NPR reports:
The Justice Department is threatening to sue Apple and five major publishers for allegedly colluding to raise the price of digital books. Apple persuaded publishers, including Harper Collins, Penguin and Simon and Schuster, to change how they price their e-books before the launch of the first iPad, according to The Wall Street Journal.
“Location, location, location” isn’t just a mantra for real estate agents and house hunters. When it comes to litigation, venue is an important issue to consider for both plaintiffs and defendants alike. In Westwood Apex v. Contreras, the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit explains an important federal law bearing on venue and, in particular, a class action defendant’s ability to change it.
Westwood Apex, a subsidiary of the for-profit higher-education institution Westwood College (Westwood) which operates campuses in 14 states including California, filed a breach of contract action against Jesus Contreras in state court, seeking to recover roughly $20,000 in unpaid student loan debt. In response, Contreras filed a class action counterclaim on behalf of all current and former Westwood students against the school as well as a number of affiliated entities alleging fraud as well as unfair and deceptive business practices in violation of various California consumer protection laws.
All of the counterclaim defendants except Westwood filed a notice of removal, transferring the action to a federal court, the District Court for the Central District of California. The Defendants asserted that removal was appropriate under a federal law called the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The law grants federal courts jurisdiction over class action lawsuits where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and the opposing parties are minimally diverse (at least one plaintiff must live in a different state than one defendant).
After issuing an order to show cause as to why the case should not be removed, the District Court remanded the case back to the state court, ruling that CAFA does not permit a counterclaim defendant to remove an action to federal court. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld this decision and the underlying reasoning.
Enacted in 2005, CAFA – codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453 – was intended to fight perceived abuses (so-called “junk lawsuits”) in the class action litigation process. Although the statute allows “any defendant” to remove a qualifying class action, the Court held that it does not extend the removal power to counterclaim defendants. “[A] counterclaim defendant who is also a plaintiff to the original state action may not remove the case to federal court,” the Court ruled, citing the Supreme Court’s 1941 decision in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corporation v. Sheets as well as the Ninth Circuit’s more recent opinion in Progressive West v. Preciado (2007). As a result, the Court upheld the District Court’s ruling, leaving the action in state court.
The law firm of DiTommaso Lubin on behalf of a class of Abercrombie & Fitch customers recently obtained certification of a class-action against Abercrombie regarding $25 promotional cards with no expiration date on the face of the cards. Abercrombie will not honor the cards any longer. Customers obtained the cards in a promotion which required a $100 purchase to receive the $25 cards. The cards came in a paper sleeve which stated a short use period of just a few months. However, the card itself stated that it had no expiration date.
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois certified a nationwide breach of contract class action based on the Class’s position that the card is a contract. It is the Class’s position that contractual term of no expiration date on the card itself trumps the sleeve either because the sleeve is mere advertising or because when two terms in a contract conflict the contract should be construed against the entity that drafted it — in this case Abercrombie & Fitch. The Court has not yet made a decision on the merits of the case. You can read the Court’s decision by clicking here. The 7th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals rejected Abercrombie’s request to hear an immediate appeal on the class-certification decision.
DiTommaso Lubin is also representing a consumer of Abercrombie’s sister company Hollister in an identical putative class action lawsuit involving the same promotion. The Court has not yet certified a class in that case.
If you are a member of the class alleged in Hollister case, you can contact DiTommaso Lubin for additional information about participating as a class representative.
Claims for trademark infringement and false advertising under the Lanham Act do not apply to allegedly false assertions of “authorship of a creative work,” according to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In M. Arthur Gensler, Jr. & Associates, Inc. v. Jay Marshall Strabala, the court dismissed a Lanham Act suit based on claims of authorship of architectural designs, but suggested that a copyright claim might be more appropriate.
The plaintiff, M. Arthur Gensler, Jr. & Associates, Inc. (“Gensler”) is a design firm with offices in multiple countries. It employed the defendant, Jay Marshall Strabala (“Strabala”) as an architect from 2006 to 2010. Gensler sued Strabala under the Lanham Act and two Illinois deceptive trade practice statutes. Strabala moved the court to dismiss Gensler’s suit for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court agreed and dismissed the case.
In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider all of a plaintiff’s “well-pleaded factual allegations” as true. While Strabala was an employee of Gensler, he worked on multiple high-profile projects, including the Shanghai Tower in China and multiple buildings in Houston, Texas. Strabala left Gensler in February 2010 and began practicing under an assumed business name, 2DEFINE Architecture. While based in Chicago, he advertised offices in Shanghai, China and Seoul, South Korea. Strabala set up a website and a page on the photo-sharing site Flickr to market his business. His Flickr site included claims that he designed the Shanghai Tower and several of Gensler’s Houston buildings. Gensler sued to stop Strabala from claiming primary responsibility for the design of these buildings.
Gensler alleged that Strabala’s claims constituted “false designation of origin” and “false advertising” under the Lanham Act. The court considered whether a claim of authorship of a creative work could be considered a “false designation of origin,” and concluded that it cannot. In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., a 2003 Supreme Court case involving a film studio and a video publisher, the Supreme Court considered whether “origin of goods” included the author/producer of the films themselves, or just the actual physical videotapes. It specifically interpreted the “origin of goods” provision to refer to actual tangible goods, not creative works. Because Gensler could not cite any authority that overruled the Dastar holding, the Illinois district court found its claim unpersuasive. The court did note, however, two federal appellate cases that applied Dastar but allowed the possibility of copyright claims.
For a person seeking to sue for car fraud, it’s not enough to know who swindled you and how they did it. You also need to know what claims to raise in order to recover your losses. In Martin v. Ford Motor Co., the district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania explains that fraud claims may not always do the trick.
Plaintiff Aaron D. Martin filed a Complaint against Defendant Ford Motor Company, including class action claims brought “on behalf of himself and other similarly situated.” He claims that Ford failed to disclose a known defect in its 1999-2003 Ford Windstar model cars. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that although Ford expressly warranted that the 2001 Windstar that Plaintiff purchased from an authorized dealer was free of defects, the car’s rear axle is allegedly unsealed, causing it to rust and corrode over time before ultimately cracking. The defect is allegedly widely known and much discussed in the automotive industry, according to Plaintiff, and therefore Ford should have been aware of it. Three months after the complaint was filed, Ford recalled all Windstars manufactured between 1998 and 2002 in order to fix the rear axle problem.
Plaintiff’s many claims against Ford include a general fraud claim as well as those for intentional misrepresentation or omission, false statements and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Defendants countered by arguing that these claims are barred by the “economic loss” doctrine, which in Pennsylvania prohibits a Plaintiff from recovering economic losses in a tort claim where the entitlement to the money is based in contract. In other words, because Plaintiff’s right to recover any losses from Ford is based on the parties’ contract, the company argued that he cannot seek to recover these losses in tort (i.e., via the fraud claims).
While the court noted that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to intentional misconduct, such as fraud, it also held that this exception is not available where the intentional misconduct alleged concerns the quality of a good being sold. In this case the intentional misconduct – Ford’s alleged misrepresentations – concerned the quality of the vehicle, a good offered for sale. As a result, the economic loss doctrine barred Plaintiff’s fraud claims under state law, which the court dismissed.
The ruling does not mean, however, that Plaintiff cannot recover damages against Ford. The court refused to dismiss Plaintiff’s fraud claims raised under the laws of various states other than Pennsylvania. Nor did it dismiss his claim for unjust enrichment. Plaintiff also retains the right to sue for breach of contract.
Solid evidence and strong legal arguments are all well and good, but in order to successfully sue a car dealer for fraud, you first have to bring the action in the right venue. In Tolbert v. Coast to Coast Dealer Services, Inc., the Northern District of Ohio explains that it will enforce an arbitration clause requiring a dispute to be resolved via arbitration unless the provision is “unconscionable.”
Plaintiffs Leah Tolbert and Diana Barker bought a 2004 Jeep Sports Liberty Truck from Defendant Coast to Coast Dealer Services, Inc. (Coast to Coast), a used car dealership. Plaintiffs made a $3,500 down payment and agreed to pay the remaining purchase price ($4,400) in $300 monthly payments. They also purchased a Vehicle Service Agreement (VSA), under which Defendant agreed to service and repair the car. The VSA included an arbitration clause providing that “any and all claims, disputes, or controversies of any nature whatsoever” between the parties is subject to arbitration, a dispute resolution format in which parties submit the matter to one or more private arbitrators.
Plaintiffs allegedly began having trouble with the car shortly after driving it off of the lot. The “check engine” light allegedly went on within a day of the purchase, the first of what would be a long string of alleged issues related to the car. According to the court, Plaintiffs “had to bring the vehicle back to [the dealership] over ten different times for various problems, including the engine light, engine smoke, fan relay system, and replacement of the water pump and thermostat.” Plaintiffs stopped making the monthly payments on the car when it allegedly became inoperable due to an engine problem and Coast to Coast repossessed the vehicle after performing repairs on it.
Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit, alleging that Defendant committed fraud by selling the car without disclosing various mechanical defects and by offering the VSA with no intent of honoring it. Whether or not this was the case, however, will be decided elsewhere. The court granted Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the VSA’s arbitration clause is valid and requires that Plaintiffs’ claims be resolved by an arbitrator.
While Plaintiffs argued that the arbitration clause was “unconscionable” – because it forces them to give up their right to be awarded attorneys’ fees and punitive damages and arbitration proceedings will result in significantly higher costs – and therefore unenforceable, the court disagreed. “An unconscionable contract is one in which there is an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties to a contract, combined with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party,” the court stated. In an arbitration proceeding, the court found that Plaintiffs retained the full slate of remedies available under Ohio law and noted that the arbitration clause includes a provision requiring Defendant to advance Plaintiffs’ arbitration costs if they are unable to pay them. As a result, the arbitration clause was not unconscionable.
Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog