Articles Posted in Consumer Fraud/Consumer Protection

One of the best websites to learn about consumer law issues and to find lawyers who focus on consumer rights issues is the website of the National Association of Consumer Advocates.

The website contains numerous links to sections on Auto Fraud, Lemon Law, Predatory Lending Practices, Credit Reporting Problems and Debt Collection Abuse.

Class action lawsuits our firm has been involved in or spear-headed have led to substantial awards totalling over a million dollars to organizations including the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumer Law Center, and local law school consumer programs. Lubin Austermuehle is proud of our achievements in assisting national and local consumer rights organizations obtain the funds needed to ensure that consumers are protected and informed of their rights. By standing up to consumer fraud and consumer rip-offs, and in the right case filing consumer protection lawsuits and class-actions you too can help ensure that other consumers’ rights are protected from corporate misdeeds.

In a consumer fraud class action, the Fifth District Court of Appeal has ruled that consumers may sue over a manufacturer’s intentional suppression of important facts, even when when disclosure of the hidden information would have alerted the consumer to the product’s dangers and caused the consumer not to purchase the product. In De Bouse v. Bayer, 5-06-0077 (Oct. 9, 2008), plaintiff Teresa De Bouse filed a proposed class action against pharmaceutical companies Bayer and GlaxoSmithKline, as well as several individuals, alleging that they violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act by intentionally concealing information casting doubt on the safety and efficacy of the statin drug Baycor.

This is actually the second appellate decision in De Bouse; the Illinois Supreme Court had returned it to the appeals court with instructions to reconsider it in light of a contemporary decision on the Consumer Fraud Act called Barbara’s Sales v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill. 2d 45, 879 N.E.2d 910 (2007). In that case, the state Supreme Court held that claims that a product was “the best” was “puffing” (routine exaggeration by advertisers) and did not amount to deception. Thus, a deceptive advertising campaign was not enough to violate the Consumer Fraud Act in this case, the Supreme Court ruled. The Fifth District, on remand, pointed out that while the drug makers were accused of a deceptive advertising campaign, their campaign was not “puffing” and involved alleged suppression of material facts so Barbara’s Sales did not apply.

The original appeal to the appeals court came with three certified questions:

The National Consumers League’s Fraud Center is one of the best informational websites on the internet to learn about consumer rights and protection issues. Informed consumers are best armed to protect themselves from consumer scams and consumer frauds. The website contains sections for Telemarketing Fraud, Internet Fraud, Scams Against Businesses, Scams Against Elderly, Counterfeit Drugs, and a Fraud News section.

Lubin Austermuehle is a private consumer rights law firm who associates with other law firms around the country that can help you recover funds lost due to fraud against brick and mortar companies in the United States with assets. All too often with many internet and telemarketing frauds this may not be possible as the scam artists may be overseas, hard to locate or without assets.

Class action lawsuits our firm has been involved in or spear-headed have led to substantial awards totalling over a million dollars to organizations including the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumer Law Center, and local law school consumer programs. Lubin Austermuehle is proud of our achievements in assisting national and local consumer rights organizations obtain the funds needed to ensure that consumers are protected and informed of their rights. By standing up to consumer fraud and consumer rip-offs, and in the right case filing consumer protection lawsuits and class-actions you too can help ensure that other consumers’ rights are protected from corporate misdeeds.

One of the best websites to obtain information about consumer law topics and purchase consumer and lawyer oriented publications and books about consumer rights issues is the website of the National Consumer Law Center.

A particularly well done book offered by the National Consumer Law Center is called Surviving Debt. It is a “how to” book that consumers can use to learn about their rights regarding matters such as unfair debt collection practices. The National Consumer Law Center provides a detailed description of the book.

The National Consumer Law Center describes Surviving Debt as follows:

As Illinois and Chicago area consumer rights attorneys with a substantial auto dealer fraud and lemon law practice, we were pleased that a federal district court ruled in October that a manufacturer can be sued for a dealer’s alleged implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Semitekol v. Monaco Coach Corporation, No. 06 C 6424 (Oct. 21, 2008), is an RV warranty case pending in the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs, a married couple, purchased a Monaco motor home from an RV dealer. The motor home turned out to have the following alleged problems: electrical problems, a malfunctioning air-conditioner and heating problems. Numerous attempts to fix it were allegedly unsuccessful, and the motor home allegedly spent 180 of the 341 days the couple owned it in repair shops before the couple allegedly revoked acceptance of the motor home.

The couple sued Monaco, among others, alleging that it breached its own written warranty, the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the implied warranty of merchantability created by Illinois law. Monaco moved to dismiss the implied warranty allegation, arguing that Illinois law requires direct contact between a buyer and seller to create an implied warranty. In this case, the manufacturer pointed out, the dealer was the actual seller of the Monaco motor home. The plaintiffs responded by arguing that direct contact in this case was established by BMS’s advertising and actual status as an “authorized Beaver Monaco dealership”; the fact that Monaco allegedly referred customers to the dealer to deal with problems and customer service concerns; consumers’ ability to find and contact the dealer through Monaco’s Web site; BMS’s authorization to distribute Monaco publications; and the fact that plaintiffs had the option of picking up their new motor home at either company.

In its analysis, the district court agreed for purposes of a motion to dismiss that the dealer was acting as Monaco’s agent. It dismissed arguments that past caselaw does not support such a finding, pointing out that unlike the current plaintiffs, none of the plaintiffs in the cases the defense cited showed any evidence for an agency relationship. The court did not agree that there actually was an agency relationship, or even that an agency relationship is enough to establish the direct contact necessary to prove an implied warranty under Illinois law. Rather, it pointed out that these are questions of fact that are improper to resolve with a motion to dismiss. Thus, the motion was denied. Dismissal motions by the dealer and two parts manufacturers also failed.

Our Chicago class action attorneys recently noted that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has conditionally certified a wage and hour class action alleging that Illinois Bell Telephone failed to pay overtime to its hourly employees. In Russell v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 08 C 1871 (filed April 1, 2008), Constemecka Russell alleges that Illinois Bell regularly required her and other hourly employees to work off the clock, and sought to conditionally certify these employees as a class and notify them of the action. Several of her colleagues have joined and submitted affidavits supporting her allegations. The case is pending, but the judge granted those motions Sept. 15 over most of Illinois Bell’s objections.

U.S. District Judge Matthew Kennelly’s opinion granting certification and notice repeats many of Russell’s allegations about the unpaid overtime. Russell worked in sales for the company at a call center, and she alleges that she was paid only for time she spent logged into the call center’s computer system. However, there were certain work tasks that she had to perform without being logged in, during lunch and rest breaks, including tasks like filling orders as well as time spent logging onto the computers and opening software programs. She estimated that she spent between 15 minutes and an hour per day doing this unpaid work, which sometimes would have entitled her to overtime.

In response to Russell’s request for class certification and notice, Illinois Bell argued that class certification is inappropriate because it doesn’t use the phone system to keep time, and thus there is no common policy or practice linking the proposed plaintiffs. The court was unimpressed by this argument. It pointed to multiple assertions by Russell that company practice was to require unpaid work before and after time on the phone, as well as affidavits by joining plaintiffs stating that managers explicitly instructed them to work off the clock. It also dismissed arguments that written policies were evidence that Illinois Bell complied with the law.

A statement that a car has not been involved in an accident and “it’s fine” can constitute common-law fraud and a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled. In Hanson-Suminski v. Rohrman Midwest Motors, Inc., 1-07-0755 (Nov. 7, 2008), a customer successfully sued after she discovered that her used car had been in an accident, even though the dealer who sold it to her had told her it was not. The appeals court rejected the dealership’s arguments that both the decision and the financial award were erroneous.

The plaintiff, Traci Hanson-Suminski, bought a used 2002 Honda Civic from defendant Arlington Acura in Palatine, Ill. On the test drive, she asked the salesman if the car had been in an accident, to which he replied “No, it’s fine.” She did not take the car to an independent mechanic or get a Carfax sheet, nor did the salesman advise her that she could do so. She discovered that the car had indeed been in a rollover accident causing “moderate or severe” damage the following year, when she tried to trade it in. At trial, witnesses testified that the car had a “green light” at the auction where the dealership bought it, indicating no title problems, but that a car in good condition should have been more expensive. The plaintiff prevailed on her common-law fraud claim at a jury trial and on her Consumer Fraud Act claim at a bench trial. To avoid an illegal double recovery, the judge ruled that the Consumer Fraud Act claim would be satisfied with the jury’s common-law fraud verdict.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiff should not have prevailed on her Consumer Fraud Act claim, in part because she failed to show that fraud could have been avoided with reasonable prudence, and because the salesman’s statement was mere “puffery.” In its opinion, the appeals court cited Harkala v. Wildwood Reality, Inc., 200 Ill. App. 3d 447, 453 (1990), to show that the plaintiff had no obligation to double-check the salesman’s statement that the car had not been in an accident. Furthermore, it said, a car’s accident history is not a matter of public knowledge, as that case required. “Puffery” is a legal term for exaggerations used in advertising, which no reasonable person would believe. Because it was reasonable to believe the salesman was not lying, and it is not reasonable to think that car salespeople always claim cars are accident-free, the court said, it dismissed the puffery claim as without merit.

As Chicago class action attorneys, our firm has been able to help many Illinois tenants protect their rights under a special state law that not every renter knows about. The Illinois Security Deposit Interest Act requires many Illinois landlords to pay their renters the interest on security deposits. The law applies to landlords of buildings with 25 or more rental units, and to deposits held six months or more. Under those circumstances, the law requires landlords to pay interest on security deposits once a year, after the end of the yearly rental agreement, except when the renter owed unpaid rent. Landlords who willfully fail to do this can be sued for the amount of the withheld interest, as well as attorney fees and court costs.

That was the case in Wang v. Williams and Royal Rentals, 343 Ill.App.3d 495, 797 N.E.2d 179, 277 Ill.Dec. 832 (Sept. 10, 2003). Zhiyuan Wang of Carbondale sued his landlord, Royal Rentals, for failing to return his security deposit, failing to pay interest during the two years he rented from Royal, consumer fraud and breach of contract. The trial court dismissed his interest claim and his breach of contract claim, both of which were based on the Security Deposit Interest Act, because Wang’s lease included a provision stating “TENANTS agree to waive right to interest on security deposit.” Wang appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeal.

On appeal, Royal Rentals argued that legal rights, including Wang’s rights under the Security Deposit Interest Act, can be waived when the right in question is conferred only for the benefit of individuals rather than the public. The court found this unconvincing. It pointed out that the Security Deposit Interest Act protects the rights of renters, a class of people. In support, it cited several cases, including Gittleman v. Create, Inc., 189 Ill. App. 3d 199, 545 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1989), a similar case in which tenants sued their landlord for a security deposit refund and interest. That lease had a provision reading “It is understood that the security deposit is net of security deposit interest, if any.” That court found for the tenants, saying the provision was intentionally vague about how interest should be paid and suggesting that the landlord used that vagueness to try to circumvent the Security Deposit Interest Act.

As Chicago class action attorneys with a focus on consumer rights and consumer protection law, we know that renters in Chicago are fortunate to be protected by a law requiring landlords to pay interest on the renters’ own security deposits once a year, as long as the tenant stays for more than six months. Section 080 of the Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (PDF) also specifies that landlords must return security deposits, minus unpaid rent or reasonable costs of repairs, within 45 days of the tenant’s departure. Unlike with the corresponding state law, this is true regardless of the number of units the landlord owns. If a landlord fails to comply, the tenant has the right to sue for twice the amount of the deposit, plus interest and attorneys’ fees.

The ordinance also applies even if the landlord did not willfully (that is, intentionally) withhold the payment. That provision was established by the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, 307 Ill.App.3d 155, 717 N.E.2d 443, 240 Ill.Dec. 350 (1999). In that case, Aurelia Lawrence sued her landlord for withholding interest on a pet deposit. At trial, the court decided that a pet deposit is a security deposit for the purposes of the law (rather than a fee or charge). But because the landlord didn’t willfully refuse to pay interest on that pet deposit, it declined to impose the penalty of twice the deposit plus interest and attorney fees. Lawrence moved for a new trial, which was denied, and appealed to the First District.

In its analysis, the appeals court noted that it did not need to decide whether the landlord actually did willfully fail to pay; what mattered was whether the ordinance required willfulness in the first place. In order to require willfulness, the court wrote, a law must be penal (intended to punish) rather than remedial (intended to make the victim whole). Both sides agreed that the case turned on the issue of penal versus remedial. The court first decided that its decision should not be controlled by Szpila v. Burke, 279 Ill. App. 3d 964, 665 N.E.2d 357 (1996), in which the appeals court decided that a tenant was entitled to damages once rather than for each separate violation of the ordinance. In that case, the First District said, it found willfulness because to do otherwise would give a result that was out of proportion to the violation and unjust. A similar case, Namur v. Habitat Co., 294 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 691 N.E.2d 782 (1998), was dismissed because it did not address the question at issue here.

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