Breach of Contract

Appeals Court Dismisses Chiropractor’s Class Action Lawsuit Against Insurer for Alleged Underpayment and Breach of Contract

June 22, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

In a proposed class-action insurance fraud lawsuit, the Illinois Third District Court of Appeal has ruled that a chiropractor may not sue a workers’ compensation insurer. In Martis v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company, No. 3-08-0004 (Ill. 3rd March 27, 2009), chiropractor Richard Martis sued Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company after Grinnell’s billing employees incorrectly paid Martis too little for treating an injured worker.

In February of 2006, Martis began treating an employee of Water Management Corp. of Illinois who had been injured on the job. He was to be paid by Water Management’s workers’ compensation policy, issued by Grinnell. When he submitted his bills to Grinnell, the insurer’s outside billing firm applied PPO discounts to those bills even though Martis did not have a PPO agreement with Grinnell. Thus, Grinnell underpaid Martis. He responded with a proposed class-action lawsuit encompassing all Illinois health care providers who had been underpaid by Grinnell in the same way, through incorrect PPO discounts.

The complaint by Martis alleged conspiracy, unjust enrichment, breach of contract and violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The trial court granted Grinnell’s motion to dismiss the conspiracy and unjust enrichment counts. However, it certified the class of health-care providers as to the breach of contract claim. Grinnell appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim and the class certification to the Third District.

Company Must Have Trial on Whether It Breached Golden Parachute Contract With Termination of CEO, Appeals Court Rules

June 17, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

In a breach of contract and Illinois Wage Payment Act case, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled that a company and its former executive must have a trial to determine whether it breached the executive’s employment contract. Covinsky v. Hannah Marine Corporation, No. 1-08-0695 (Ill. 1st. Feb. 17, 2009). At issue in the case is a severance clause in Jeffrey Covinsky’s employment contract with Hannah Marine Corp., for which he served as president, CEO and CFO from 1998 to 2006.

Covinsky’s contract specified that he was entitled to a “golden parachute” of 18 months’ salary if there is “…a change in the present ownership which results in the termination of the Employee’s employment…” This agreement was executed in 2004, when Hannah Marine was jointly owned by three people, including Donald Hannah. Hannah sued the other shareholders in 2005 for financial mismanagement, and ended up buying out the other two shareholders. Covinsky told Hannah in 2005 that he assumed Hannah would want to let him go after the change; in 2006, Covinsky told Hannah he did not intend to resign and wanted to finish the contract, which was set to expire in 2006.

A month later, when the takeover was final, Hannah told Covinsky that he was terminated and that Hannah “accepted” Covinsky’s resignation. Covinsky protested that he never resigned, but was not paid the severance. He sued Hannah Marine and Donald Hannah for breach of the employment contract and violating the Illinois Wage Payment Act. Hannah countersued Covinsky for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted summary judgment to Covinsky on both counts as to Hannah Marine, but dismissed the Wage Act claim against Hannah personally. It also dismissed the company’s counterclaim. Both sides appealed, resulting in the consolidated instant appeal.

Material Breach of Contract Invalidates Covenant Not to Compete, Illinois First District Rules

May 27, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Our firm’s Illinois non-compete agreement litigation lawyers were pleased to note a ruling by the First District Court of Appeal that a doctor may not bring a lawsuit against his former business partner for breaching a non-compete agreement. Bisla v. Parvaiz, No. 1-07-1647 (Ill. 1st., Feb. 21, 2008), arose out of a soured employment arrangement between Dr. Virenda Bisla and Dr. Akhtar Parvaiz, both doctors in Chicago. Bisla hired Parvaiz as an employee in 1998, under an agreement specifying that Parvaiz would have the opportunity to become a 50% partner in Bisla’s medical company after three years, if he met certain criteria. It also specified that Bisla would provide medical insurance for Parvaiz and his family, and malpractice insurance in Indiana for Parvaiz.

Neither type of insurance was provided to Parvaiz, according to the First District. And when the three years in the agreement had passed, Bisla did not offer Parvaiz a 50% share of the company, as agreed. Instead, he offered Parvaiz a 45% share, spread over five years, and presented him with a new employment contract and stock purchase agreement. Bisla told Parvaiz that it was in his best interests to sign these papers, but Parvaiz refused because they did not comply with the original employment agreement. He continued working for Bisla’s company for the next five years, but believed that they were using an oral contract since the first employment contract had expired.

The next year, Bisla’s company was temporarily dissolved by the State of Illinois for nonpayment of a filing fee. Bisla did not tell Parvaiz about the dissolution, which automatically terminated their employment agreement. However, in 2005, Parvaiz began working for a competing medical company. When Bisla found out, he demanded a share of the proceeds, then fired Parvaiz and eventually brought a lawsuit seeking to stop him from competing. Parvaiz countered that he believed the agreement was over. The trial court agreed, finding that their agreement was invalid because the employment agreement was breached by both the temporary dissolution and Bisla’s refusal to make Parvaiz a partner. It denied the injunction Bisla sought against Parvaiz, and Bisla appealed.

GMAC ‘Unfairly’ Repossessed Vehicle Under Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, Appeals Court Decides

May 6, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Lubin Austermuehle’s auto fraud, lemon law, and consumer fraud trial lawyers were impressed by a recent First District Court of Appeals ruling against the credit arm of General Motors for a wrongful repossession. The court said a trial court was correct to rule that General Motors Acceptance Corporation acted unfairly when it repossessed a truck in violation of its agreement with the owner. In Demitro v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, No. 1-06-3417 (Ill. 1st. Feb. 9, 2009), the appeals court declined to overturn a Cook County trial court ruling that GMAC violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.

Demitro purchased a Chevrolet Suburban in 2002 and had no trouble making payments until 2003, when he underwent surgery and went on disability in May of 2003. His payment checks for June and July of that year bounced, and in August, he spoke with a GMAC representative who told him so. The next day, Demitro called GMAC and authorized about one month’s payment to be deducted from his checking account. The GMAC representative then called a repossession agency that had already been authorized to take Demitro’s truck and put the repossession on hold. The representative sent Demitro a letter giving him seven days to make the back payments and keep his account current. After that time expired, it said, GM could exercise its right to repossess the truck.

On the very next day, Demitro awoke to discover that his truck had been repossessed. The GMAC representative was notified. He acknowledged that the repossession was a mistake and a violation of the seven-day extension in the letter, but nonetheless recommended to management that they keep the truck. They did, and informed Demitro that he was now liable for repossession charges of $39,695.04 as well as the outstanding balance on his account. Unable to get to the bank, Demitro informed GMAC that his telephone payment would bounce. GMAC later withdrew that payment from his account after he had added more money, but failed to credit him for the payment.

Small Entrepreneurs Turn to Litigation After Falling Victim to Alleged ‘Franchise Fraud’

April 22, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Lubin Austermuehle has an active practice in franchise litigation, especially representing franchisee in disputes with franchisors they believe have not been completely honest. Because we work in this area, our Chicago franchise litigation attorneys were pleased to see a cover story on just that situation in the March/April 2009 issue of Mother Jones magazine. The article discusses allegations of “franchise fraud” — the practice by franchisors of cheating the franchisees they sign up by failing to disclose important information, writing onerous financial requirements into contracts and adding after-the-fact legal requirements franchisees didn’t agree to and can’t refuse without being sued.

The article focuses on the Coffee Beanery, a chain of cafes, and one Maryland couple’s experience when they started a Coffee Beanery franchise in Annapolis. At their initial meeting with the franchisor, Coffee Beanery vice president Kevin Shaw allegedly told them they could clear $125,000 a year in the right location. Not only did this allegedly violate a federal law that forbids franchisors from predicting future earnings, but it wasn’t quite true — the magazine said 40 franchises had already failed at the time. Another 60 have since died.

But a bigger problem was the expense of the equipment that the Coffee Beanery said they were contractually obligated to accept. The franchisor allegedly sent them expensive equipment that didn’t work, was unnecessary or wasn’t appropriate for their business. It also allegedly demanded that they abide by contractual obligations they didn’t remember signing up for, such as a gift card program. All of this cost tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars — and refusing would have opened them up to a lawsuit.

Appeals Court Upholds Finding Against Breach of Contract Because No Contract Existed

April 5, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

A recent Illinois appeals court ruling caught the eyes of our Naperville business litigation attorneys. On December 22, the Illinois First District Court of Appeal ruled that a trial court was correct in finding no breach of contract between an individual and an investment firm. CFC Investment v. McLean, No. 1-08-0161 (Ill. 1st Dec. 22, 2008). Defendant Daniel McLean was a real estate developer and investor doing business through a group of companies the appeals court collectively called River East. Plaintiff CFC Investments was an investor in River East.

CFC offered to sell its interest in 2001, and part owner Craig Duchossois, through phone calls and written negotiations with McLean, agreed on a price of $16.7 million. McLean wrote in a signed letter that he was “willing to arrange for the purchase of your interest in River East” and that after CFC’s written agreement, he would “commence to secure the capital.” Duchossois signed to signal his acceptance and sent it back in September of 2001. McLean then wrote a letter specifying that River East needed 90 days to complete the buyout. However, no action was taken until March of 2002, when Duchossois wrote to demand that McLean finish the deal. He received no response. In early April of 2003, River East investors sold their interests to Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company. CFC’s share of the proceeds was $2.5 million.

In 2004, CFC sued McLean for breach of contract. The trial turned partially on the issue of whether McLean had offered to buy the shares himself, as Duchossois believed, or merely find investors to do it, as McLean contended. The trial court barred evidence favorable to CFC several times, rejected a proposed jury instruction from the company and answered a question from the jury over CFC’s objections. CFC appealed of all these decisions.

Auto Dealership Entitled to New Trial Over Compensation Under Quantum Meruit, Seventh Circuit Decides

April 1, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

In a breach of implied contract lawsuit, a Wisconsin auto dealership must have a new trial because the original trial judge misconstrued Wisconsin law on quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled. Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., Nos. 08-1067 & 08-1689 (7th Cir. February 25, 2009).

Middleton Motors, a Ford dealership near Madison, Wis., was a struggling business when it asked the more successful Lindquist Ford of Iowa for financial and management help. In their initial negotiations in 2003, they agreed that Lindquist’s manager, Craig Miller, would manage both dealerships and be compensated by Middleton with a percentage of the profits once he made the dealership profitable again. No deal was struck at that time, but nonetheless, Miller started managing Middleton.

In subsequent months, negotiations ran aground when Lindquist repeatedly did not offer a cash infusion, proposed as an investment in the business, that Middleton wanted. During this time, Middleton repeated several times that Miller’s compensation would be a percentage of Middleton’s profits when the dealership was profitable again. About a year into this situation, Middleton fired Miller, frustrated that the dealership was still unprofitable and no deal had been reached on a cash infusion. Two months after the firing, Miller sent Middleton a letter demanding a salary for 2003, and half of profits for the next two years. Middleton disagreed that it owed Miller anything.

Appeals Court Rules Contract Not Valid After ‘Material Modifications’

January 15, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

Changes to a contract invalidated a business owner’s agreement to sell his auto dealership, the Illinois Third District Court of Appeal has ruled. In Finnin et al v. Bob Lindsay Honda-Toyota, 3-05-0428 (June 29, 2006), the court ruled that a trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant, because the plaintiffs made material changes to the contract that was allegedly breached.

The dispute dates to March of 2002, when the three plaintiffs, including Michael Finnin, approached defendant Robert Lindsay about selling his Toyota-Honda dealership in Knox County. The parties, and their lawyers, worked out the details of the sale over several months and eventually signed an agreement incorporating those details. In August, an assistant to Lindsay’s attorney sent a copy of the agreement, with all of the agreed-on conditions that were then current, and with Lindsay’s signature. On receipt, the plaintiffs’ attorney noticed two mistakes, including a substantially lower purchase price than the parties had agreed on. The attorneys discussed the problem at the time, and Lindsay’s attorney suggested that the draft be returned so that he could send out a corrected version. The plaintiffs’ attorney took no action.

Eight or nine days later, Lindsay himself phoned Finnin to tell him that he was selling the dealership to another buyer. Finnin and his fellow plaintiffs decided they still wanted to buy the dealership, and their attorney made the necessary changes to the draft that day. Lindsay still sold the dealership to the third party, and the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract. The trial court granted Lindsay summary judgment, saying that even though the changes plaintiffs made to the contract were consistent with the parties’ intent, they consisted of a counteroffer to his offer, and thus there was no contract to breach.

Appeals Court Rules Small Business Cannot Sue Bank Over Embezzlement

January 8, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

A small business may not sue a bank for allowing a minority shareholder to embezzle, the Illinois Second District Court of Appeal has ruled. In Time Savers, Inc. v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 02-06-0198 (Feb. 28, 2007), the company had sued its bank for breach of contract, common-law fraud, conspiracy to defraud, aiding and abetting and violating the Illinois Fiduciary Obligations Act.

The case stems from bad loans taken out by the minority shareholder in construction and maintenance equipment supplier Time Savers (TSI), Stephen Harrison. He owned 20% of the company and shareholder Lawrence Kozlicki owned the remaining 80%. Harrison also owned another business, RDSJH Equipment Venture, that does the same kind of equipment supply business. Kozlicki has no ownership interest in RDSJH, but the two companies did business together. Between 1997 and 2001, Harrison, through TSI, refinanced existing loans and took out new ones with LaSalle Bank seven times. With these loans, Harrison financed new equipment purchases for RDSJH; the equipment was then rented to TSI, allowing RDSJH to enrich itself at TSI’s expense.

Kozlicki and TSI contended that LaSalle suspected or knew that the loans were for Harrison’s personal benefit, but failed to alert Kozlicki or investigate further. TSI pointed to various documents and communications, as well as the fact that some funds were deposited into an RDSJH account. The complaint at issue in this appeal is the third amended complaint by TSI; the company voluntarily dismissed the original complaint and the DuPage County trial court dismissed the first, second and third amended complaints at LaSalle’s request. (The bank also moved for sanctions after the third amended complaint was dismissed.) The final dismissal is the subject of this appeal.

Dealer Implied Warranty Applies to Manufacturer When They Have an Agency Relationship, U.S. District Court Rules

January 1, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin, Patrick Austermuehle and James V. DiTommaso

As Illinois and Chicago area consumer rights attorneys with a substantial auto dealer fraud and lemon law practice, we were pleased that a federal district court ruled in October that a manufacturer can be sued for a dealer’s alleged implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Semitekol v. Monaco Coach Corporation, No. 06 C 6424 (Oct. 21, 2008), is an RV warranty case pending in the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs, a married couple, purchased a Monaco motor home from an RV dealer. The motor home turned out to have the following alleged problems: electrical problems, a malfunctioning air-conditioner and heating problems. Numerous attempts to fix it were allegedly unsuccessful, and the motor home allegedly spent 180 of the 341 days the couple owned it in repair shops before the couple allegedly revoked acceptance of the motor home.

The couple sued Monaco, among others, alleging that it breached its own written warranty, the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the implied warranty of merchantability created by Illinois law. Monaco moved to dismiss the implied warranty allegation, arguing that Illinois law requires direct contact between a buyer and seller to create an implied warranty. In this case, the manufacturer pointed out, the dealer was the actual seller of the Monaco motor home. The plaintiffs responded by arguing that direct contact in this case was established by BMS’s advertising and actual status as an “authorized Beaver Monaco dealership”; the fact that Monaco allegedly referred customers to the dealer to deal with problems and customer service concerns; consumers’ ability to find and contact the dealer through Monaco’s Web site; BMS’s authorization to distribute Monaco publications; and the fact that plaintiffs had the option of picking up their new motor home at either company.

In its analysis, the district court agreed for purposes of a motion to dismiss that the dealer was acting as Monaco’s agent. It dismissed arguments that past caselaw does not support such a finding, pointing out that unlike the current plaintiffs, none of the plaintiffs in the cases the defense cited showed any evidence for an agency relationship. The court did not agree that there actually was an agency relationship, or even that an agency relationship is enough to establish the direct contact necessary to prove an implied warranty under Illinois law. Rather, it pointed out that these are questions of fact that are improper to resolve with a motion to dismiss. Thus, the motion was denied. Dismissal motions by the dealer and two parts manufacturers also failed.