The Jacksonville Business Journal Reports: “Overtime lawsuits thrive in Florida’s recession”
The article states:
Like unemployment, home foreclosures and bankruptcies, the number of lawsuits brought by employees alleging unpaid wages is also on the rise.
The article describes the spate of lawsuits filed in New York against high profile restaurants for alleged wage theft for unpaid wages and tips. The increase in lawsuits for unpaid overtime and other wage claims is a trend being seen all around the country. The article which can be read in full by clicking on the link at the start of this post states in part:
Some of the city’s hottest chefs and restaurateurs are increasingly being targeted by lawsuits filed by a handful of attorneys on behalf of small numbers of employees.
This week’s targets include Michael White and Chris Cannon’s restaurant group, which runs three upscale Italian restaurants in Manhattan, and Masaharu Morimoto of “Iron Chef” fame. They come on top of a suit filed in federal court last month against Italian giants Mario Batali and Joe Bastianich that has grown to at least 20 plaintiffs from two.
The suits have similar allegations: that restaurants are depriving low-level employees of due tip wages in violation of state and federal labor laws. Some also allege that restaurants fail to abide by a state law requiring that employees receive an extra hour of pay if they work for 10 or more hours in one day. They seek unpaid wages and tips, interest, liquidated damages and attorney’s fees, and all seek class-action certification.
NPR reports:
Can’t put your BlackBerry down? Your boss may come to dread that if you’re working while you’re off the clock. A police sergeant in Chicago is suing the city. He says he’s due plenty of overtime back pay because he logged in on his BlackBerry to continue working even though his shift was over.
A California wage and hour ruling caught the attention of our Illinois employment rights attorneys because it caused substantial dissent and inspired a replacement decision more than six months after its original opinion was published. Rutti v. Lojack Corporation Inc., No. 07-56599 (9th. Cir. March 2, 2010) concerned whether commute time and time spent at home on work-related tasks should be compensated at work. In its most recent decision, a three-judge panel of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that commute time is not federally compensable, but split on whether the time is compensable under state law. Similarly, all three agreed that Mike Rutti’s minimal time spent checking assignments for the day from home was not compensable, but disagreed on whether longer evening periods spent transmitting data counted as work time.
Rutti was one of about 450 technicians nationwide for Lojack, Inc. to install alarms in customers’ cars. He spent most of the day on the road traveling between job sites in a company-owned vehicle, but began and ended the day at home, performing administrative tasks for Lojack. Lojack paid him an hourly wage starting when he arrived at the first work site and ending when he left the last one. He file a proposed class action lawsuit seeking compensation under federal and state wage and hour laws for his preliminary and postliminary activities, as well as commute time to and from work sites. The trial court granted Lojack summary judgment dismissing all of the federal claims but upheld a state-law claim seeking compensation for commuting, before dismissing the remaining state-law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rutti appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the Ninth separated the case into three issues: whether the commute time was compensable; whether his off-the-clock activities were substantial enough to be compensable; and when Rutti’s work day started under the “continuous work day” doctrine adopted by the Department of Labor. On the commute time issue, the appeals court agreed with the trial court, but only as to Rutti’s Fair Labor Standards Act claims. A 1996 federal law called the Employee Commuter Flexibility Act says employees need not be compensated for travel time, preliminary activities or postliminary activities that take place outside of a normal work day. That’s true even when the vehicle used is the employer’s vehicle and is subject to restrictions on its use, as long as it’s subject to an agreement between the parties.
Rutti had more luck on the issue of off-the-clock activities performed at home before and after work. These are also subject to the ECFA, the Ninth wrote, but only if they are not “principal activities.” In addition, caselaw says they must not be minimal activities. The activity at the beginning of the day included receiving job orders, mapping them and planning his route for the day. This is related to his commute, the court found, and commuting is not compensable. They are also relatively minimal, taking no more than a few minutes. Thus, the Ninth upheld the trial court on the preliminary activities. However, it reversed the trial court as to Rutti’s postliminary activities, which it said were more time-consuming. This included connecting with Lojack’s servers to upload data about his work for the day. This was part of Rutti’s regular work and necessary to Lojack’s business, the court wrote, making it part of the company’s “principal business activities.” The court also found that it was not minimal, citing evidence that it could take more than 10 to 15 minutes because of frequent failures, and that it was a regular part of the work. Thus, it may very well have been compensable time under federal law and should not have been dismissed at the summary judgment stage.
Finally, the court ruled that Rutti may have a case under the “continuous work day” doctrine set forth in Dooley v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2004), which held that automobile damage appraisers who worked from home were entitled to compensation for commutes because activities they performed at home were “principal activities” that formed part of a continuous work day. Because the court had already determined that Rutti’s preliminary activities were not compensable, it wrote, the morning commute is not part of a continuous workday. The evening commute might be, the Ninth said, except that 29 C.F.R. § 785.16 says employers may not be compelled to compensate workers for periods when they are relieved from duty so long that they can use the time for their own purposes. This was the case with the postliminary upload time, the court said, because Lojack gave technicians 12 hours in which to upload.
Using all of that reasoning, the majority upheld most of the trial court’s rulings, but vacated rulings as to state-law claims for compensation and postliminary claims for the data upload. A separate concurring opinion by Judge Silverman and joined by Judge Hall agreed as to the California state-law claims for commuting. California requires employers to compensate their workers for all time “during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer, the judges wrote, citing Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 578 (2000). Because Rutti was subject to multiple rules governing his behavior with the company truck, he was clearly under Lojack’s control, they wrote. Another concurrence authored by Judge Hall alone said the panel should have upheld the trial court on the postliminary data upload as well, because they were minimal. Finally, Judge Callahan dissented from the majority’s opinion on the state-law claims, arguing that Morillion did not apply because Rutti was not required to commute by company bus, as in that case.
A recent California state appeals court decision caught the eyes of our Chicago employment class action attorneys because it addressed fine distinctions in class certification. In Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 156 (Feb. 8, 2010), California’s Second District Court of Appeal ruled that a trial court improperly denied class certification when it relied on individual testimony to establish the existence of a uniform employer policy. It agreed, however, that plaintiff Alex Jaimez was an inappropriate class representative.
From 2001 to 2007, Jaimez was a route sales representative for DAIOHS First Choice Services, which provides refreshments and vending-machine products to offices. From 2003 to 2007, all of them were reclassified from overtime-exempt to non-exempt, receiving an hourly wage plus overtime when applicable. In 2007, Jaimez filed this action in Los Angeles Superior Court, seeking to certify four classes of employees who were allegedly denied overtime; meal breaks; rest breaks; or pay stubs.
The plaintiffs argued that First Choice had improperly classified RSRs as exempt before the change, illegally denying overtime, meal breaks and rest breaks. After the change, the company continued not paying overtime, the plaintiffs claimed, but pressured RSRs to finish their routes in eight hours even when the routes were long. The plaintiffs also claimed that they were not informed that they were entitled to another meal break if they worked more than 10 hours. Before 2006, they said, meal breaks were automatically removed from time records regardless of whether they were taken; after 2006, employees were pressured to sign a statement that they took the break, even when they didn’t. These were the result of consistent, uniform corporate policies, the motion said, making class certification appropriate. The proposed class sought back wages and penalties under state law.
First Choice opposed the class certification motion by submitting testimony from 25 current RSRs who said they had no such problem. All of them said they were able to take rest and meal breaks when they wished, are encouraged to do so and have time to do so. Relying on these declarations, the trial court denied class certification, saying Jaimez was not typical enough an the proposed class did not have common questions of law and fact. It also said Jaimez was not a good representative, because pretrial testimony showed that he’d lied about a previous criminal conviction for petty theft when he was hired. Plaintiffs then asked for leave to file a First Amended Complaint with new class representative, but was denied. They appealed both orders.
On appeal, the Second District said the trial court misapplied state class certification standards by considering conflicting issues of fact rather than evaluating whether the plaintiffs’ theory of recovery was appropriate for class treatment. In this case, the plaintiff’s “theory of recovery” includes questions of fact and law that predominate over all RSRs in the class, including questions about First Choice’s policies, record-keeping and misclassification of employees. When the trial court used the RSR declarations submitted by First Choice to deny this, the appeals court said, it incorrectly reached the merits of the claim rather than the question of predominance. In fact, the appeals court said the declarations actually support to some extent the allegations made by the plaintiffs about policies and practices. That RSRs may have different damages does not mean they don’t have common questions of law and fact to try.
The appeals court further found that Jaimez was a sufficiently typical representative of the class, noting that he had submitted nine declarations from others that were substantially similar. However, it also found that he was not an adequate representative because of his dishonesty about his criminal conviction. Thus, the appeals court upheld the trial court’s class certification ruling on that issue, but reversed on all other issues. It also reversed the denial of leave to file a First Amended Complaint, noting that the trial court itself invited Jaimez to file such a complaint and that First Choice did not oppose it. The case was remanded to trial court with instructions to certify subclasses after a new class representative is appointed.
Our Naperville wage and hour rights attorneys noted a recent ruling out of Massachusetts that could be important for police officers and firefighters around the United States. In Calvao et al. v. Town of Framingham, No. 09-1648 (1st.Cir. March 17, 2010), the First U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that employers don’t have to notify their public safety workers when they take advantage of a special provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act that exempts them from the ordinary 40-hour work week. Instead, these employers are permitted to establish “work periods” of seven to 28 days, after which the employees must be paid overtime. The plaintiffs, a class of about 100 Framingham, Mass. police officers, believed that the Town of Framingham was not eligible for this exemption because it never “established” the work period by notifying them of its existence.
The FLSA was amended in 1966 and 1974 to apply to state and municipal workers. This triggered concerns about costs from local governments, which ended partially with Congress enacting the section of law at issue in this case, which allows a longer period before overtime is triggered, to account for the unpredictable nature of public safety work. The Town of Framingham circulated a memo in 1986 declaring that the work period for police and fire personnel was 24 days. This worked out to about 43 hours in a seven-day period before overtime was triggered. Fourteen years later, in 2000, the police officers’ union negotiated a change in schedule from four days on and two off to five days on and three off. Both fit into the 24-day schedule. In 2005, the officers brought the instant action, suing for a declaratory judgment that they had been denied overtime because the work period had never been “established” as required by federal law. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants on this issue, and the officers appealed.
They had no better luck at the First Circuit, which found no evidence for their argument in the text of the statute, its legislative history or Department of Labor guidelines. The text of the law at issue does not require notice, the court wrote, or even suggest how an employer might establish its work period. The statute doesn’t explicitly prohibit giving notice, but Congress did explicitly give responsibility for enforcing FLSA regulations to the Secretary of Labor. Regulations enacted by people in that role “make it clear the Secretary rejected a notice requirement,” the court wrote. In fact, the Secretary in office at the time reviewed and rejected a proposed notice requirement, noting that the Act does not require one. In addition, legislative history shows that Congress expressly rejected a proposal to require employee agreement before the work period could be established.
Finally, the court rejected the officers’ argument that a Department of Labor letter ruling mandates a notice requirement. The issue was never brought up in district court and would be waved in any case, it wrote, but is also inappropriate for three reasons. One is that the letter never mentioned a notice requirement, instead saying that “”[a]n employer must designate or otherwise objectively establish the work period . . . and pay the affected employees in accordance with its provisions.” The letter was also responding to a specific court case raising issues not relevant in the instant action. And opinion letters don’t have the force of rulings, the court said, especially since the Secretary of Labor has already reached the opposite conclusion from the one the officers sought here. Thus, the summary judgment ruling by the district court was affirmed.
A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia caught the attention of our Illinois overtime rights attorneys. In Robinson-Smith v. Government Employees Insurance Co., No. 08-7146 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 5, 2010), more than 200 auto damage adjusters sued auto insurance company GEICO for unpaid overtime. The adjusters claimed that they were incorrectly classified as administrative employees, making them exempt from overtime laws. A federal district court agreed and granted summary judgment to the workers. However, the D.C. Circuit reversed that decision, saying the claims adjusters meet the definition of administrative employees because they exercise “some discretion” on the job.
The case turns on whether the adjusters exercise “discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance,” as required by the Department of Labor definition of an administrative employee. The adjusters claimed they did not have sufficient discretion or independence, in part because they estimate only the price of auto damage and not liability. The trial court agreed, finding that supervisors have to sign off on some of the adjusters’ decisions, and their decisions were largely constrained by GEICO training and standards. But the appeals court opinion, authored by Judge Karen L. Henderson, said it was undisputed that the adjusters exercised at least some discretion. Because the DOL test does not include a requirement for how often that discretion is exercised or whether it’s a primary duty, the judge wrote, some discretion is enough to make the adjusters ineligible for overtime.
The case follows a similar decision from the Ninth Circuit in In re Farmers Ins. Exch., Claims Representatives’ Overtime Pay Litig., 466 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006). That case had very similar facts, and was also overturned at the appeals level by a court that found the definition of “administrative employee” sufficient for claims adjusters. Like that decision, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Robinson-Smith overturns only a grant of summary judgment for the claims adjusters. This means both sides will still have a chance to prove their claims at trial.
As Chicago employee rights attorneys, we were interested to see what may have been the first unpaid overtime filing of 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Harris v. Cheddar’s Casual Café, No. 20-cv-0045 (N.D. Ill.) was filed Jan. 5 by three former servers and bartenders who seek to certify a class of current and former employees denied overtime and tips by the Cheddar’s Casual Café chain of restaurants. Plaintiffs Donny Harris, Keith McKinstery and Shaniqua Bell allege that managers at a Cheddar’s in Boilingbrook, Ill shaved time off their timecards and required them to work off the clock in order to avoid paying overtime. They also allege that their tips were diverted to a tip pool that illegally included non-tipped workers.
The complaint in the case says plaintiffs, and other similarly situated workers, were required to clock in and out for their shifts using the chain’s computerized system. They allege that the restaurant, and manager Solomon Tristan, illegally manipulated the timesheets created by that system to remove hours. They also allege that they were encouraged to work before clocking in and after clocking out, further denying them overtime. Furthermore, the plaintiffs say, they were compelled to participate in a tip pool that included the restaurant’s “quality assurance” workers, who they say are not tipped employees. Under federal law, employers may not pay tipped employees less than minimum wage unless they are allowed to keep all their tips, or contribute only to a legal tip pool. Thus, the complaint said, Cheddar’s policies violate the Fair Labor Standards Act.
At Nationwide Consumer Rights, our Wheaton, Ill. overtime attorneys see cases like this frequently. Hourly employees such as waiters and bartenders are regular targets for employers who prefer not to pay all of the wages they owe, and even sometimes to skim their earned tips to pay other employees. This behavior relies on employees to stay quiet, either because they don’t know they have rights or because they’re afraid of punishment for speaking up. However, federal and state law is very clear employees must be compensated for all of their time at work, and paid time and a half for any time over 40 hours in a week. Failure to follow these basic requirements exposes companies to lawsuits seeking all of the back pay owed, attorney fees and any other costs incurred. In cases of egregious law-breaking, courts may also require employers to pay punitive damages — money intended to penalize willful law-breaking.
Our Oak Brook, Ill. employee rights attorneys were very interested to see a recent labor lawsuit against telecom giant AT&T. Bloomberg News reported Dec. 17 that two separate units of the company were hit with simultaneous lawsuits Dec. 16 over unpaid overtime. The plaintiffs seek to represent more than 5,000 current and former workers who they say were misclassified as low-level managers, so AT&T would not have to pay them overtime. Each of the two lawsuits seeks $500 million in unpaid overtime, as well as compensation for rest and meal breaks that were allegedly not granted.
According to the article, the employees were classified as “Level One” managers, even though their job duties didn’t meet the federal definition of management positions. They say they worked as many as 60 hours a week, or 10 to 14 hours a day, and were expected to be available on weekends, all without overtime pay. In fact, the Atlanta plaintiffs claim that they were eligible for overtime when they worked for BellSouth, before its acquisition by AT&T. Joe Luque, a lead plaintiff in the San Francisco litigation, said in a press release that he was chewed out when he tried to exercise managerial duties by firing a poor-performing employee. The suits come shortly after a Connecticut federal court certified a class of AT&T workers with similar complaints, in a suit filed by the same law firm.
As Chicago overtime rights lawyers, we’re pleased to see workers standing up for themselves against such a large employer. The right to overtime pay is provided by a federal law called the Fair Labor Standards Act, which requires time and a half for any work above 40 hours a week. This can be very expensive — so some companies, instead of hiring extra personnel to handle the work, look for ways to break the law. Mis-classifying employees as “managers” with no real management duties is one way to end-run around workers’ rights. Other employers may pressure their employees to work off the clock; work through legally required rest and meal breaks; or shift the extra hours to another week. Unfortunately, far too many workers don’t understand their rights, or are afraid of losing their jobs if they stand up for themselves.
Our Illinois overtime rights lawyers were interested to see a recent ruling on unpaid overtime from the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. In Musch v. Domtar Industries, No. 08-4305 (7th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009), Alan Musch and his colleagues were maintenance workers at two Wisconsin paper mills owned by Domtar Industries. In their lawsuit, they say their job routinely exposes them to dangerous chemicals, requiring them to put on special protective gear before shifts and to shower and change after. They are not paid for the time it takes to do those things, however. They sued for unpaid overtime pay for the showering and changing time, as well as for time spent shaving, a requirement under Domtar company policy.
After the case was filed, Domtar moved for summary judgment dismissing the case. It argued that company policy says workers should shower and change immediately after exposure to a hazardous chemical, even if that means the employee goes into overtime. Because it has that policy, the company argued, overtime compensation was inappropriate. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment for Domtar. After the court declined to reconsider, the plaintiffs appealed both rulings. They argued that the district court missed or ignored evidence showing that chemicals actually were on workers’ skin; that is, they do not shower because they merely think they might have the chemicals. Thus, changing and showering time is appropriate for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit started by noting that the FLSA and Wisconsin law both require employers to pay for all of the work employees do. However, federal law makes a distinction between work and preliminary or postliminary activities. Changing and washing is ordinarily considered preliminary or postliminary, the court wrote, but may sometimes be considered part of the job if it’s “integral” and “indispensable” to the job. The plaintiffs argued evidence showed that they didn’t always realize there were chemicals on their skin until the end of shifts, meaning showering after shifts would be following the company’s stated policy.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed. The plaintiffs’ evidence showed that showers were sometimes necessary, it wrote, but not that the Domtar policy of showering after any exposure was insufficient. Furthermore, the court said, employees admitted to bringing work clothes home to wash them, suggesting that they don’t believe the chemical exposure is that serious. Finally, employees are free to seek overtime under the existing company policy when they are required to shower and change, the Seventh said. Because these are all “normal conditions” under the meaning of the FLSA, the post-shift changing and showering is postliminary activity, not an essential job requirement, the court wrote. Thus, it upheld the trial court’s orders.
Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog