Class-Action

California Federal Court Dismisses Class Action Lawsuit Claiming Unpaid Commissions – Park v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.

November 20, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed a class action claim brought by a financial advisor employed by a major financial services company. In Park v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., the plaintiff claimed breach of contract and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), based on allegations that the defendant failed to pay commissions owed to plaintiff and other employees. The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support his claim for breach of contract, and that the UCL claim lacked support as a result.

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a financial advisor by Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. Part of his job involved the sale of financial products to investors. He received commission payments from the defendant as compensation for sales, in amounts based on an “applicable commission grid.” This grid was allegedly contained in a “written agreement” between the plaintiff and the defendant that the court described in its order as “unspecified.” According to the plaintiff, the defendant said that it would base commissions on the full amount of revenue received for the financial products sold. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant took a portion of the revenue received before applying the commission grid, thus reducing the total amount of the commissions paid to the plaintiff and other employees.

The plaintiff filed a federal class action lawsuit on November 15, 2011, claiming breach of contract and violations of the UCL. The lawsuit alleged that the defendant’s policies knowingly denied earned compensation to certain employees, resulting in breach of contract and unjust enrichment to the defendant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the plaintiff had not stated a cause of action on which the court could grant relief. The court cited precedents from the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to establish that, in order to defeat the defendant’s motion, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate enough allegations of fact to make his claims facially plausible. The court found that the plaintiff did not meet this standard, and it granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Posner Decision Breathes New Life Into Class Actions in Sears Front Loading Washer Litigation

November 16, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

The Seventh Circuit Federal Court of appeals in a succinct and simply worded opinion by Judge Posner blew much needed fresh air into class action litigation by approving certification of class actions against Sears for front loading washing machines which are allegedly prone to mold or which had an allegedly defective controller. Judge Posner correctly concluded that machines with these type of uniform alleged defects are worth less than machines in correct working order and that consumers are therefore entitled to pursue refunds or other compensation for their alleged damages. Judge Posner correctly noted that class actions make sense to rectify consumer rights involving mass product defects which are essentially uniform but the damage recoveries to individual consumers would be too small to justify litigation. He made short shrift of the parade of claimed individual issues that defendants always claim exist to defeat class certification.

The class action suits which Posner considered involved alleged defects in Kenmore-brand Sears’ washing machines sold in periods beginning in 2001 and 2004. One asserted a defect that causes mold; the other asserted a defect that stops the machine inopportunely. The district court denied certification of the class complaining of mold and granted certification of the class complaining of sudden stoppage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed certification of the stoppage claims and reversed denial of certification for the mold claims. Rule 23(b)(3) conditions maintenance of a class action on a finding “that the questions of fact or law common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The basic question in the litigation is: were the machines defective in permitting mold to accumulate and generate noxious odors? The question is common to the entire mold class, although the answer may vary with the differences in design. The individual questions are the amount of damages owed particular class members. It is more efficient for the question whether the washing machines were defective to be resolved in a single proceeding than for it to be litigated separately in hundreds of different trials.

You can read the full opinion here.

This opinion should swing the pendulum towards the middle again and end trial courts from reflexively finding hypothetical individual issues to destroy the chances of cases that truly justify class action treatment from proceeding which has been occurring all too frequently in recent years. It should breathe new life into class actions which can help protect consumers from mass wrongdoing where the damages are too small to justify individual consumer lawsuits. Without the threat of class actions, business entities have far less incentive to correct mass product defects if a cost benefit analysis would make it easier for them to ignore resolving the issues in a fair manner. However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision to allow businesses, including disreputable ones, to force consumer to sign arbitration agreements eliminating consumer rights to bring class actions allows for an escape hatch from this decision which will continue to harm consumer rights unless Congress acts to prevent forced arbitration of consumer claims. Such congressional action is very unlikely.

Forced arbitration precludes class actions and also forces consumers to arbitrate their individual cases outside of court sometimes in front of rigged or biased arbitration outfits that retain unqualified arbitrators and favor their repeat business customers. While JAMS and American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) are extremely reputable arbitration organizations that provide forums, which in our opinion can be equal or superior to courts, our firm is now seeing sleazy businesses such as used car dealers forcing consumers to arbitrate claims in front of unfair business oriented arbitration organizations that provide kangaroo courts where consumers rights are trampled on and the business firms that pay these organizations are rewarded with unfair and favorable verdicts in cases where the evidence of misconduct is clear cut. Lawyers will avoid taking cases when these incompetent and pro-business arbitration organizations are selected in adhesion contracts created by used car dealers and other disreputable businesses. Without lawyers to represent them, consumers will not only have lost the protection of the court system but they will not be able to retain counsel to even bring their cases. Legislatures need to act to police these private court systems run by disreputable and biased organizations and to ensure that arbitration organizations that hear consumer claims are all legitimate outfits like the AAA and JAMS.

Since so many businesses are forcing consumers to opt out of class actions and to arbitrate claims on an individual basis, the full benefit of Judge Posner’s efficiency analysis for allowing class actions to proceed will unfortunately be lost. Our state and federal legislative bodies need to act to reopen the courthouse doors for vindicating consumer rights by ending mandatory arbitration in consumer contracts or at least to create government oversight bodies to drive out disreputable arbitration outfits that businesses are using to deny consumer rights. The government regulates lawyers and judges, but these disreputable and incompetent arbitration organizations lack the same regulation, which oftentimes means unjust results for consumers.

Lubin Austermuehle’s Oak Brook and Chicago Attorneys Peter Lubin Named 2013 Illinois Super Lawyer as Class-Action, Business Litigation and Consumer Rights Attorneys

November 1, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Super Lawyers named Chicago and Oak Brook business trial attorneys Peter Lubin Super Lawyers in the Categories of Class Action, Business Litigation and Consumer Rights Litigation. Lubin Austermuehle’s Oak Brook and Chicago business trial lawyers have over a quarter of century of experience in litigating complex class action, consumer rights and business and commercial litigation disputes. We handle emergency business law suits involving injunctions, and TROS, covenant not to compete, franchise, distributor and dealer wrongful termination and trade secret lawsuits and many different kinds of business disputes involving shareholders, partnerships, closely held businesses and employee breaches of fiduciary duty. We also assist businesses and business owners who are victims of fraud.

Peter S. Lubin

online at

NPR Reports: “Wal-Mart’s Female Employees File Suit In Tennessee”

October 30, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

USA Today Reports:”NCAA seeks to block class action in O’Bannon case”

October 24, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

USA Today reports that the NCAA is seeking dismissal of the class action claims by former players including Oscar Robertson because the NCAA’s lawyers claims plaintiffs have changed their legal theories too many times. This potential class action claims that the NCAA has unfairly profited from the players images without paying them for these valuable rights. The article states:

Lawyers defending the NCAA in an anti-trust lawsuit related to the use of college athletes’ names and likenesses say the case should not be certified as a class action, in part, because the plaintiffs changed their legal strategy in a way that is unfair and could mean the NCAA has wasted “significant time and money” responding to the suit.

To read the full article click here.

Supreme Court To Address Standards For Class Certification in Securities Fraud Actions and Whether Plaintiffs Need to Prove “Fraud On The Market” Claim to Certify a Class-Action

October 1, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

The Supreme Court in Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds has recently agreed to decide on whether federal courts in certifying a securities class must decide in order to certify the class whether the fact of damages claims regarding a “fraud on the market” have merit or are true. Federal courts generally didn’t decide the merits of the case in class actions at the time of class certification. However, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision the Walmart class action corporate defendants and business interests have urged the Court to make Plaintiffs prove their case at the class certification stage.

An excellent article discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to hear Amgen and its ramifications can be reviewed by clicking here. The article explains the significance of the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the case as follows:

For over 20 years, the “fraud on the market” theory, which the Supreme Court endorsed in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), has been a key tool for plaintiffs in class action securities fraud litigation under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. The theory posits that the price of a security trading in an efficient market reflects all publicly available information about that security. Based on that premise, the theory gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that investors rely on material misrepresentations reflected in market prices at the time they transact. Without this presumption, plaintiffs purporting to assert class action securities fraud claims would have difficulty showing reliance on a class-wide basis, and hence satisfying the typicality and predominance prerequisites to class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). Decisions as to class certification strongly influence the balance of leverage as between plaintiffs and defendants in class actions generally. Thus, the showing plaintiffs must make in order to invoke the “fraud on the market” theory is a critical issue in securities litigation.

The impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Amgen could go well beyond securities actions and make it more difficult to ever certify any type of class action.

California Court Limits Removal under Class Action Fairness Act – Westwood Apex v. Contreras

July 26, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

“Location, location, location” isn’t just a mantra for real estate agents and house hunters. When it comes to litigation, venue is an important issue to consider for both plaintiffs and defendants alike. In Westwood Apex v. Contreras, the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit explains an important federal law bearing on venue and, in particular, a class action defendant’s ability to change it.

Westwood Apex, a subsidiary of the for-profit higher-education institution Westwood College (Westwood) which operates campuses in 14 states including California, filed a breach of contract action against Jesus Contreras in state court, seeking to recover roughly $20,000 in unpaid student loan debt. In response, Contreras filed a class action counterclaim on behalf of all current and former Westwood students against the school as well as a number of affiliated entities alleging fraud as well as unfair and deceptive business practices in violation of various California consumer protection laws.

All of the counterclaim defendants except Westwood filed a notice of removal, transferring the action to a federal court, the District Court for the Central District of California. The Defendants asserted that removal was appropriate under a federal law called the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The law grants federal courts jurisdiction over class action lawsuits where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and the opposing parties are minimally diverse (at least one plaintiff must live in a different state than one defendant).

After issuing an order to show cause as to why the case should not be removed, the District Court remanded the case back to the state court, ruling that CAFA does not permit a counterclaim defendant to remove an action to federal court. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld this decision and the underlying reasoning.

Enacted in 2005, CAFA – codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453 – was intended to fight perceived abuses (so-called “junk lawsuits”) in the class action litigation process. Although the statute allows “any defendant” to remove a qualifying class action, the Court held that it does not extend the removal power to counterclaim defendants. “[A] counterclaim defendant who is also a plaintiff to the original state action may not remove the case to federal court,” the Court ruled, citing the Supreme Court’s 1941 decision in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corporation v. Sheets as well as the Ninth Circuit’s more recent opinion in Progressive West v. Preciado (2007). As a result, the Court upheld the District Court’s ruling, leaving the action in state court.

Chicago Class Action Attorneys at Lubin Austermuehle Obtain Certification of a Class Action Against Abercrombie & Fitch For Refusing to Honor Promotional Cards Which Say on Their Face They Have No Expiration Date

July 25, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

The law firm of Lubin Austermuehle on behalf of a class of Abercrombie & Fitch customers recently obtained certification of a class-action against Abercrombie regarding $25 promotional cards with no expiration date on the face of the cards. Abercrombie will not honor the cards any longer. Customers obtained the cards in a promotion which required a $100 purchase to receive the $25 cards. The cards came in a paper sleeve which stated a short use period of just a few months. However, the card itself stated that it had no expiration date.

The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois certified a nationwide breach of contract class action based on the Class’s position that the card is a contract. It is the Class’s position that contractual term of no expiration date on the card itself trumps the sleeve either because the sleeve is mere advertising or because when two terms in a contract conflict the contract should be construed against the entity that drafted it — in this case Abercrombie & Fitch. The Court has not yet made a decision on the merits of the case. You can read the Court’s decision by clicking here. The 7th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals rejected Abercrombie’s request to hear an immediate appeal on the class-certification decision.

Lubin Austermuehle is also representing a consumer of Abercrombie’s sister company Hollister in an identical putative class action lawsuit involving the same promotion. The Court has not yet certified a class in that case.

If you are a member of the class alleged in Hollister case, you can contact Lubin Austermuehle for additional information about participating as a class representative.

7th Circuit Reverses its Decision in Sears Class-Action

May 2, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

The Thorogood lawsuit against Sears, characterized by the 7th Circuit as purportedly “near frivolous,” concerned marketing of a clothes dryer. It was certified and later decertified as a class action on the ground that no issues could be resolved in a single, class-wide evidentiary hearing, and was ultimately dismissed. Murray, a member of the proposed class, who did not become a party, filed a “copycat” class action, using the same attorney. Following a third visit to the Seventh Circuit, the district court enjoined the Murray suit as defiant of the decertification. The Supreme Court remanded. The Seventh Circuit consolidated the Thorogood and Murray cases for its fourth opinion. On the merits, the court stated that “One would have to have a neurotic obsession with rust stains (or be a highly imaginative class action lawyer) to worry about Sears’ drum,” and that it would “unsay nothing,” in its previous opinions, but vacated the injunction. “We were wrong. The Supreme Court’s decision—rendered after we ordered the injunction … although it does not refer to the All Writs Act, inclines us to doubt that Murray, not having been a party to the Thorogood suit, can nevertheless be bound by a ruling in it, including the ruling decertifying the class.” You can view the 7th Circuit’s decision here.

Combining Two or More Classes into One Toxic Contamination Action – Thomas v. Wilbert & Sons, LLC

April 5, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

In Thomas v. Wilbert & Sons, LLC, Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of Appeals tackles the tricky situation in which two or more certified classes are combined for trial. While such a scenario can be procedurally complicated, the basic class certification principles – including that a court considering class action certification request or challenge not concern itself with the likelihood of success on the merits of an action – remain the same.

The plaintiffs, residents of a trailer home park in or around Plaquemine, Louisiana, brought the action against the defendants Dow Chemical Company (Dow), Wilbert & Sons, L.L.C. (Wilbert) and other parties claiming that the plaintiffs were injured when Dow allegedly contaminated the Plaquemine aquifer, which provides groundwater to the local area via wells. The plaintiffs seek damages for personal injury due to exposure to the contaminated water as well as property damages – alleging that the contamination damaged their wells and devalued their property – and punitive damages.

While this action was pending, a second group of plaintiffs – which the court refers to as the Robichaux plaintiffs – filed a similar action in neighboring Iberville Parish in March 2002. These plaintiffs did not sue Wilbert, but sought punitive damages and injunctive relief from the state of Louisiana. The Robichaux plaintiffs attained class certification status before the Thomas plaintiffs. In 2007, the Thomas plaintiffs were certified as a class as follows: “[a]ll persons or entities who or which sustained damages to their real property since 1985 due to vinyl chloride, its successors or derivatives in the Plaquemine aquifer, or who were exposed to the drinking water supply at the [trailer home park] which occurred on or before and since the year 1997 near or in Plaquemine…”
The two actions were then consolidated for trial. At this time, the Robichaux plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision to certify the Thomas plaintiffs, arguing that the decision prejudiced their rights as the members of a previously certified class.