst & Young for an alleged scheme to defraud the Illinois Health Facilities Authority under the Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act.

The case arose out of a bond refinancing attempt by the Authority. In order to pay off revenue bonds, it issued “advance refunding” bonds, which are normally tax-exempt. However, if the proceeds of these bonds are reinvested in securities with a higher yield, they lose their tax-exempt status unless the profits go to the U.S. Treasury. To ensure they did not lose the tax exemption, the Authority hired Morgan Stanley as an underwriter for the advance refunding bonds and Ernst & Young to verify Morgan Stanley’s work.

Defendants accuse Morgan Stanley of fraudulently “yield burning” by charging abovemarket rates for the bonds — ensuring that they would not become taxable — and pocketing the $21,000 difference. They also accuse Ernst of abetting this behavior by knowingly hiding it in its audit. They both companies for violating the Whistleblower Act, and Ernst for aiding and abetting Morgan Stanley’s violations. The Cook County trial court dismissed the claims against Ernst for failure to state a sufficient cause of action. The plaintiffs appealed.

Attorney Fees Are Actual Damages in Legal Malpractice Claims, Second District Rules

May 17, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Our Illinois legal malpractice lawyers recently noted an appellate decision from the Second District establishing that attorney fees are “actual damages” within the meaning of Illinois law. Nettleton v. Stogsdill, No. 2-07-1215 (Ill. 2nd Dec. 29, 2008). The ruling arose out of a legal malpractice claim by Margaret Nettleton, who was unhappy with the representation provided by attorney William J. Stogsdill, Jr., in her divorce.

Nettleton retained Stogsdill in 2001 for her divorce, whose trial was set for late 2002. On the day before trial, however, an associate from Stogsdill’s office appeared to ask for a continuance because Stogsdill was in another trial and unable to attend or prepare. The motion was denied, but a two-day continuance was granted the next day when Stogsdill himself appeared. On the day of the new trial, Stogsdill asked for a voluntary nonsuit, which was denied because he hadn’t given notice to all of the parties. He then called Nettleson to the stand, where he asked her to state and spell her name. He then rested her case. The divorce was not granted. Stogsdill filed a second petition for dissolution, but Nettleton fired him about two months later. (She was represented by four other firms before her divorce was granted.)

Nettleton eventually sued, alleging that Stogsdill and his firm committed malpractice by being unprepared, by moving for a nonsuit without her consent and by putting her on the witness stand and then resting without her consent. The damages she cited included loss of the attorney fees paid to both Stogsdill and other attorneys. The trial court granted Stogsdill’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Nettleton hadn’t demonstrated actual damages caused by Stogsdill’s actions — she hadn’t shown that she would have received a larger divorce settlement if not for Stogsdill. After various other legal maneuvers, Nettleton appealed.

Land Owners May Pursue Lawsuit Alleging Chicago Landmark Ordinance Violates Illinois Constitution, First District Rules

May 11, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

In a decision with wide-reaching implications for Chicago land owners and developers, the First District Court of Appeal found March 6 that at least part of the Chicago Landmarks Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. Hanna v. City of Chicago, No. 1-07-3548 (Ill. 1st Dist. March 6, 2009) is an Illinois real estate lawsuit alleging that the ordinance was overly vague, improperly delegated the city’s legislative authority and violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Illinois Constitution.

Plaintiff Albert Hanna owned property in Chicago’s Arlington Deming neighborhood, and plaintiff Carol Mrowka owned property in the East Village neighborhood. Both had been approved as Landmark Districts, which means that property owners in those areas must get approval from the Commission of Chicago Landmarks for any alteration, construction, demolition or other work on their property. Land owners may contest the designation at a hearing. The plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago, the Commission and several city officials to overturn the ordinance, which authorizes the designations.

Count I of the complaint alleges that the ordinance is so vague that citizens have no way to tell how they should behave to comply with it. Counts II and III allege that the ordinance violates provisions of the Illinois Constitution reserving legislative power to the city council and state legislature. Counts V through XX allege that the ordinance violates the constitution’s equal protection clause and substantive due process clause. In trial court, the city moved to dismiss the multiple counts of their complaint for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion as to counts I through III and V through XX. The plaintiffs now appeal that decision.

GMAC ‘Unfairly’ Repossessed Vehicle Under Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, Appeals Court Decides

May 6, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Lubin Austermuehle’s auto fraud, lemon law, and consumer fraud trial lawyers were impressed by a recent First District Court of Appeals ruling against the credit arm of General Motors for a wrongful repossession. The court said a trial court was correct to rule that General Motors Acceptance Corporation acted unfairly when it repossessed a truck in violation of its agreement with the owner. In Demitro v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, No. 1-06-3417 (Ill. 1st. Feb. 9, 2009), the appeals court declined to overturn a Cook County trial court ruling that GMAC violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.

Demitro purchased a Chevrolet Suburban in 2002 and had no trouble making payments until 2003, when he underwent surgery and went on disability in May of 2003. His payment checks for June and July of that year bounced, and in August, he spoke with a GMAC representative who told him so. The next day, Demitro called GMAC and authorized about one month’s payment to be deducted from his checking account. The GMAC representative then called a repossession agency that had already been authorized to take Demitro’s truck and put the repossession on hold. The representative sent Demitro a letter giving him seven days to make the back payments and keep his account current. After that time expired, it said, GM could exercise its right to repossess the truck.

On the very next day, Demitro awoke to discover that his truck had been repossessed. The GMAC representative was notified. He acknowledged that the repossession was a mistake and a violation of the seven-day extension in the letter, but nonetheless recommended to management that they keep the truck. They did, and informed Demitro that he was now liable for repossession charges of $39,695.04 as well as the outstanding balance on his account. Unable to get to the bank, Demitro informed GMAC that his telephone payment would bounce. GMAC later withdrew that payment from his account after he had added more money, but failed to credit him for the payment.

Appeals Court Upholds Finding Against Breach of Contract Because No Contract Existed

April 5, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

A recent Illinois appeals court ruling caught the eyes of our Naperville business litigation attorneys. On December 22, the Illinois First District Court of Appeal ruled that a trial court was correct in finding no breach of contract between an individual and an investment firm. CFC Investment v. McLean, No. 1-08-0161 (Ill. 1st Dec. 22, 2008). Defendant Daniel McLean was a real estate developer and investor doing business through a group of companies the appeals court collectively called River East. Plaintiff CFC Investments was an investor in River East.

CFC offered to sell its interest in 2001, and part owner Craig Duchossois, through phone calls and written negotiations with McLean, agreed on a price of $16.7 million. McLean wrote in a signed letter that he was “willing to arrange for the purchase of your interest in River East” and that after CFC’s written agreement, he would “commence to secure the capital.” Duchossois signed to signal his acceptance and sent it back in September of 2001. McLean then wrote a letter specifying that River East needed 90 days to complete the buyout. However, no action was taken until March of 2002, when Duchossois wrote to demand that McLean finish the deal. He received no response. In early April of 2003, River East investors sold their interests to Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company. CFC’s share of the proceeds was $2.5 million.

In 2004, CFC sued McLean for breach of contract. The trial turned partially on the issue of whether McLean had offered to buy the shares himself, as Duchossois believed, or merely find investors to do it, as McLean contended. The trial court barred evidence favorable to CFC several times, rejected a proposed jury instruction from the company and answered a question from the jury over CFC’s objections. CFC appealed of all these decisions.

Direct Deception Not Necessary in Consumer Fraud By Omission, Rules Appeals Court

January 22, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

In a consumer fraud class action, the Fifth District Court of Appeal has ruled that consumers may sue over a manufacturer’s intentional suppression of important facts, even when when disclosure of the hidden information would have alerted the consumer to the product’s dangers and caused the consumer not to purchase the product. In De Bouse v. Bayer, 5-06-0077 (Oct. 9, 2008), plaintiff Teresa De Bouse filed a proposed class action against pharmaceutical companies Bayer and GlaxoSmithKline, as well as several individuals, alleging that they violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act by intentionally concealing information casting doubt on the safety and efficacy of the statin drug Baycor.

This is actually the second appellate decision in De Bouse; the Illinois Supreme Court had returned it to the appeals court with instructions to reconsider it in light of a contemporary decision on the Consumer Fraud Act called Barbara’s Sales v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill. 2d 45, 879 N.E.2d 910 (2007). In that case, the state Supreme Court held that claims that a product was “the best” was “puffing” (routine exaggeration by advertisers) and did not amount to deception. Thus, a deceptive advertising campaign was not enough to violate the Consumer Fraud Act in this case, the Supreme Court ruled. The Fifth District, on remand, pointed out that while the drug makers were accused of a deceptive advertising campaign, their campaign was not “puffing” and involved alleged suppression of material facts so Barbara’s Sales did not apply.

The original appeal to the appeals court came with three certified questions:

Appeals Court Rules Contract Not Valid After ‘Material Modifications’

January 15, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Changes to a contract invalidated a business owner’s agreement to sell his auto dealership, the Illinois Third District Court of Appeal has ruled. In Finnin et al v. Bob Lindsay Honda-Toyota, 3-05-0428 (June 29, 2006), the court ruled that a trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant, because the plaintiffs made material changes to the contract that was allegedly breached.

The dispute dates to March of 2002, when the three plaintiffs, including Michael Finnin, approached defendant Robert Lindsay about selling his Toyota-Honda dealership in Knox County. The parties, and their lawyers, worked out the details of the sale over several months and eventually signed an agreement incorporating those details. In August, an assistant to Lindsay’s attorney sent a copy of the agreement, with all of the agreed-on conditions that were then current, and with Lindsay’s signature. On receipt, the plaintiffs’ attorney noticed two mistakes, including a substantially lower purchase price than the parties had agreed on. The attorneys discussed the problem at the time, and Lindsay’s attorney suggested that the draft be returned so that he could send out a corrected version. The plaintiffs’ attorney took no action.

Eight or nine days later, Lindsay himself phoned Finnin to tell him that he was selling the dealership to another buyer. Finnin and his fellow plaintiffs decided they still wanted to buy the dealership, and their attorney made the necessary changes to the draft that day. Lindsay still sold the dealership to the third party, and the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract. The trial court granted Lindsay summary judgment, saying that even though the changes plaintiffs made to the contract were consistent with the parties’ intent, they consisted of a counteroffer to his offer, and thus there was no contract to breach.

Appeals Court Rules Small Business Cannot Sue Bank Over Embezzlement

January 8, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

A small business may not sue a bank for allowing a minority shareholder to embezzle, the Illinois Second District Court of Appeal has ruled. In Time Savers, Inc. v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 02-06-0198 (Feb. 28, 2007), the company had sued its bank for breach of contract, common-law fraud, conspiracy to defraud, aiding and abetting and violating the Illinois Fiduciary Obligations Act.

The case stems from bad loans taken out by the minority shareholder in construction and maintenance equipment supplier Time Savers (TSI), Stephen Harrison. He owned 20% of the company and shareholder Lawrence Kozlicki owned the remaining 80%. Harrison also owned another business, RDSJH Equipment Venture, that does the same kind of equipment supply business. Kozlicki has no ownership interest in RDSJH, but the two companies did business together. Between 1997 and 2001, Harrison, through TSI, refinanced existing loans and took out new ones with LaSalle Bank seven times. With these loans, Harrison financed new equipment purchases for RDSJH; the equipment was then rented to TSI, allowing RDSJH to enrich itself at TSI’s expense.

Kozlicki and TSI contended that LaSalle suspected or knew that the loans were for Harrison’s personal benefit, but failed to alert Kozlicki or investigate further. TSI pointed to various documents and communications, as well as the fact that some funds were deposited into an RDSJH account. The complaint at issue in this appeal is the third amended complaint by TSI; the company voluntarily dismissed the original complaint and the DuPage County trial court dismissed the first, second and third amended complaints at LaSalle’s request. (The bank also moved for sanctions after the third amended complaint was dismissed.) The final dismissal is the subject of this appeal.