Articles Posted in Class-Action

The issue of ground contamination is an extremely important one for homeowners. With the collapse of the housing market, many people have already found that their homes are worth far less than what they paid or still owe on them. If there has been any kind of chemical leak in the area, homeowners may find themselves with property that can’t sell at all, no matter how low they drop the price.

Such might be the case due to Shell Oil Company allegedly contaminating private property near its refinery in Roxana, IL. The lead plaintiff, Jeana Parko, filed the lawsuit on behalf of herself and her neighbors, alleging that they suffered lower values on their property as a direct result of benzene leaking into the ground and other carcinogenic chemical releases caused by the refinery. The leaks were allegedly caused by broken pipelines in the refinery itself, resulting in more than 200,000 pounds of pure benzene being released directly into the ground. The lawsuit was originally filed in Madison County Court in April 2012, but has since been moved to federal court.

U.S. District Judge G. Patrick Murphy has agreed to certify the class, although Shell argued that the owners of the estimated 387 plots of land at issue should be forced to litigate individually. Defendants often argue for individual litigation over class action lawsuits because the awards of individual litigation are likely to be much lower and the plaintiffs are less likely to sue on their own. The pressure of a certified class is also more likely to induce the defendant to settle the case outside of court.

Judge Murphy did not agree with Shell’s arguments for denying the class certification. In his decision, he wrote, “The question of whether hazardous petroleum byproduct pervades village property and of whether defendants are complicit in any resultant damage are best suited to class-wide resolution”. He also points out that to have each of the almost 400 plaintiffs file their own individual lawsuits would create a “redundant and unnecessary strain on the dockets of multiple justices” without doing anything to increase the “accuracy of the resolution”.
Derek Brandt is a shareholder of Simmons, Browder, Gianaris, Angelides & Barnerd, the law firm representing the plaintiffs in the case. Brandt argues that the class certification will be beneficial to both the plaintiffs and the defendants. “It gives authority to the defendant, so that no one later can come back and ask ‘what about me?’ All of the plaintiffs would be included in whoever is in the class,” says Brandt. “It also gives the plaintiffs an advantage because they can proceed in mass.”

Earlier in the case, Shell attempted to have the class action lawsuit stayed or dismissed due to two other similar cases they are facing which are still pending in Madison County. These attempts were unsuccessful and the case is now preparing to go to trial.
In addition to Shell Oil Company, the defendants in the lawsuit include Equilon Enterprises dba Shell Oil Products, US, ConocoPhillips Company, WRB Refining LP, ConocoPhillips WRB Partner and Cenovus GPCO.

Simmons is also representing the Village of Roxana in a similar lawsuit against Shell Oil Co.

Continue reading ›

 

While many people grumble about paying the exorbitant ATM fees that are being charged these days, few people know that there may be legal recourse. Until recently, the Electric Funds Transfer Act required ATMs charging a fee to provide two notices to customers: one notice in a sticker on the ATM, and another notice on the screen during the transaction. The Act has since been amended so that only the onscreen notification is required. However, during the time that both notices were required, Kore of Indiana Enterprise allegedly failed to provide one of these notices on two ATMs that they owned.

Kore owned ATMs in two bars in Indianapolis, which are allegedly popular with college students. Kore allegedly failed to post a notice that it charges a fee for each use of the ATMs. David Hughes sued Kore on behalf of himself and everyone who had used the ATMs during the time that the Electric Funds Transfer Act required two notices of an ATM fee. The lower court denied his motion for certification for class status, and Hughes appealed.

A plaintiff in an individual suit of this kind is entitled to actual damages or to statutory damages of anywhere from $100 to $1000. In the case of a class action lawsuit, the amount of damages is left to the discretion of the judge but cannot exceed $500,000 or 1 percent of the defendant’s worth, whichever is smaller. If the plaintiffs are successful, it is also the judge’s responsibility to award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” which the defendant would also pay.

In this class action lawsuit, the limit to the damages would be $10,000, since that is 1 percent of Kore’s worth. In the time period that this case covers, there were more than 2800 transactions at the two ATMs. The damages for a class action would this be at most $3.57 per transaction. If each class member only engaged in one transaction, that would leave 2800 class members who are each entitled to no more than $3.57.

The district judge decertified the class for two reasons, the first reason being that the class members would do better to bring individual suits, since they are entitled to at least $100 in an individual lawsuit. The $100 to $1000 range for statutory damages appears to be per suit rather than per transaction. However, individual lawsuits of this kind are unlikely to make it to court since $100 is such a small reward to sue for.

The judge’s second reason for decertifying the class was that the requirement of providing notice to class members could not be satisfied since the ATMs do not store user names. They track each transmission with a 10-digit identification number. The first six digits identify the user’s bank while the last four identify the user. To attach names to these numbers would require subpoenaing each bank that is identified. Since these ATMs were used largely by college students, this could involve subpoenaing hundreds of banks from students’ home towns.

Since distributing $3.57 to each class member would provide no real relief to the plaintiffs, the best solution, according to the appellate court, may be a “cy pres” decree. This is when the money the plaintiffs are awarded in a case goes to a charity whose work coincides with the interest of the class. In this case, the money could be given to a foundation that deals with consumer protection. Such a foundation could do much more with $10,000 than each class member could do with $3.57. Another purpose of a cy pres is to prevent the defendant who violated a statute or otherwise engaged in wrongdoing from getting away without punishment when distribution of the award to the class members is unlikely.

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision refusing to certify the class and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Continue reading ›

 

Arbitration provisions are appearing in more and more contracts lately, in everything from employment contracts to consumer contracts. With increasing frequency, companies are looking to block employees and consumers access to the courts, in the event that they have a complaint against the company.

In a recent class action lawsuit, Ganley Chevrolet and Ganley Automotive Stores, tried to force a consumer class action lawsuit against them into arbitration. The courts, on the other hand, have agreed that the dealership group’s sales agreement was “incomplete and misleading” and therefore unenforceable.

The dispute began in March 2001 when Jeffrey and Stacy Felix purchased a 2000 Chevy Blazer. Ganley allegedly told the Felixes that they were approved for 0.0% financing but that the offer would expire that evening. They agreed and traded in their van as part of the deal. Ganley allegedly insisted that they take the new car home with them. A few days later though. Ganley told the couple that the bank would approve only 1.9% financing, which they accepted. After having the car for more than a month, the Felixes were told that the bank had decided not to approve the 1.9% financing but that Ganley had found another bank which would give them a loan with a 9.44% financing rate. The Felixes refused to sign a new agreement at such a high rate. They kept the vehicle though, and have been putting money in escrow to purchase it.

Meanwhile, they filed a lawsuit against Ganley Chevrolet and Ganley Automotive Stores alleging “bait and switch tactics.” This is a practice in which a dealer will offer goods at one low price to get the customer interested, then suddenly raise the price at the last minute. It is also a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales and Practices Act. The lawsuit further alleges misrepresentation and emotional distress. It includes individual claims as well as class action claims and challenges the validity of the arbitration provision in the sales agreement.

The lower court judge found the arbitration provision to be “ambiguous and misleading” and therefore rejected Ganley’s request for arbitration and approved class action status on behalf of all consumers whose sales agreement with any Ganley store had the same provision from June 1999 until the company changed the provision in 2007. The judge also awarded $200 in damages to each of the “thousands of members” of the certified class.

Ganley appealed the decision and the case went to the Ohio Court of Appeals which upheld the class certification in a 2-1 decision. The court found that class action status in this case was appropriate under the consumer protection law. The one dissenting judge agreed that, Ganley’s use of the arbitration provision might be an “unfair or deceptive practice” that would justify individual lawsuits in court. However, he argued that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for class action status and such was his reason for dissent.

In order to qualify for class action status, the plaintiffs must meet certain criteria. These criteria include: 1) an identifiable class must exist, and its definition must be clear; 2) the named plaintiff representatives must be members of the class; 3) the class must be large enough to make joining all of the members practicable; 4) the class must have in common questions of law or fact; 5) the claims or defenses of the representatives must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 6) the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Ganley argues that the trial court should not have certified the class because the class definition and time period are too broad and ambiguous. Ganley also argued that the commonality, predominance, and typicality prerequisites to class certification had not been met. The Court of Appeals disagreed and upheld the lower court’s ruling.

Continue reading ›

 

Watch the latest video at video.foxbusiness.com

NY Attorney General sues Trump University for alleged consumer fraud. Our Chicago consumer fraud and class action lawyers have successfully pursued class actions against trade schools in Illinois that have misrepresented the percentage of graduates who have obtained jobs in the field or omitted to disclose that very few graduates obtain jobs in the field. Illinois requires trade schools to disclose the percentage of graduates who obtain jobs in the field.

Our law firm is pursuing class actions and putative class actions against for profit vocational schools in the Chicago area. We have interviewed many students of for profit universities, colleges and vocational schools who believe that various for profit colleges and Universities have cheated them along with the government in getting the students to borrow money with government backed loans for essentially a worthless education.

Continue reading ›

 

Ever since the Supreme Court’s rulings in Walmart and Comcast, denying class certification in those cases, courts have had to increasingly deny plaintiffs class certification. Recently, a rift has appeared between federal courts with different interpretations of what should be acceptable for a class action to proceed. Traditionally, all that plaintiffs have needed to secure class certification is a class with well-defined limits, proof that the members of the proposed class have a common complaint against the defendant, evidence that the named plaintiffs are sufficient representatives of the entire class, and proof that the plaintiffs’ counsel can adequately represent the class in a court of law. Only after the class has achieved certification do the plaintiffs worry about trying to include all potential class members.

On one side of the argument is the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, which has consistently made rulings on the belief that class actions are an efficient mode of determining the liability of a defendant, particularly when individual claims are small. This court has ruled in favor of class actions in such cases as the one against Sears and Whirlpool for moldy washing machines, as well as a case addressing lack of properly displaying warnings for ATM fees. Both of these cases have been discussed on this blog.

On the other side of the debate is the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals which has recently ruled that class actions may not be certified until individual class members can be ascertained. This decision comes in the case of Carrera v. Bayer in which consumers allege that they were deceived by Bayer’s claim that green tea extract in its One-A-Day WeightSmart supplements would boost consumers’ metabolism. The district judge, Jose Linares of Newark, New Jersey, denied class certification on a nationwide basis, but granted the plaintiff’s subsequent motion for certification of a class of Florida purchasers under that state’s trade practices suit.
On appeal at the 3rd Circuit Court, Bayer’s attorneys argued that the class should not have been certified because it is impossible to discern everyone who bought the product. Consumers purchasing a widely-distributed over-the-counter product are unlikely to have kept packages or receipts or any kind of record that they purchased the product. Bayer’s representatives therefore argued that membership of the class cannot be ascertained and, on these grounds, the class should not be certified.

The legal counsel for the plaintiffs argued that there are three methods by which they can determine class membership: pharmacy membership programs that track members’ purchases; and screening of affidavits from consumers who claim to have bought One-A-Day WeightSmart to eliminate fraudulent or duplicate claims. They also pointed out that Florida’s consumer law does not require proof of individual reliance. Therefore Bayer’s potential $14 million exposure should not be affected by how big the class is or how the class is defined.
In its decision, the three-judge panel of the 3rd Circuit Court ruled that, unless the plaintiffs could determine a real plan for determining buyers, certifying the class and allowing the case to proceed would be to violate Bayer’s rights of due process. This, according to the 3rd Circuit Court, gives the defendant the right “to raise individual challenges and defenses to claims”. They therefore remanded the case until the plaintiffs could provide sufficient evidence that the class is “ascertainable” despite the fact that the plaintiffs had already laid out a very clear plan for identifying and finding class members.

In the brief filed for the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, the controversial status of the 3rd Circuit Court’s decision is laid out. The brief points out that Rule 23 (for determining class certification) “does not require a roll call (nor, for that matter, does due process). The brief also states that, “In the half-century since the creation of the modern class action, the panel’s decision is the first by any federal circuit court to hold that class certification may be defeated on the basis of ‘ascertainability’ even when the existence of a well-defined class is not in doubt and the full extent of potential liability is known. … If allowed to stand, the panel’s decision will effectively wipe out most class actions involving small-dollar consumer products – cases for which class treatment has always been recognized as most essential.”

You can view the very well done motion for en banc rehearing before the 3rd Circuit here.

Continue reading ›

 

KOAM TV 7

Mars Petcare defends itself after some former workers in Southeast Kansas file a class action lawsuit. Mars Petcare makes Pedigree and other pet foods sold at many major retailers.

A former employee at one of Mars Petcare’s manufacturing facilities in Galena, Kansas doesn’t want his identity released.

“Retaliation from the company,” says the former worker. “It’s huge. It’s going to be the biggest thing to hit this area. It’s going to be a corporate killer.”

Court documents filed in Jasper County, Missouri claim the pet food company should have known about the danger condition of phosphine gas levels, but failed to warn of that condition or remove it.

“It causes respiratory and intestinal damage,” says the former worker. “We don’t know how much. We know there was stuff coming in that was fumigated and was not listed as being fumigated that went straight into making pet food.”

Continue reading ›

Employees of a bank with multiple branch locations throughout Illinois sued to recover unpaid overtime wages under both the federal Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL). After the district court certified two classes of plaintiffs, the defendant bank appealed the certification to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Based in part on a U.S. Supreme Court decision clarifying the requirements for class certification, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. Ross, et al v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2012).

The plaintiffs alleged in their lawsuit that the bank had several “unofficial” policies that allowed it to deny overtime pay to employees, id. at 903, such as using “comp time” instead of overtime wages or altering employee timesheets. They also alleged that some assistant bank managers (ABMs), while officially exempt from eligibility for overtime pay, spent most of their time on non-exempt work. The plaintiffs therefore sought to certify two classes: non-exempt employees who were entitled to overtime compensation, and ABM employees who performed non-exempt work and were entitled to overtime pay. A class action requires four basic elements: “numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.” Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The district court certified both classes under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which applies to cases where the issues affecting all class members supersede those affecting individual members, and where a class action is the best way to resolve the conflict.

Continue reading ›

An Illinois court dismissed a lawsuit against a bank alleging deceptive fees for debit card transactions, ruling that a prior settlement in a class action lawsuit, of which the plaintiff was a class member, barred the suit. Schulte v. Fifth Third Bank (“Schulte 2”), No. 09 C 6655, statement (N.D. Ill., Jun. 15, 2012). The plaintiff acknowledged being part of the class, and by accepting the terms of the settlement agreement, the court held, the plaintiff had released the bank from any further claims related to ATM fees.

The original lawsuit alleged that the defendant “resequenced” debit card transactions during a posting period in an order from highest to lowest, rather than in chronological order. Schulte v. Fifth Third Bank (“Schulte 1”), 805 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (N.D. Ill. 2011). This meant that the balance of the customer’s account drew down faster, leading to more overdrafts and associated fees. A class action lawsuit commenced in November 2009, and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois approved a class settlement agreement in July 2011.

The Schulte 1 settlement applied to customers of the defendant from October 21, 2004 to July 1, 2010. The court applied a five-part test established by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for determining if a class action settlement is fair:

Continue reading ›

A consumer sought to certify two classes in a lawsuit against a credit reporting agency, after the agency allegedly refused to remove negative information from his credit report that was the result of identity theft. The lawsuit asserted various claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The court certified one of the two classes in Osada v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., No. 11 C 2856, slip op. (N.D. Ill., Mar. 28, 2012), finding that it met the requirements contained in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

According to the court’s opinion, the plaintiff learned in late 2008 that unknown parties had taken out two mortgage loans in his name in a total amount greater than $600,000. He contacted the defendant, Experian, regarding how the fraudulent loans would affect his credit report. He also filed a police report, but did not send a copy to Experian. When each mortgage eventually went into foreclosure, the courts handling those matters reportedly realized that identity theft was a factor. The plaintiff submitted an identity theft affidavit to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in late 2009 and wrote to Experian in early 2010 requesting removal of the mortgages from his credit report. He attached the FTC affidavit, the police report, and proof of residence to his request.

Continue reading ›

Contact Information