Business Disputes

Investors May Not Go Forward With Flawed Fraud Claim, Seventh Circuit Rules

September 8, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Our Illinois class action attorneys recently noted a Seventh Circuit decision ending a class-action case in the difficult realm of securities fraud. In Re Guidant Corporation, No. 08-2429 (7th Cir. Oct. 21, 2009), is a securities class action stemming from allegedly misleading statements Guidant Corp. made about its implanted defibrillators. A design flaw with certain lines of defibrillators was discovered in February of 2002, and by April, Guidant had corrected the problem in all of the new devices it made. However, the problem remained in machines already made, and Guidant failed to recall them or warn the public. All in all, Guidant knew in 2002 of at least 25 reports of short-circuiting from the older defibrillators. More reports emerged later.

Two years after this redesign, Guidant entered into merger talks with Johnson & Johnson. As part of these negotiations, it issued a press release expressing confidence about its growth prospects in the implanted defibrillator market. In their claim, plaintiffs said this was false and misleading because Guidant knew it still had liability for the Ventak defibrillators. Subsequent press releases on the merger also omitted this information, as were three merger-related forms Guidant filed with the SEC. However, in March of 2005, a young man died after his Guidant defibrillator short-circuited. Guidant issued several other SEC filings and press releases without disclosing this before it finally sent a letter to doctors in May of 2005 disclosing reported problems, an act prompted by an article about to be published in the New York Times.

The FDA recalled the defibrillators the next month, and Guidant’s stock dropped immediately. It dropped further when Johnson & Johnson announced that it was reconsidering the merger. All in all, the stock fluctuated between $63 a share and $80 a share until Guidant was purchased by Boston Scientific. The instant case is a consolidated class action filed against Guidant and eleven officers and directors as a result of these drops. In addition to alleging that all defendants made false and misleading statements about the company and omitted material information from their statements, it alleged that the individual defendants used insider knowledge and the approval of the Johnson & Johnson merger to sell stock during the period at issue.

Over the course of pre-trial motions, the plaintiffs attempted to amend their complaint at least three times, twice because of new information revealed in related product liability cases. At some point, Guidant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The claims were brought under the Securities Exchange Act, which requires heightened pleading standards for plaintiffs alleging securities fraud. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs’ pleadings were not particular enough and failed to include facts showing that defendants knowingly and with malice misled investors. It dismissed the case with prejudice. It also declined to reconsider based on new evidence from a products liability case, and declined a motion to amend their complaint based on the same evidence. The plaintiffs appealed all three decisions.

In its analysis, the Seventh started by noting that plaintiffs had ample time to make changes to their complaint. In addition to the consolidated complaint from individual claims, it allowed an amendment at the start to change the class period. Plaintiffs notified the court twice of new evidence from other cases, but failed to amend their complaint with that evidence. The Seventh found that this was ample time for plaintiffs to amend their complaint to meet the admittedly strict standards provided for securities cases by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.

It then moved to the trial court’s denial of reconsideration of the dismissal. The plaintiffs claimed that it should have been reconsidered because they had new evidence from product liability cases, a standard ground for reconsideration. They acknowledged that those facts were older, but said the trial court stymied them by refusing to lift a stay of discovery. The Seventh found this unpersuasive, saying the trial court could have ruled either way without abusing its discretion. The trial court must have assessed the new evidence, it wrote, and decided that a new amended complaint would still have lacked the necessary specific facts and evidence of scienter. And the plaintiffs could have entered the new evidence into the record earlier. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying reconsideration. For the same reasons, it was also not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to amend, the Seventh said. Thus, all of the district court’s rulings were affirmed.

Fortune Reports: “How Ronald Perelman Met His Match”

September 8, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Fortune Reports: How Ronald Perelman Met His Match

Fortune magazine provides an insightful account of billionaire Ronald Perelman’s litigation on behalf of his daughter against his ex-wife’s family of New Jersey book store and publishing distributor magnates. The New Jersey state court sanctioned Perelman’s counsel in excess of a million dollars for allegedly pursuing frivilous litigation. The article states:

When the Revlon chairman sued his ex-father-in-law Robert Cohen and his ex-brother-in-law James Cohen in 2008, hardly anyone batted an eyelash. …

Even by modern standards of dysfunctional-family estate battles — think of the Astor clan — this one was a lulu. … But Perelman, it turned out, tangled with the wrong octogenarian. …

Judge Koblitz’s decisions fell like a lash on Perelman’s legal team. In June she found Robert Cohen competent, rejecting Perelman’s demand that a guardian be appointed to represent him during the litigation. Later in the month she ruled on the central claim in Perelman’s case, that Robert Cohen had made a promise to Claudia before Sept. 1, 1978. “It’s just not there,” the judge said. “You can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear.”

Clothing Retailer Sues Competitor and Former Employees Alleging They Stole Secret Designs

August 26, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

As Illinois trade secrets litigation attorneys, we were interested to see a trade secrets lawsuit arise out of the time-sensitive and competitive world of women’s fashion. As the Naples Daily News reported in July, Florida clothing company Chico’s FAS Inc. has sued competitor Cache Inc. and two former employees who moved to Cache, Rabia Farhang and Christine Board. Chico’s alleges that Farhang and Board shared designs from Chico’s White House/Black Market line with Cache, resulting in nearly identical spring and summer collections from the two brands. The lawsuit’s complaint includes exhibits of pictures of both collections. It accuses the women of breach of their nondisclosure agreements and legal duties, and Cache of inducing them to breach those agreements, and all defendants of tortious interference with contractual relations, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, theft, unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy.

According to the complaint in the case (PDF), which was filed in New York state court, Cache has not been financially successful in the past four or five years, during which time Chico’s White House/Black Market line has done well. Chico’s alleges that Cache tried to fix this by inducing Farhang and Board to leave Chico’s in the fall of 2009, taking their knowledge of design plans for 2010 clothing lines along with other trade secrets and confidential information. At Chico’s, Farhang and Board both participated in the designs of the 2010 lines, Farhang as a senior officer. Using the allegedly stolen designs, the complaint says, Cache saw an increase in sales in spring of 2010, and Chico’s alleges that Cache will use stolen designs in its fall line as well. Because of this, it requested preliminary and permanent injunctions stopping Cache from selling clothes from its spring, summer and fall lines, as well as a recall of the spring and summer lines. It also asked for financial damages and court orders protecting its trade secrets and confidential information.

Our Chicago business emergency lawyers believe this case is a good example of a situation in which swift action is necessary. If the allegations by Chico’s are true, its intellectual property and brand have already been somewhat diluted by Cache’s use of very similar designs in its spring and summer lines. This would be ongoing damage to the company that includes difficult-to-measure non-financial harm to its identity and customer loyalty, as well as actual financial damages from infringement. Furthermore, the tight schedules of fashion and retail companies mean that they bring out their fall lines in mid-summer, which means the court must take quick action on the July 29 lawsuit to stop the infringing on the fall line. This also means that Cache’s fiscal health could be in serious trouble if the count chooses to grant the injunction against the fall line and the recall order for the spring and summer lines. For both sides, this claim represents a legal emergency requiring quick action to protect their business.

Illinois Supreme Court Resolves Question on Unintentional Missed Deadlines in Trade Secrets Case

August 11, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Our Chicago trade secrets litigation attorneys were interested to see that a trade secrets and breach of restrictive covenant case was responsible for clarifying a point of procedure at the trial level. In Vision Point of Sale v. Haas et al., No. 103140 (Ill. Sup. Co. Sept. 20, 2007), the Cook County trial court certified a question of law having to do with unintentional noncompliance with a procedural requirement. In such a case, the court asked, may courts consider information of record that goes beyond the reasons for the noncompliance? The First District Court of Appeal said yes, but the Illinois Supreme Court reverse that decision.

The case arises from a Trade Secrets Act, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference and unjust enrichment claim filed by Vision Point of Sale, Inc. against Ginger Haas and Legacy Inc. Haas was an executive assistant at Vision before resigning and immediately taking a job at Legacy. Vision contended that Haas, at Legacy’s direction, stole confidential and proprietary information as she left, with the goal of soliciting Vision’s customers. Both companies refurbish and sell used point-of-sale equipment. Vision requested and received a preliminary injunction as well as a permanent injunction. Discovery on the permanent injunction included a request for admissions from defendants. When Vision returned its responses, the final page was signed by its attorney, but the final page of the document was signed by Vision CEO Frank Muscarello. This violated the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which required Muscarello’s signature on the final page of responses as well.

The defendants immediately moved to strike the document as defective and deem all of its facts admitted because of the missing signature. The trial court granted that motion. Vision moved for more time to file a set of amended responses. That motion argued that a good-faith reading of the rules was enough “good cause” to allow the amendment. It was denied, but after the case proceeded and the court became frustrated with the defendants’ noncompliance with the preliminary injunction, it vacated that denial and allowed Vision to amend its responses. Not surprisingly, the defendants objected and asked the court to certify the question in the instant appeal. The appellate court found that courts may consider information in the record beyond the reasons for the noncompliance, writing that in this situation, the circuit court may consider any facts that “strike a balance between diligence in litigation and the interests of justice.” The defendants appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.

In considering this appeal, the high court said it was considering Supreme Court Rule 183, and to a lesser extent, Rule 216. Rule 183 says that courts may extend deadlines if one party makes a motion requesting the extension and shows good cause. The relevant parts of Rule 216, which deals with requests for admissions, say that recipients must respond within 28 days with a sworn statement denying the objections or a written statement saying they are improper in some way. Otherwise, every fact in the document is deemed admitted. The court started with a detailed discussion of Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204 (1995), the last Illinois Supreme Court case interpreting the good-cause requirement. In that case, the high court found that circuit courts have the discretion to extend the 28-day deadline for responses to requests to admit.

However, the Bright court upheld the trial court’s decision to deny an extension in that particular case, because the movant had failed to show good cause. That court said the “mere absence of inconvenience or prejudice to the opposing party is not sufficient to establish good cause under Rule 183,” and that the burden of establishing good cause should be on the movant. Thus, the rule established by Bright says that trial courts may extend deadlines for responses to requests for admissions if the movant can show good cause. The defendants argue that this is inconsistent with the appellate court’s ruling in the instant case — and the Supreme Court agreed. The appellate court’s analysis focused on issues other than why the plaintiffs failed to meet their deadline, the high court wrote, making it at odds with Bright. Allowing courts to consider the totality of the circumstances, the court wrote, would allow too many irrelevant issues to enter into the analysis.

However, the court did agree with plaintiffs that the cases subsequently arising from Bright created an unduly harsh discovery rule. Cases like Hammond v. SBC Communications, Inc. (SBC), 365 Ill. App. 3d 879, 893 (2006) expanded the rule in Bright to create “a second, broader, harsher, and apparently inflexible standard that ‘mistake, inadvertence, or attorney neglect’ on the part of the moving party can never serve as the sole basis for establishing good cause[.]” This can be fatal to cases and is unnecessarily severe, the high court said, but the appellate court’s decision is not the answer. Rather, the Supreme Court clarified that it never intended such a result in Bright and overruled cases creating that result. This analysis was enough for the Supreme Court to overrule the trial court’s ruling on the discovery motion in this case. However, the high court also found that the plaintiffs’ response was not deficient because the appellate ruling on which it is based, Moy v. Ng, 341 Ill. App. 3d 984 (2003), has no basis in Rule 216 or the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, the appellate court was reversed and the case was remanded.

Class Action Complaint Alleges that Yelp Extorts Businesses to Manipulate Reviews On Its Website

August 1, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Lubin Austermuehle represents businesses caught on either side of a dispute about online or offline defamation of a business or its products or services. Our Chicago business attorneys have assisted our clients in removing damaging and false reviews from internet review sites run by their competitors. Self-publishing on the Internet, and sites like Yelp, make it easy for individuals to publish false information about a competitor or a business they don’t happen to like. Online business libel laws balance the need to protect small businesses from false and damaging information with the First Amendment right to free speech. Our Illinois trade libel and trade disparagment attorneys represent both plaintiffs and defendants in claims regarding false and misleading claims; deceptive online publishing; misuse of a trademark, logo or other identifying feature. You can contact one of our Nationwide Class Action attorneys at 630-333-0333 for a free consultation or contact one of our Chicago class action attorneys us online.

NPR Reports Trial-Bound Companies Learn Lesson: Save E-Mail

July 25, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

NPR reports:

A number of recent high-profile lawsuits suggest that companies must preserve important email documents on their computer systems, or risk major court sanctions. Increasingly, companies are turning to outside vendors to ensure they don’t accidentally destroy electronic documents that could come up in a lawsuit

Generic Drugs Not Misbranded Under Lanham Act, Seventh Circuit Rules

July 14, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

A recent decision by the Seventh Circuit caught the notice of our Illinois trademark infringement litigators. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. et al, Nos. 09-1438, 09-1462, 09-1601 (7th Cir. Oct. 29, 2009) is a dispute between the original maker of a laxative whose patent has expired and the companies that now manufacture a generic version. Schering, the original patent holder, sued four companies for claiming that the drug’s active ingredient is not available over the counter, when Schering does manufacture an over-the-counter version. The trial court in the case dismissed Schering’s complaint, a decision the Seventh Circuit upholds here.

The laxative in question was originally sold as the prescription drug MiraLAX. After its patent expired, the four defendants were authorized to sell generic prescription versions, either as GlycoLax or under the chemical name polyethylene glycol 3350. All four defendants’ drugs have labels stating that the active ingredients in their drugs are sold only by prescription. This is a requirement of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, but it is no longer entirely true. After the generic versions were approved, Schering won approval for an over-the-counter version of MiraLAX. It brought a trademark lawsuit against the defendants, claiming their labeling makes false and misleading statements that misrepresent the nature of their own and Schering’s products, and constitute misbranding under the FD&C Act.

Importantly, the FDA is conducting its own investigation into whether the generic drugs are now misbranded. Simultaneous sales of the same active ingredient in generic and over-the-counter versions violates federal law, which the FDA is also trying to resolve. The Seventh Circuit noted that the FDA may resolve Schering’s lawsuit by finding that the generic drugs may no longer be sold, or that their labels are not false and misleading under the FD&C Act. In either case, the court wrote, it would rather defer that decision to the FDA. This was also the decision of the trial court in the case, which dismissed Schering’s case without prejudice, suggesting that the company re-file after the FDA’s decision, if necessary. Schering appealed, asking for a judgment in its favor rather than a trial. The defendants cross-appealed, arguing that the case should have been dismissed with prejudice.

The Seventh started by noting that a dismissal without prejudice is appealable unless the defect leading to it is immediately curable. It then turned to the merits of Schering’s claim. Letters from FDA regulators the company cited are irrelevant, the court said, because they did not determine the final outcome of the agency’s review. It also dismissed Schering’s argument that the generic drugs were misbranded under the FD&C Act because their labels say “prescription only,” noting that prescription drugs are required to carry this warning. And it noted that federal courts have previously resolved conflicts between FDA labeling requirements and intellectual property law, including in SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2000).

Schering has been “coy” about what kind of labeling it would find sufficient on the generic drugs, the court wrote, leaving suggested wording out of its briefs entirely and agreeing with suggested wording only under pressure at oral arguments. That reticence, the court wrote, made it believe this is not a matter that “can be resolved intelligently without a decision by the FDA.” Because it has more experience with how consumers interact with drug labeling, the court said, the FDA should decide on proper labeling before a Lanham Act claim is filed. Thus, the Seventh Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision to dismiss Schering’s claim in anticipation of the FDA’s ruling. For the same reason, however, it also upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss without prejudice — so Schering can re-file its claim, if necessary, in the future.

How to Collect a Judgement — Our Chicago Business Lawyers Assist Our Clients in Enforcing and Collecting on Money Judgments

June 17, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Our Chicago business trial lawyers assist our clients in obtaining and collecting on money judgments. You can contact one of our Chicago business attorneys online by clicking here or call (888) 990-4990 for a free consultation. Our Oak Brook, Wheaton and Chicago commerical law attorneys have over 25 years of experience litigating claims on behalf of our business clients and have been featured in national and local media. Super Lawyers selected our Oak Brook and Chicago attorneys as among the top 5% in Illinois.

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Former Employee’s Stock Options Remain Valid Under Employment Contract

June 16, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

As Chicago employment contract litigation attorneys, we noted a favorable decision for employees from the Seventh Circuit in October. Lewitton v. ITA Software, Inc., No. 08-3725 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2009) upheld a former employee’s right to buy stock options that had vested during his employment, even though he tried to make the purchase after leaving. Derek Lewitton was hired in April of 2005 as vice-president of sales at ITA Software, which makes a software program that compares the prices of airplane flights. His contract said some of his stock options would be forfeited if ITA didn’t meet certain revenue goals, subject to a time delay to account for delays in the development of a new program called 1U.

Unfortunately, 1U was never widely adopted among ITA’s clients, and ITA scaled it back considerably. Lewitton left ITA in May of 2007. In August of the same year, he tried to buy 138,900 shares of ITA stock. ITA let him buy only 34,722, arguing that the remaining 104,178 were forfeited under his contract. Lewitton sued ITA for breach of his employment contract. ITA removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, after which Lewitton moved for summary judgment, arguing that his employment contract was clear on his right to purchase stock options. The judge granted summary judgment, agreeing that the contract “unambiguously” granted 5,660 options for each month he was at ITA, and that no forfeiting events had taken place. ITA appealed.

The Seventh Circuit started by examining whether the language of Lewitton’s employment contract was ambiguous under Illinois law, which both parties agreed applies. The principal question, the court wrote, is whether the contract unambiguously allows Lewitton to buy the 5,660 shares per month he claims. The contract specifies that those shares are forfeited if ITA didn’t meet certain goals in by the end of an assessment period, but that assessment period would be deferred it the development schedule for 1U was “materially deferred.” In trial court, both sides agreed that 1U’s development didn’t go the way it was expected to go. On that basis, the trial court found that the assessment period was never triggered, and thus the stock options were not forfeited. On appeal, ITA argued that “materially deferred” was ambiguous and not intended to apply when ITA put the program on indefinite hold.

The Seventh disagreed, finding the term unambiguous. The ordinary dictionary definitions of the words are clear, the court wrote. And in fact, the contract includes parts that explain a material deferral by using the words “defer” and “delay” interchangeably. That example clearly shows that the parties agreed to delay the assessment period until after 1U was launched. Because 1U was never launched, the assessment period was never started, the court wrote, and thus the stock option forfeiture provision does not apply. The court dismissed ITA’s argument that the contract was never intended to give Lewitton more shares than other ITA executives. That argument was supported by negotiations and internal ITA communications, the court wrote, and caselaw requires it to consider none of that extrinsic evidence. Furthermore, the contract had a clause specifying that it supersedes all prior “agreements, understandings or negotiations.”
ITA also argued that even if the contract is unambiguous, the case presented an issue of material fact inappropriate for summary judgment. The issue in question, ITA said, is whether ITA really did delay the 1U program rather than ending it altogether. However, the court found that this was “just another attempt to create ambiguity where none exists.” At the district court, the Seventh Circuit noted, ITA made several statements through affidavits and discovery conceding that work was still being done, although resources devoted to it were significantly reduced or nonexistent. Nothing in the record points to a genuine issue of material fact on this question, the court wrote, so the trial court was upheld in its summary judgment order. Finally, the Seventh dismissed ITA’s contention that the district court should determine whether the options are valid under Delaware law (it’s a Delaware corporation), because it had explicitly waived that argument in an agreed order. Thus, the Seventh upheld the district court on all issues.

Video Regarding Covenants Not to Compete in Dental Practice Purchase Agreements — Our Chicago Business Law Attorneys Handle Non-Compete Agreement Lawsuits

May 29, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Lubin Austermuehle prosecutes and defends cases involving controversies over a covenant not to compete, or other restrictive covenants and other business law issues. Our Illinois restrictive covenant attorneys represent clients in active litigation over the validity and enforcement of these covenants, as well as helping to evaluate whether litigation may arise over such a contract. With more than 25 years of experience, we have handled these claims for businesses of every size, from large corporations to family-owned businesses, as well as individual employees. Based in downtown Chicago and in Oak Brook near Naperville, Hinsdale, Wheaton and Downers Grove, our Chicago business law lawyers represent clients throughout the state of Illinois, as well as in Indiana and Wisconsin. To learn more about how our Illinois covenant not to compete lawyers can help you, please do not hesitate to contact us through our Web site or call toll-free at 630-333-0333.