Breach of Contract

A Guarantor is Not a Surety Under the Illinois Sureties Act

April 13, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

At Lubin Austermuehle, we pride ourselves on staying abreast of changes in the law that may affect our clients, especially those rendered by the highest court in the state. The Supreme Court of Illinois released a new decision not long ago that was picked up by our Lombard business litigation attorneys, and the case is of particular interest to business owners who have personally guaranteed a business loan. In JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc. the Court addressed the meaning of the term surety and whether a guarantor falls within that definition under the Illinois Sureties Act.

The initial dispute in JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc. arose from a line of credit extended by Plaintiff JP Morgan Chase Bank to Defendant Earth Foods. The loan was personally guaranteed by the three co-owners of Earth Foods, and three years after the line of credit was first extended, Earth Foods defaulted on the loan. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against both the company for breach of contract and the co-owners as guarantors of the defaulted loan. The individual Defendants asserted an affirmative defense that the guaranty obligation was discharged under the Sureties Act because the Act applies to both guarantors and sureties and the law does not distinguish between the two. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court. In granting the motion, the court held that the individual Defendants were guarantors and the Act only applied to sureties. Defendants appealed the trial court’s decision, and the appellate court held that the term surety encompassed both a surety and a guarantor under the Act and remanded the case. Plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court to review the appellate court’s reversal.

On appeal, the Supreme Court performed an extensive statutory analysis of the Illinois Sureties Act. In performing this analysis, the Court first determined that dictionaries, treatises and past court decisions recognize a clear legal distinction between guarantors and sureties. They then went on to determine the legislative intent behind the Sureties Act through a discussion of other laws related to the same subject matter. Through their discussion, the Court held that a suretyship differs from a guaranty in that a suretyship is a primary obligation to ensure the debt is paid, while a guaranty is an obligation to pay the debt if the principal does not pay. The Court went on to say that the plain language of the Act indicates that the protections of the Sureties Act are not applicable to guarantors. Despite this ruling, the Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted in JP Morgan Chase Bank’s favor and remanded the case to the trial court due to genuine issues of fact regarding whether the parties intended the individual Defendants to be guarantors or sureties for the loan in question.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc. unequivocally answered the question whether the terms surety and guarantor are interchangeable for the purposes of the Illinois Sureties Act. Despite the fact that there is a clear distinction between the two, the Supreme Court allows for the intent of the parties to rule when including either term in a loan agreement. Therefore, business owners should be careful when drafting and negotiating the terms of a guarantor or a surety and be clear which role is intended by the parties to avoid a potential lawsuit down the road.

Appellate Court of Illinois Orders in Camera Review of Potentially Privileged Documents in Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty

April 12, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Business litigation is necessarily an adversarial process – the stakes are high and as such the opposing parties in most lawsuits will fight over many issues during the case. One of the most contentious segments of any case is the discovery process. Because the information obtained during discovery can make or break a case, it is important to understand the law in this area. In that vein, our Berwyn business attorneys would like to share a recent Illinois Appellate Court decision that may affect many of our clients the next time they go to court.

In Mueller Industries Inc. v. Berkman, Defendant Berkman worked for Plaintiff as president of a company owned by Plaintiff pursuant to an employment contract. During his employment, Defendant formed an investment partnership and obtained a 10% ownership interest in a company that was one of Plaintiff’s primary suppliers. Defendant’s lawyer – whose firm was also counsel for Plaintiff – advised him how to structure the investment venture so as to not run afoul of his employment contract with Plaintiff. The initial employment agreement subsequently expired, and a new open-ended agreement was consummated that contained a non-compete clause and other restrictive covenants governing outside financial interests and business opportunities. Defendant then had his attorney form a new company to compete with Plaintiff, and Defendant subsequently resigned his position with Plaintiff.

Plaintiff filed suit for breach of his employment contract and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging Defendant profited personally at the expense of Mueller through his investment partnership. A discovery dispute ensued when Defendant refused to produce documents related to his investment in the supply company and his creation of the competing company. Defendant refused production based upon the 5th amendment and attorney-client privileges. Plaintiff filed a motion to compel production, which was granted by the trial court.

Defendant appealed the trial court’s grant of the motion, and reasserted that the documents were privileged. The Appellate Court reversed in part, holding that Defendant’s pre-existing relationship with his lawyer kept all communication prior to the attorney’s firm’s representation of Plaintiff privileged. However, all communications after the dual representation began were no longer so protected because Defendant no longer had any reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Finally, the Court found that Defendant had failed to demonstrate that producing the requested documents would amount to incriminating testimony, but remanded the case with orders for the lower court to perform an in camera review of the disputed documents and urged the trial court to make a detailed record of its findings.

Illinois Appellate Court grants Preliminary Injunction in Action to Enforce Non-Competition Clause in Employment Contract

March 29, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

While most businesses strive to maintain employee stability, the fact of the matter is that during the course of any company’s existence there will be a certain amount of turnover. In states like Illinois, many employers utilize employment contracts that contain non-compete clauses and other restrictive covenants to protect themselves when employees depart. In spite of these precautionary measures, disputes will often still occur, which is why our Aurora non-compete lawyers are always watching developments in this area of the law.

In Steam Sales Corp. v. Summers, Defendant Summers worked for Plaintiff soliciting and servicing customer accounts pursuant to a written employment agreement that contained both non-compete and liquidated damages clauses. The clauses were to be effective for two years after the cessation of Defendant’s employment with Plaintiff. Plaintiff had several exclusive relationships with manufacturers, which gave it access to information not available to its competitors that served as an advantage in the marketplace. Defendant had access to this information, and after working for Plaintiff for almost two years, he quit to form a competing company and subsequently obtained the business of two of Plaintiffs (now) former clients.

In response, Plaintiff filed suit for Defendant’s violation of the restrictive covenant contained in the employment agreement between the parties and demanded injunctive relief pursuant to the liquidated damages clause in the contract. The circuit court granted the preliminary injunction based upon the non-compete clause and enjoined Defendant from soliciting or selling any service or product similar or identical to Plaintiff’s. Defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal. The Appellate Court found that Plaintiff had not breached the parties’ contract and that the restrictive covenant was enforceable because it was reasonable in its geographic (Defendant’s sales territory when he worked for Plaintiff) and temporal scope and in its application.

Wall Street Journal Reports: “Howard Stern Sues Sirius XM”

March 28, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

In a very informative short piece, the Wall Street Journal reports that Howard Stern has filed suit regarding Sirius/XM’s failure to pay Stern and his agent stock bonus payments that were part of Stern’s compensation package. Stern initially did not press for the payments for a few years but has now filed suit for non-payment. The main issue in the dispute is whether XM subscribers post merger can be included in the target subscriber base numbers which trigger stock bonus payment obligations. The article states:

Howard Stern, who seems to be in a perpetual fight with his bosses, is at it again.

The production company for the radio personality is suing Sirius XM, claiming the satellite radio company has refused to pay stock awards it owes to him based on subscriber targets in Stern’s contract. The lawsuit also says Sirius owes money to Stern’s agent under a consulting agreement.

“World-renowned radio personality Howard Stern (“Stern”) put Sirius on the map,” the lawsuit says. “But, with the exception of a stock award that Sirius paid for the initial year of Stem’s contract, Sirius has refused to pay One Twelve [the production company for Stern’s show] the additional performance-based stock awards to which One Twelve is entitled.”

You can read the full article by clicking here. You can read the Complaint in the lawsuit by clicking here.

Another interesting article on the dispute appeared in Forbes. That article provides some speculation on the behind the scenes motives driving the case and can be read by clicking here.

If You Have a Business Agreement, Get It in Writing!

March 10, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

The issues faced by our clients, and particularly our business clients, are often complex both factually and legally. Our Palatine business lawyers recently discovered a case filed in Du Page county that illustrates how business legal issues can, and often do, dovetail with personal legal issues. Prignano v. Prignano demonstrates the importance of obtaining legal advice before making business agreements and contracts that include will and probate issues.

In Prignano v. Prignano, the widow of George Prignano, a man who owned several businesses with his brother Louis, sued that brother for allegedly failing to honor an agreement that the survivor of the two brothers would buy the decedent brother’s share of their co-owned businesses. The Prignano brothers jointly owned two corporations, Sunrise Homes and Rainbow Installations, and were equal partners in 710 Building Partnership. The Plaintiff widow alleged that the Defendant had an oral agreement with her deceased husband George whereupon Louis would purchase George’s share of their three businesses with the proceeds from life insurance policies purchased for that purpose. Plaintiff also alleged that she and Defendant had an oral agreement that Defendant would purchase his brother’s share of the businesses from Plaintiff.

After George’s death, Defendant, who was the executor of George’s estate, allegedly kept George’s share of the businesses and the life insurance payments for himself unbeknownst to Plaintiff. When Plaintiff discovered this, she filed suit against him for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The trial court ruled in her favor on all counts and awarded her damages and prejudgment interest. Defendant then appealed the trial court’s finding of liability and the award of prejudgment interest.

On appeal, the Second District of the Appellate Court of Illinois reaffirmed the trial court’s finding that both oral agreements (between the brothers and between Plaintiff and Defendant) were valid and enforceable due to the testimony of third parties who were aware of the oral agreement between the brothers, and the existence of a written agreement that was drawn up after the oral contract between Plaintiff and Defendant was initially formed. The Court also found that Defendant owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff as he was a corporate officer and partner in the businesses, and upon George’s death, his interest in the businesses was transferred to Plaintiff. As such, the Court held that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to exercise “the highest degree of honesty and good faith” in dealing with Plaintiff, and Defendant breached that duty. The Court then vacated the trial court’s judgment on the unjust enrichment claim because Plaintiff was victorious on her breach of contract claim. The Court stated that unjust enrichment does not apply when there is a breach of contract under Illinois law. Finally, the Court reaffirmed the award of prejudgment interest because Plaintiff had been deprived of money that was rightfully hers, and Defendant should not profit from his wrongful retention of the funds.

Prignano v. Prignano exemplifies why business owners should have all of their business agreements and contracts reviewed by a trained legal professional. Family business owners, in particular, should guard against casual or oral agreements, as personal relationships can be strained when there is a misunderstanding regarding such agreements. If you are unsure about the legality or legitimacy of your business agreements, or are currently in a dispute, you should consult a discerning Chicago and Naperville business attorney to determine your rights.

Detroit Pistons Owner Sues Competitor and Ex Employees for Alleged Trade Secrets Theft

January 12, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Our Chicago trade secrets attorneys were interested to see a recent trade secrets lawsuit coming from the high-dollar world of professional sports. Palace Sports & Entertainment, owner of the Detroit Pistons basketball team, is suing rival venue and sports company Olympia Entertainment Inc., plus nine ex-employees who moved to Olympia, for alleged theft of its confidential trade secrets. Crain’s Detroit Business reported that the claim stems from the movement of ten Palace employees to Olympia, starting in February when Palace president Tom Wilson left to run a new venture for Olympia and its parent company, Ilitch Holdings. This venture was to look into a new venue for the Detroit Red Wings, also owned by Ilitch. Nine people followed Wilson, including two executive vice presidents. In Michigan state court, Palace accuses them of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair competition, conspiracy, conversion, tortious interference and misappropriation of trade secrets.

According to the complaint in Palace Sports & Entertainment Inc. v. Olympia Entertainment Inc., dated June 8, 2010, Palace is accusing the ex-employees of taking and misusing trade secrets, despite having signed different versions of a confidentiality agreement that gave them a fiduciary role in Palace’s confidential information. The contract also contained restrictive covenants not to disclose such information to people outside the company, or use it for their own or anyone else’s gain. Confidential information was defined broadly, including “any technical, economic, financial, marketing or other information, which is not common knowledge.” Palace alleges that the ex-employees misappropriated information including suite prices, customer and prospect lists and sales notes, a business plan, marketing plans, suite assignments, appointment logs, proposals, vendor lists and at least one contract. When Palace notified Olympia of the first theft, it said, Olympia provided physical documents and lists of files. But Olympia did not provide the electronic data behind those files, Palace alleged and has even put some of the data on its own computers.

Palace demanded that Olympia return all of the electronic files and physical documents; that each ex-employee swear an oath that all of the information has been returned; and that a third-party expert be allowed to comb Olympia’s computers and the ex-employees’ personal computers for the information. Olympia has not complied. In its lawsuit, Palace said this caused it immediate and irreparable harm by enabling unfair competition. Olympia said publicly that it believed Palace simply did not like losing its employees. No further court documents are freely available, but trial is set for May 27, 2011.

This case generated great interest in the Detroit press, in part because Ilitch was considering buying the Pistons from Palace. But as Illinois business lawyers, we would like to discuss the strength of Palace’s case, judging by the allegations made in its complaint. Specifically, we suspect that the defendants could consider a defense based on whether the information they are accused of stealing was actually confidential trade secrets. Under the laws of Michigan, Illinois and other states, some information is not a trade secret because it is widely available to the public and not valuable. Thus, a trade secrets lawsuit cannot survive if it is based on the use of information such as lists of businesses copied from a phone book. Even if Palace’s confidentiality agreement defines such information as confidential, employees would be under no obligation to comply. The agreement cited in the complaint may also be subject to a challenge for being overly broad or vague because its definition of confidential business information includes “any information, not known to the general public.” This could easily include information with no special economic value.

Filing Counterclaims Does Not Waive Contractual Right to Arbitration, Fourth District Rules

November 30, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

As Illinois mediation and arbitration lawyers, we were interested to see a decision confirming that parties may invoke their contractual rights to arbitrate even after some participation in the other side’s lawsuit. TSP-Hope Inc. v. Home Innovators of Illinois, Inc., No. 1-07-1028 (Ill. 4th June 26, 2008) pits a Springfield housing nonprofit, TSP-Hope Inc., against residential construction company Home Innovators of Illinois. The two made a contract in July of 2005 for the construction of houses. In the summer of 2006, construction stopped. Shortly after, TSP-Hope sued for breach of contract and other causes.

About a month later, the defendant filed for an extension of time to plead, saying the plaintiff had served a demand three days before for the defendant to file suit to enforce its liens. Another month later, the defendant filed an answer and counterclaims, including duress in contract formation, breach of contract and enforcement of the liens. After a series of motions and counter-motions, the defendant in July of 2007 filed to dismiss all claims and compel arbitration. In this motion, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had verbally agreed to mediation before the lawsuit. The parties’ contract specified that they should use mediation at first, and then binding arbitration with a specified arbitration company, to resolve disputes. The trial court eventually granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim, saying it had not been waived by participation in the litigation. After a motion to reconsider failed, the plaintiff appealed.

Unusually, the Fourth said, the defendants did not file a brief in the appeals case. However, the court said it had sufficient evidence from the plaintiffs’ brief. That brief argued that defendants had waived their right to arbitration by waiting almost 11 months to assert it, and by submitting arbitrable issues to the trial court in the meantime. To determine whether this is true, the Fourth wrote, it needed to determine whether the defendant had acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Under Cencula v. Keller, 152 Ill. App. 3d 754, 757, 504 N.E.2d 997, 999 (1987), this can include submitting arbitrable issues to the court.

The Fourth then ran down a list of past cases in which a party was found to have waived its right to arbitration. In all of those cases, the court noted, parties had conducted discovery and made pleadings that were more than just responses to the other side. Neither of these was true in this case, it said. It is true that the defendant’s counterclaims could have waived its right to arbitration, the court said, but this is not automatic. In this case, the counterclaim “appeared to be responsive to plaintiff’s complaint” as well as the plaintiff’s demand to enforce its liens. Under those circumstances, the Fourth concluded that the defendant had not acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Thus, the appeals court affirmed that trial court was correct to find that there was no waiver.

Federal Arbitration Act Controls Dispute Between Construction Companies, Third District Finds

November 9, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Our Illinois mediation and arbitration attorneys were interested in a court ruling on the controlling legal authority in a dispute over whether an issue is arbitrable. R.A. Bright Construction Inc. v. Weis Builders Inc., No. 3-09-0910 (Ill. 3rd June 9, 2010) pits construction company Weis Builders against its subcontractor, R.A. Bright Construction. A dispute later arose in which Bright claimed Weis owed it $765,701 under two contracts the parties had signed. Bright sued and Weis moved to dismiss, or alternatives, to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, but two judges from the Third District Court of Appeal reversed that decision under the Federal Arbitration Act. A third dissented, saying the FAA cannot apply because no interstate commerce was involved in the dispute.

Weis, a Minnesota company with offices in four states, was originally hired to build a Wal-Mart in Lockport, Ill. Weis in turn hired Bright to do concrete work for $2.93 million, and later, underground utilities work for $679,567. Neither party alleged fraud or misrepresentation in those contracts. For reasons the opinion does not discuss, Bright alleged that Weis owed it $765,701 on those two contracts, which Weis denied. Bright sued and Weis filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, or alternatively, to stay and compel arbitration, under the Federal Arbitration Act. Before that motion could be heard, Bright filed an amended complaint seeking to enforce a mechanic’s lien against Wal-Mart for the money. The trial court later denied the motion from Weis and this appeal followed.

In its appeal, Weis argued that section 2 of the FAA compels arbitration because the Illinois Supreme Court has found that the FAA mandates judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements “in any … contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” Bright disagreed for two reasons. It argued that the FAA does not apply because no interstate commerce was involved in this transaction. And even if it does, Bright said, the clause in question violates the Illinois Building and Construction Contract Act.

The Third started with the issue of whether the contract between Weis and Bright was interstate commerce. The U.S. Supreme Court has found that the FAA preempts state laws hostile to arbitration and is intended to exercise power over interstate commerce to the fullest, the court noted. To interpret this situation, it relied in part on Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.265, 278, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753, 767, 115 S. Ct. 834, 841 (1995), in which the Supreme Court overturned the Alabama Supreme Court on a motion to compel arbitration. In that case, a homeowner was suing a pest control company for inadequate work, and the pest control company argued that the FAA applied because it had a “slight nexus” with interstate commerce. While the work was contracted and performed locally, the companies were multistate and some materials came from out of state.

Despite the intention of the parties to stay local, the Supreme Court wrote, a strict reading of the facts showed that the commerce was in fact interstate. Similarly, the Third wrote, the transaction between Bright and Weis was an interstate transaction in fact. Weis is a multistate corporation and Bright bought some materials from a Wisconsin company. Thus, their contract was interstate commerce within the meaning of the FAA and that law applied.

The Third next disposed of Bright’s argument that the clause violates the Illinois Building and Construction Contract Act, because the FAA allows consideration of contract defenses “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” While this is valid, the court said, a defense based on the Act is not grounds to contest “any contract”; it is grounds only to contest construction and building contracts. It noted that the state Supreme Court had recently made a similar ruling in Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., No. 106511 (Il April 15, 2010). Finally, the Third rejected a forum non conveniens defense, saying this is not a general contract defense but a procedural mechanism. Thus, a two-judge majority reversed the trial court and remanded the case with orders to stay and compel arbitration. The dissenter, Justice McDade, disagreed that the contract between Bright and Weis was a transaction involving interstate commerce, and thus argued that the FAA does not apply to this case. “Nothing beyond ‘the multistate nature of one of the parties’ (slip order at 8) demonstrates that the transaction ‘in fact’ involved interstate commerce.”

Video Explaining that an Employer’s Material Breach of an Employment Agreement Can Invalidate a Non-Compete Agreement

November 7, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Our Chicago non-compete agreement attorneys have defended high level executives in covenant not to compete and trade secret lawsuits. A case in which our firm defended a former Motorola executive was covered in Crain’s Chicago business. You can view that article by clicking here.

Lubin Austermuehle handles litigation over non-compete clauses for individuals and businesses of all sizes, including small or closely held businesses for whom competition from an ex-employee can be a serious threat. Our Chicago business lawyers have substantial experience in restrictive covenant and breach of contract cases, and we are proud of our record of strong results.

DiTommas-Lubin a Chicago business law firm represent both plaintiffs and defendants in such cases, and can also help stop litigation before it starts by reviewing contracts to look for covenants and clauses that could create problems later. Based in Oakbrook Terrace and downtown Chicago, our Schaumburg noncompete clause lawyers take cases from Naperville, Keniworth, Aurora, Lake Forest, and many other cities throughout Illinois, as well as in Indiana, Wisconsin and the entire United States. To learn more or set up a free consultation, please contact us through the Internet or call toll-free at 630-333-0333 today.

Second District Voids Contractor’s Arbitration Clause Because Homeowners Never Signed It

November 3, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Our Illinois consumer protection attorneys were pleased to see a recent victory in an Illinois appeals court for consumers concerned about the effects of mandatory binding arbitration. In Artisan Design Build, Inc. v. Bilstrom, No. 2-08-0855 (Ill. 2nd Sept. 22, 2009), David and Jody Bilstrom of Hinsdale, Ill., hired Artisan Design Build of Wisconsin to remodel their home. Their contract provided, among other things, an arbitration clause saying disputes “shall be subject to and decided by mediation or arbitration.” The repairs required eight changes to the original contract, significantly increasing the overall price of the work. The Bilstroms paid the first six bills, but refused to pay the seventh despite multiple requests. On Sept. 20, 2006, they locked Artisan out of the project and told it they had hired someone else to finish the job. Artisan claimed they owed $208,695.69.

In April of 2008, Artisan sued the Bilstroms to foreclose its mechanic’s lien; for breach of contract; and for unjust enrichment. The Bilstroms filed a motion to dismiss, claiming Artisan had violated the Illinois Home Repair and Remodeling Act by failing to finish its work within the contracted time; failing to carry insurance; and failing to provide them with a consumer rights pamphlet. The parties continued the case several times while they tried without success to reach a settlement. When that proved fruitless, Artisan filed a complaint with the American Arbitration Association. The Bilstroms moved to stay the arbitration, saying Artisan had voided that part of the contract by suing first, and by violating the Home Repair and Remodeling Act. The trial court agreed with them, prompting an amended complaint from Artisan. The trial court dismissed that and Artisan appealed, arguing that it did not violate the Act or waive the arbitration clause.

On appeal, the Second District first considered whether Artisan had violated the Act by failing to furnish a consumer rights pamphlet. The Bilstroms had argued that the Act’s language makes any violation an unlawful act that nullifies the contract. Artisan countered that the Act does not require courts to dismiss an otherwise valid claim just because a contractor fails to provide the pamphlet. The appeals court agreed, finding that the plain language of the Act provides no remedy other than a Consumer Fraud Act lawsuit. Furthermore, the court wrote, the legislature could not possibly have intended to allow consumers to void contracts for failure to provide the pamphlet, because allowing this would allow consumers to essentially steal from contractors. Thus, the appeals court found that the trial court was wrong to dismiss Artisan’s amended complaint.

Artisan had less luck on the question of whether it had waived its right to arbitration by filing a lawsuit first. Section 15.1 of the Act also requires contractors to advise clients of binding arbitration and waiver of jury trial clauses, which consumers should be able to reject or accept.

Failure to advise, or to obtain acceptance, explicitly voids the clause. Artisan clearly failed to do so in this case, the Second District wrote, because there are no signatures or “accept” or “reject” notations in the appropriate place on the contract. This argument does not reach the issue of whether Artisan waived its right to binding arbitration, the court said, but it can affirm on any grounds in the record. It did affirm the trial court’s decision on the arbitration clause, and remanded the case for further proceedings on Artisan’s amended complaint.