Breach of Contract

llinois Appellate Court Rules that a Relocation Provision in a Commercial Lease Must Abide by State Regulations

October 20, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Earlier this year, the Appellate Court of Illinois handed down an opinion that has implications for businesses with leased premises. Our Aurora business attorneys found Bright Horizons Children’s Centers LLC v. Riverway Midwest LLC, which is a dispute regarding a commercial lease that was initially filed in Cook County.

Bright Horizons is a company that operates day care facilities across the state of Illinois. The company entered into a ten year commercial lease agreement with Riverway for a property in Rosemont, Illinois. The lease agreement contained restrictive language allowed for the building to only be used for a child-care center. The agreement also contained a relocation provision which gave Riverway the right to relocate Bright Horizons, upon 180 day written notice, to a different property of equal quantity and quality to the original premises. The dispute between these two parties arose when Riverway sought to invoke the relocation clause less than one year into the lease.

Riverway attempted to exercise the relocation provision on three occasions. The first attempt was unsuccessful because the alternative premises allegedly presented to Bright Horizons did not meet the requirements of the lease agreement. Bright Horizons accepted the second space offered by Riverway, but Riverway withdrew their notice before renovating the new facilities to meet the requirements of the lease. Riverway then proposed a third relocation premises, and allegedly informed Bright Horizons that if they were unable to agree on an alternative space, Riverway would terminate the lease in 180 days from the date of the notice. This third property allegedly ran afoul of state licensing standards for child care facilities and the Illinois Administrative Code. Bright Horizons informed Riverway that the third property did not meet Illinois’ licensing standards and could not be legally used as a child care facility. In response, Riverway informed Bright Horizons that they were in default of the lease and that Bright Horizons could cure their default by relocating to the third alternative premises.

Bright Horizons then filed for declaratory judgment requesting that the trial court find: 1) that they were not in breach of the lease, 2) that Riverway could not terminate the lease, and 3) that Riverway had failed to properly exercise the relocation clause of the lease agreement. Bright Horizons then filed for summary judgment on these issues, which was granted by the trial court. Riverway then appealed the trial court’s ruling. On appeal the Appellate Court agreed with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Bright Horizons. In so ruling, the Court held that the lease allowed for one permitted use of the premises and required that Bright Horizons comply with all laws and regulations, including the state child-care licensing standards. The Court held that Bright Horizons’ relocation to the proffered space would violate state regulations and cause Bright Horizons to be in breach of the lease due to their inability to operate a child-care. As such, the Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Bright Horizons.

Appellate Court Overturns Grant of Summary Judgment in Successor Liability Case

October 9, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

For many business owners, they operate their companies with the hopes that they will continue to be successful ventures long after they are gone. However, both low level and senior personnel eventually move on, and businesses may have obligations to their surviving family members. Lubin Austermuehle is familiar with such agreements, and often times companies may not wish to honor those obligations after employees are no longer working for the company. Pielet v. Pielet is one case discovered by our Crystal Lake business litigation lawyers that addresses that very issue.

In Pielet v. Pielet, Arthur Pielet allegedly entered into a consulting agreement with Defendants that provided him lifelong monthly payments in exchange for his consulting services for Defendants scrap metal business, and should he pass on, those payments were to continue and be paid to his wife until her death. Arthur Pielet eventually died, and Defendants then allegedly ceased making payments to his widow, who filed suit alleging a breach of contract and successor liability among other causes of action. Plaintiff successfully filed a motion for summary judgment, and Defendants appealed the trial court’s decision.

On appeal, Plaintiff argued that Defendant PBS One, a successor in interest to Pielet Corp. (the company who was originally obligated under the consulting agreement), was liable under the agreement because they had entered into a purchase and assignment agreement with Pielet Corp. In response, PBS One argued that a novation had occurred whereby Pielet LP had substituted for Pielet Corp. in the consulting agreement, which absolved PBS One of liability. PBS One supported their claims with deposition testimony that, in the absence of providing a defense, at least raised an issue of material fact as to the existence of the novation. Additionally, PBS One argued that because the company had dissolved four years prior to the cessation of payments (and the accrual of Plaintiff’s claims), the applicable Illinois Survival Statute prevented Plaintiff’s claim.

The Appellate Court began with its analysis of the Survival Statute, and found that the statute applies to “rights”, “liabilities”, and “causes of action.” Because the case at bar concerned Plaintiff’s “right” to payment and Defendants’ “liability” to pay, and Plaintiff raised her claim to payment within the five-year period allowed under the statute, her claim was allowed under the law. The Court went on to discuss Defendant’s second argument regarding the existence of a novation that would place liability elsewhere. The Court did not make a finding of a novation, but the facts indicated that a novation could be inferred at two different points in time. Thus, the Court concluded that a triable fact question existed as to whether a novation occurred, and if there was a novation, at what point in time did it occur. In so holding, the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on all of the appealed causes of action, and remanded the case.

Directors Are Not Liable for the Torts of Employees Unless Personally Involved, but Should Still Keep a Close Watch Over What Corporate Officers are Doing

July 28, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

There are hundreds of new cases filed in Illinois courts every day, and many of those cases involve business disputes. At Lubin Austermuehle, we pride ourselves on staying on top of new court filings so that we know of changes in the law as they happen. Our Waukegan business attorneys just found a decision rendered by the Appellate Court of Illinois that provides some useful information for our business clients.

Zahl v. Krupa is a dispute between investors in a fund allegedly run by a company and the directors of that company. Plaintiffs alleged that they were approached by Defendant Krupa, President of Jones & Brown Company, Inc., who solicited money to be invested in a fund only available to the officers and directors (and their family members) of the company. There were two agreements allegedly written on company letterhead that set out the terms of the investments, whereupon Plaintiffs would invest between $100,000 and $160,000 each and receive an 11.1% return guaranteed by Jones & Brown. Plaintiffs each allegedly signed an agreement with Defendant Krupa and gave him the funds requested. There was no other written documentation regarding the investments or the agreements. Plaintiffs allegedly never got the return on their investment nor did they get their money back.

Plaintiffs then filed suit against Krupa, the other officers of Jones & Brown, and the directors of the business. Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, fraud, and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. The breach of contract and fraud causes of action were reliant upon the alleged assertion that Defendant Krupa, in soliciting Plaintiffs, was acting as an agent or apparent agent of Jones & Brown. The remaining causes of action sought to hold Defendants liable for Defendant Krupa’s deception because they knew or should have known that he was untrustworthy.

Through discovery, the depositions of several parties allegedly showed that Defendant Krupa never had actual authority to enter into the investment agreements because the directors neither signed nor authorize the agreements. Testimony also revealed that the investment agreements were allegedly outside the scope of Jones & Brown’s normal business as a construction company, which showed that Krupa did not have apparent authority. As a result of these facts, Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim based upon lack of actual and apparent authority. In moving for summary judgment on the fraud claim, Defendants cited Illinois case law holding that directors cannot be held personally liable for fraud unless they personally participated in perpetrating the fraud. As the directors did not sign the agreements or participate in their creation, the court granted summary judgment. Finally, Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the negligence claims because they did not know that Krupa had the potential for fraud.

Plaintiffs then appealed the trial court’s ruling against them, and the Appellate Court conducted a de novo review of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court agreed with the trial court’s findings and held that Defendants were not negligent with respect to Krupa and did not know about his dealings with Plaintiffs. The Court went on to say that there was no reason for Defendants to suspect Krupa of wrongdoing.

In reviewing Zahl v. Krupa, the case serves as a reminder for business investors to carefully examine any investment opportunities and accompanying paperwork to ensure the legitimacy of the investment. Additionally, business owners and directors should keep an eye on their officers and employees to ensure that they do not find themselves defending a lawsuit for their employees’ allegedly objectionable actions.

Lubin Austermuehle’s Oak Brook and Chicago Attorney Peter Lubin Named 2011 Illinois Super Lawyers as Class-Action, Business Litigation and Consumer Rights Attorneys

July 21, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Super Lawyers named Chicago and Oak Brook business trial attorneys Peter Lubin a Super Lawyer in the Categories of Class Action, Business Litigation, and Consumer Rights Litigation. Lubin Austermuehle’s Oak Brook and Chicago business trial lawyers have over a quarter of a century of experience in litigating complex class action, consumer rights, and business and commercial litigation disputes. We handle emergency business law suits involving injunctions, and TROS, covenant not to compete, franchise, distributor and dealer wrongful termination and trade secret lawsuits and many different kinds of business disputes involving shareholders, partnerships, closely held businesses and employee breaches of fiduciary duty. We also assist businesses and business owners who are victims of fraud.

Peter S. Lubin

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Appellate Court of Illinois Upholds Circuit Court’s Rescission of Oral Agreement to Jointly Purchase a Gas Station due to Fraudulent Misrepresentation

July 13, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

When starting a new business venture, choosing the right partners is one of the most important decisions any company owner will make. Unfortunately, not all partnerships work out, and in some instances that is due to the dishonest machinations of fellow owners. Our Elgin business attorneys recently discovered one such case where one business partner was allegedly defrauded by two other owners in a transaction to jointly purchase and operate a gas station in Tinley Park.

Hassan v. Yusuf pits Plaintiff, a man who thought he was investing in the purchase of a gas station, against his two business partners who were also involved in the deal. Defendants solicited an investment of $120,000 from Plaintiff, equal to their own contributions, to purchase the gas station in question, but allegedly failed to inform Plaintiff that he was only purchasing one-third of the business, and had no claim to the real-estate upon which the station was built. After Plaintiff entered into an oral agreement to purchase the station with Defendants and run the day-to-day operations of the business, Defendants acquired title to the property and conveyed that title to a corporation solely owned by Defendants. The business was profitable at first, but eventually began operating at a loss. Defendants then demanded Plaintiff invest more money in the venture to cover these losses, but Plaintiff had no additional funds to invest, and requested an accounting of the business’s financial records and documentation showing his ownership and portion of the losses. Defendants failed to provide said documentation, and Plaintiff ceased working at the station and eventually filed suit.

The Circuit Court of Cook County found that Defendants had defrauded Plaintiff through their misrepresentations regarding the purchase of the business and accompanying real estate. In its judgment, the trial court granted Plaintiff rescission of the contract and damages for the total amount of money he invested in the business. After the trial verdict, Defendants appealed the finding of fraud on the basis that there was not clear and convincing evidence of a misrepresentation that Plaintiff would be an owner of the real estate under their agreement.

The Appellate Court upheld the Circuit Court’s decision, finding the record sufficient to support a finding that Defendants misrepresented to the Plaintiff that he was purchasing a one-third interest in the station and accompanying real estate, even though they had no intention of actually doing so. Furthermore, there was clear evidence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties, which gave rise to a claim for fraud by omission when Defendants failed to make explicit to Plaintiff that he was not acquiring an interest in the land. The Court went on to state Plaintiff’s reliance upon Defendants’ misrepresentations were justifiable, and upheld the trial court’s decision to rescind the contract, but reduced the damages award in an amount equal to Plaintiff’s share of the profits from the station. The Court did so because giving Plaintiff his share of the profits would be inconsistent with the remedy of rescission, which is supposed to place a party in the same position they would be in had the contract never occurred.

Appellate Court of Illinois Upholds Discharge of Guaranty Contract on Discharge Grounds

June 29, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Most businesses require loans to normalize their income stream and ensure that they have the cash necessary to operate. Some business owners enter into guaranty contracts to get the capital that they need, and in the process become personally liable for the debt of their company. In such instances, disputes often arise when the other party attempts to enforce the guaranty contract to collect on the debt. Lubin Austermuehle has been involved with contract disputes of all kinds, and our Elgin guaranty contract attorneys recently uncovered a case that illustrates why it is important to draft such contracts carefully and enforce them in a timely manner.

In Riley Acquisitions Inc. v. Drexler, Defendant and her husband initially entered into a guaranty contract and promissory note with a third party to get credit for the two companies owned by the couple. Eventually, the marriage dissolved, and each spouse took control of one of the companies. Defendant’s company dissolved shortly thereafter, and Defendant then sent a letter to the third party revoking her personal guaranty. Her ex-husband eventually filed for bankruptcy – discharging his liability under the guaranty in the process, and leaving Defendant as the only guarantor on the loan. The third-party who owned the debt eventually sold and assigned its interest to Plaintiff, who filed suit to collect on the loan. Defendant asserted affirmative defenses that her obligation under the note terminated after her company (the principal on the note) dissolved and that Plaintiff’s claims were barred under the applicable ten-year statute of limitations. Defendant won a directed verdict on the basis of her discharge and statute of limitations defenses, and Plaintiff appealed.

The Appellate Court found that because Defendant’s company dissolved, its obligation on the note terminated five years later under the applicable portion of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983. This effectively terminated Defendant’s liability as well because the guaranty contract did not expressly provide that liability would continue in such a situation. Thus, because Plaintiff filed suit nine years after the dissolution of Defendant’s company, the Court upheld the trial court’s verdict on discharge grounds and did not address the statute of limitations issue.

Northern District of Illinois Grants Motion to Dismiss in Trade Secrets Case Due to Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

May 24, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

After hiring someone, businesses expect not only that their new employee will perform his job adequately, but also that he will do no harm to the company or its ability to do business. Employers know that their expectations are not always met by those employees, which is why the use of employment contracts with non-compete clauses are quite common these days. Our Chicago restrictive covenant attorneys just discovered a recent court decision that details a dispute between an employer and an ex-employee regarding one such employment agreement.

In Zep Inc. v. First Aid Corp., Plaintiff Zep employed the individual Defendants as sales representatives for its industrial cleaning products business pursuant to an employment agreement that contained non-disclosure, non-solicitation, and non-compete provisions. During their employment, Defendants had access to Plaintiff’s customer lists, supplier lists, pricing information, and other proprietary information. Eventually, a competitor, Defendant First Aid, hired the other named Defendants away from Plaintiff and subsequently solicited Plaintiffs clients and other employees.

As a result, Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract, trade secret misappropriation under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA), and tortious interference with contract. Plaintiff contends that First Aid induced the other Defendants to breach the employment agreements they signed with Plaintiff and that the other Defendants used and disclosed Plaintiffs trade secrets. In response, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the claims, which were granted as to three of the individual defendants due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court found that because three of the individual Defendants were residents of Michigan and Ohio, Plaintiff is located in Georgia, and the employment agreements were signed outside of Illinois, they did not have the requisite minimum contacts to give an Illinois court jurisdiction over the matter. Furthermore, Plaintiff had not alleged that any of Defendants’ actions were aimed at Illinois, and neither had their actions caused harm to Plaintiff in Illinois, so specific personal jurisdiction was also improper. The Court denied the remaining motions to dismiss – finding that the non-compete provisions were enforceable because the geographic limitations were reasonable and the non-solicitation clause was limited in scope to Plaintiff’s competitors for a span of one year. Plaintiff’s allegations were also found to be sufficient to support a claim under the ITSA because it had identified a list of confidential information and trade secrets in its pleadings.

Northern District of Illinois Federal Court Grants Injunction in Misappropriation of Trade Secrets Case

May 10, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Trade secrets are the lifeblood of many companies these days, and protecting those secrets is always of the utmost importance. Through our years of experience advising and representing companies, we here at Lubin Austermuehle know how to maintain the security of your trade-secret portfolio and prosecute those who attempt to misappropriate any of your trade secrets. Because employees with trade-secret knowledge come and go with such frequency these days, our Des Plaines trade-secret attorneys wanted to share a recent court decision that illustrates the perils companies face due to departing employees.

In Mintel International Group LTD v. Neergheen, Plaintiff Mintel initially employed Defendant in its London-based marketing department, and upon his hiring, Defendant signed an employment contract that included non-compete and confidentiality restrictive covenants. Defendant was then transferred to Plaintiff’s Chicago office where he signed a second employment contract containing non-compete and confidentiality clauses similar to those in the first agreement. This second contract also contained a clause prohibiting the solicitation of Plaintiff’s employees and customers – all of the clauses were in effect for one year after the cessation his employment with Plaintiff. Defendant eventually left the employ of Plaintiff and began working for a competitor company in a different product area in order to comply with his non-compete. Plaintiff failed to ask Defendant to return the laptop given to him by the company during his exit interview, and also failed to ask him about proprietary information he had emailed to himself prior to his departure – despite knowing that he had taken possession of the information before he left.

Eventually, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant alleging violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA), and breach of the non-disclosure, non-compete, and non-solicitation provisions in his employment contract with Defendant. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and money damages. After a bench trial, the Court found that Defendant had not violated the CFAA because he had only emailed copies of Plaintiff’s files to a private email address, which did not satisfy the damage requirement of the statute. The Court next held that, while the copied files qualified as trade secrets, Defendant did not violate the ITSA because there was no proof that he had or would use the information in his position at a competing company. Finally, the Court found that the restrictive covenants were not invalid as a matter of law, and enjoined Defendant from: ever using any of Plaintiff’s proprietary info, contacting any of Plaintiff’s customers for nine months, or working for his new employer in the same area as he had with Plaintiff for a period of six months.

Video on Illinois Covenant Not to Compete Law

May 1, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLvhcNrJ3u8

The above video provides an excellent overview of Illinois non-compete contract law.

Our Chicago non-compete agreement attorneys have defended high level executives in covenant not to compete and trade secret lawsuits. A case in which our firm defended a former Motorola executive was covered in Crain’s Chicago business. You can view that article by clicking here.

Northern District of Illinois Federal Court Grants Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Injunctive Relief in Breach of Contract Case

April 26, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Lubin Austermuehle has successfully litigated many business disputes, and in our many years of experience we have found that contract claims are among the most contentious conflicts. Because so many of our clients deal with breach of contract issues, our Elmhurst business attorneys are always mindful of new court decisions issued in this area of the law. In fact, our lawyers just discovered one such case, Jumpfly Inc. v. Torling, in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

Jumpfly Inc. v. Torling pits a Plaintiff employer against two former employees who allegedly violated the non-compete agreements signed when they were hired by Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Torling started a competing pay-per-click internet advertising side-business while in Defendant’s employ, and upon discovering its employee’s side-business, fired him and sent a cease and desist letter demanding that he stop violating the non-compete. The parties eventually negotiated a settlement allowing Torling to continue his business, but the agreement prohibited him from soliciting any of Plaintiff’s employees. Torling allegedly solicited Defendant Burke — who was working for Plaintiff at the time under a similar non-compete agreement — and got him to quit his position with Plaintiff to work for Defendant Torling.

Plaintiff then filed suit against the two individuals and the new company (Windy City) that they worked for — alleging rescission of a settlement agreement, breach of contract, violations of the Lanham Act and Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and intentional interference with contract based upon non-compete agreements between the parties. Plaintiff’s requested the Court to enjoin Defendants’ competitive business conduct and for monetary damages. In response, Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief and filed a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6).

The Court granted the motion to strike as to the breach of contract claim because the two year term of the non-compete agreement had already expired and an injunction would result in an unreasonable restraint of trade. The Court also noted that Plaintiff’s seven-month delay — after discovery of the illicit conduct — in asking for an injunction also weighed in favor of Defendants. The Court denied the motion to strike as to the statutory claims, however, because injunctive relief is provided by both laws which rendered the motion premature.

Next, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the breach of contract and intentional interference with contract claims due to pleading insufficient facts that Defendant Windy City induced either of the individual Defendants to breach their contracts with Plaintiff. In dismissing Plaintiffs conspiracy to interfere with contract, the Court applied the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine and declined to agree with Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants’ conduct fell with in an exception to the rule. Finally, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the settlement agreement breach claim as the effect of Defendants’ breaches had yet to be determined.